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THE NEW FEDERAL CIRCUIT MANDAMUS
PAUL R. GUGLIUZZA*
This Article explores an ongoing revolution in the mandamus jurisprudence
of the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit, the court of appeals with
nearly exclusive jurisdiction over patent cases.  Before December 2008, the
Federal Circuit had never used the interlocutory writ of mandamus to order a
district court to transfer a case to a more convenient forum, denying each one of
the twenty-two petitions it had decided on that issue.  Since that time, however,
the court has overturned eleven different venue decisions on mandamus. 
Remarkably, ten of those eleven cases have come from the same district court,
the U.S. District Court for the Eastern District of Texas.  This use of mandamus
to repeatedly overturn discretionary, non-appealable rulings of one district court
is unprecedented in any federal court of appeals.  What makes the Federal
Circuit’s cases particularly notable is that the court, not long ago, would grant
mandamus only on issues governed by Federal Circuit patent law.  Because
transfer of venue is a non-patent issue controlled by regional circuit law, the
recent cases plainly would not warrant mandamus under the court’s prior,
narrower standard.  The court’s focus on the Eastern District of Texas is also
interesting because of the popular view that the Eastern District is biased in favor
of patent holders and denies transfer motions with impunity.  
This is the first article to analyze the Federal Circuit’s retreat from its
original, restrained view of mandamus.  It begins by considering why the Federal
Circuit initially believed it could grant mandamus on patent issues only, a
question previously ignored by the literature.  The Article then explores why, in
its recent cases, the court has abandoned the view that Federal Circuit mandamus
should be limited to issues of patent law.  Surprisingly, the Federal Circuit has
never explained its reasoning.  The Article fills this analytical void and develops
a doctrinal, theoretical, and pragmatic rationale for Federal Circuit mandamus on
non-patent issues.  The Article also offers possible explanations for the Federal
Circuit’s fixation on the Eastern District of Texas and proposes a new analytical
framework for Federal Circuit mandamus—a framework that might emerge if the
court were to critically examine its mandamus power.
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INTRODUCTION
The Federal Circuit’s aggressive use of the extraordinary writ of mandamus
is making headlines.   Under the final judgment rule, litigants in federal court1
must typically wait to appeal until the district court case is completely resolved.  2
By filing a mandamus petition with an appellate court, however, a litigant may
seek immediate review of a district court ruling, even if the district court case
remains ongoing.   Because mandamus provides an escape hatch from the final3
judgment rule and can significantly disrupt proceedings in the district court, the
Supreme Court has warned that mandamus “is a ‘drastic and extraordinary’
remedy ‘reserved for really extraordinary causes.’”4
Consistent with this stringent legal standard, the Federal Circuit, the court of
appeals with nearly exclusive jurisdiction over patent cases, grants only about ten
1. See, e.g., Elizabeth Durham, Will All Roads Still Lead to the Eastern District of Texas? 
Transfer Practice After Volkswagen and TS Tech, 21 INTELL. PROP. & TECH. L.J., July 2009, at 12;
Patrick E. Higginbotham, Keynote Address, EDTX and Transfer of Venue:  Move Over, Federal
Circuit—Here Is the Fifth Circuit’s Law on Transfer of Venue, 14 SMU SCI. & TECH. L. REV. 191
(2011); Josh Jacobson, Venue Transfers and Writs of Mandamus:  An Emerging Trend, 30 A.B.A.
APPELLATE  PRAC. J., Spring 2011, at 11; Mark Liang, The Aftermath of TS Tech:  The End of
Forum Shopping in Patent Litigation and Implications for Non-Practicing Entities, 19 TEX. INTELL.
PROP. L.J. 29, 30-32 (2010); Donald W. Rupert & Daniel H. Shulman, Clarifying, Confusing, or
Changing the Legal Landscape:  A Sampling of Recent Cases from the Federal Circuit, 19 FED.
CIR. B.J. 521, 523-41 (2010); Recent Case, Federal Circuit Heightens Standard for Plaintiff
Presence That Will Weigh Against Transfer:  In re Zimmer Holdings, Inc., 609 F.3d 1378 (Fed.
Cir. 2010), 124 HARV. L. REV. 632, 632 (2010); Jeremiah L. Hart, Note, Supervising Discretion: 
An Interest-Based Proposal for Expanded Writ Review of § 1404(a) Transfer of Venue Orders, 72
OHIO ST. L.J. 139, 174-78 (2011); Elizabeth P. Offen-Brown, Note, Forum Shopping and Venue
Transfer in Patent Cases:  Marshall’s Response to TS Tech and Genentech, 25 BERKELEY TECH.
L.J. 61, 62-63 (2010); Megan Woodhouse, Note, Shop ’til You Drop:  Implementing Federal Rules
of Patent Litigation Procedure to Wear Out Forum Shopping Patent Plaintiffs, 99 GEO. L.J. 227,
240-44 (2010); Li Zhu, Note, Taking Off:  Recent Changes to Venue Transfer of Patent Litigation
in the Rocket Docket, 11 MINN. J. L. SCI. & TECH. 901, 906-09 (2010).
2. See 28 U.S.C. §§ 1291, 1295(a)(1) (2006) (granting the courts of appeals jurisdiction to
review “final decisions” of the district courts).  
3. Mandamus is, of course, not the only way to appeal a non-final decision in federal court. 
Other methods of interlocutory appeal include:  (1) pursuing an appeal under 28 U.S.C. § 1292,
which explicitly permits interlocutory appeals from a defined class of district court orders; (2)
pursuing an appeal under 28 U.S.C. § 1291 through the collateral order doctrine; (3) appealing an
order on class certification under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 23(f); and (4) appealing under
any rule promulgated by the U.S. Supreme Court that provides an exception to the final judgment
rule, as permitted under 28 U.S.C. § 1292(e).  See MICHAEL E. TIGAR & JANE B. TIGAR, FEDERAL
APPEALS JURISDICTION AND PRACTICE 65-66 (3d ed. 1999).
4. Cheney v. U.S. Dist. Court, 542 U.S. 367, 380 (2004) (quoting Ex parte Fahey, 332 U.S.
258, 259-60 (1947)).
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percent of the mandamus petitions it decides.   One issue that parties frequently5
seek to have reviewed on mandamus is whether the district court properly granted
or denied a motion to transfer a district court case to a more convenient venue
under 28 U.S.C. § 1404(a).   Before December 2008, however, the Federal6
Circuit had never granted a mandamus petition to overturn a transfer decision,
denying each one of the twenty-two petitions it had decided on that issue.   It is7
therefore surprising that the Federal Circuit has, on ten occasions since
December 2008, granted mandamus to order the U.S. District Court for the
Eastern District of Texas to transfer a patent case.   During this same time period,8
the Federal Circuit denied with prejudice ten other petitions from the Eastern
District that challenged venue decisions.   This represents a comparatively9
astronomical grant rate of fifty percent.  In reviewing the decisions of other
district courts, by contrast, the Federal Circuit has largely continued its
traditional reluctance to order transfer, denying all but one petition challenging
a venue decision.10
5. See infra note 16 and accompanying text.
6. See 16 CHARLES ALAN WRIGHT ET AL., FEDERAL PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE § 3935.4 (2d
ed. 2011); see also 28 U.S.C. § 1404(a) (2006) (“For the convenience of parties and witnesses, in
the interest of justice, a district court may transfer any civil action to any other district or division
where it might have been brought.”). 
7. See infra note 16 and accompanying text.
8. See In re Biosearch Techs., Inc., Misc. No. 995, 2011 WL 6445102 (Fed. Cir. Dec. 22,
2011); In re Morgan Stanley, 417 F. App’x 947 (Fed. Cir. 2011) (per curiam); In re Verizon Bus.
Network Servs. Inc., 635 F.3d 559 (Fed. Cir. 2011); In re Microsoft Corp., 630 F.3d 1361 (Fed.
Cir. 2011) (per curiam); In re Acer Am. Corp., 626 F.3d 1252 (Fed. Cir. 2010); In re Zimmer
Holdings, Inc., 609 F.3d 1378 (Fed. Cir. 2010); In re Nintendo Co., 589 F.3d 1194 (Fed. Cir.
2009); In re Hoffmann-La Roche Inc., 587 F.3d 1333 (Fed. Cir. 2009); In re Genentech, Inc., 566
F.3d 1338 (Fed. Cir. 2009); In re TS Tech USA Corp., 551 F.3d 1315 (Fed. Cir. 2008); see also
In re Oracle Corp., 399 F. App’x 587, 590 (Fed. Cir. 2010) (granting mandamus, ordering the
Eastern District of Texas to conduct a new § 1404(a) analysis under the proper legal standard).  
9. See In re Apple Inc., Misc. No. 103, 2012 WL 112893 (Fed. Cir. Jan. 12, 2012); In re
Simpson Strong-Tie Co., 417 F. App’x 941 (Fed. Cir. 2011) (per curiam); In re Google Inc., 412
F. App’x 295 (Fed. Cir. 2011); In re Wyeth, 406 F. App’x 475 (Fed. Cir. 2010); In re Vistaprint
Ltd., 628 F.3d 1342 (Fed. Cir. 2010); In re Echostar Corp., 388 F. App’x 994 (Fed. Cir. 2010); In
re Apple Inc., 374 F. App’x 997 (Fed. Cir. 2010) (per curiam); In re VTech Commc’ns, Inc., Misc.
No. 909, 2010 WL 46332 (Fed. Cir. Jan. 6, 2010); In re Volkswagen of Am., Inc., 566 F.3d 1349
(Fed. Cir. 2009); In re Telular Corp., 319 F. App’x 909 (Fed. Cir. 2009).
10. The court granted mandamus in In re Link_A_Media Devices Corp., 662 F.3d 1221 (Fed.
Cir. 2011) (per curiam), ordering the case transferred from the District of Delaware to the Northern
District of California.  Since deciding TS Tech in December 2008, the court has denied eight
mandamus petitions on venue matters in cases arising from courts besides the Eastern District.  See
In re Bd. of Regents of the Univ. of Tex. Sys., 435 F. App’x 945 (Fed. Cir. 2011); In re Xoft, Inc.,
435 F. App’x 948 (Fed. Cir. 2011); In re Vertical Computer Sys., Inc., 435 F. App’x 950 (Fed. Cir.
2011); In re Leggett & Platt, Inc., 425 F. App’x 903 (Fed. Cir. 2011); In re Aliphcom, 449 F.
App’x 33 (Fed. Cir. 2011); In re Voter Verified, Inc., Misc. No. 936, 2010 WL 1816686 (Fed. Cir.
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The use of mandamus to supervise the decisions of one district court, the
Eastern District of Texas, on one particular issue, transfer of venue, is
unprecedented in any federal court of appeals.  Indeed, it conforms to no theory
of appellate mandamus currently recognized by the literature or by the courts. 
Commentators have previously identified a “supervisory” theory, under which
mandamus serves a didactic purpose by correcting one instance of a significant,
erroneous district court practice.   But the Federal Circuit’s repeated correction11
of the Eastern District’s discretionary transfer decisions does not fit the
supervisory theory, as previously understood.  Accordingly, I coin the phrase
“supervisory plus” mandamus to describe the aggressive form of writ review
recently employed by the Federal Circuit.  
Not only is the Federal Circuit’s use of supervisory plus mandamus
historically unprecedented, it is at odds with the court’s own case law.  In its
early days, the Federal Circuit at times disclaimed supervisory authority over
district courts and refused to grant mandamus on any issue that did not implicate
the court’s patent law, including transfer of venue.   The court’s focus on the12
Eastern District is particularly interesting because of the popular view that the
Eastern District is biased in favor of plaintiff-patent holders and denies
defendants’ transfer motions with impunity.   Even Justice Scalia has criticized13
the Eastern District, calling it a “renegade jurisdiction[]” for habitually ruling in
favor of patent-infringement plaintiffs.14
Remarkably, commentators have not explored the Federal Circuit’s retreat
from its original, restrained view of mandamus.  In fact, this Article is the first
comprehensive study of mandamus in the Federal Circuit.   To better understand15
the evolution of Federal Circuit mandamus, I reviewed every available
mandamus decision that the Federal Circuit has issued since Congress created the
court in 1982, amounting to over 400 cases.   This survey confirmed that16
May. 3, 2010); In re Affymetrix, Inc., Misc. No. 913, 2010 WL 1525010 (Fed. Cir. Apr. 13, 2010)
(per curiam); In re Pfizer Inc., 364 F. App’x 620 (Fed. Cir. 2010).
11. See Note, Supervisory and Advisory Mandamus Under the All Writs Act, 86 HARV. L.
REV. 595, 610 (1973) [hereinafter Supervisory and Advisory Mandamus].
12. See In re Innotron Diagnostics, 800 F.2d 1077, 1082-85 (Fed. Cir. 1986).  
13. See infra Part III.A.
14. Transcript of Oral Argument at 11, eBay, Inc. v. MercExchange, L.L.C., 547 U.S. 388
(2006) (No. 05-130).
15. Cf. Charles L. Gholz, CAFC Review of Interlocutory Decisions, 67 J. PAT. & TRADEMARK
OFF. SOC’Y 417, 422-37 (1985) (reviewing and critiquing mandamus decisions from the first three
years of the court’s existence).
16. To complete this survey, I reviewed every case (both precedential and not) in the Westlaw
Federal Circuit database (CTAF) containing the word “mandamus.”  A complete list of the
decisions reviewed is on file with the author and supports the statistical assertions made in this
Article.  Although the exact precision of the Article’s calculations might be affected by decisions
not contained in Westlaw’s database, any gaps in coverage appear to be relatively minimal,
especially for cases decided in 2000 and after.  The research in this Article is current through
February 2012.
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mandamus has been and remains a difficult remedy to obtain in the Federal
Circuit.  From 2000 through 2010, the Federal Circuit granted only 23 of the 215
mandamus petitions it decided.   Considering the high legal standard for17
mandamus relief, which is reflected in this data, the Federal Circuit’s supervision
of the Eastern District’s venue decisions is an aberration.  
Before examining the Federal Circuit’s recent interest in the transfer
decisions of the “renegade” Eastern District, however, I begin by uncovering the
origins of the Federal Circuit’s initial view that it could consider only patent
issues on mandamus, a task that no scholar has yet undertaken.  I attribute that
view in part to the limited appellate subject-matter jurisdiction of the Federal
Circuit’s predecessor, the Court of Customs and Patent Appeals, and in part to
the Federal Circuit’s idiosyncratic view that it does not derive its mandamus
authority from the same source as the regional circuit courts of appeals.  
I then explain why the Federal Circuit was wrong to limit mandamus to
patent issues only.  In recent years, the court has, in fact, issued mandamus on
non-patent issues, such as transfer of venue and the attorney-client privilege.  18
But it has offered only strained readings and unpersuasive distinctions of its older
case law, causing the leading treatise on federal jurisdiction and procedure to
bemoan the “unsettled” relationship between Federal Circuit and regional circuit
writ authority.   I fill the analytical void that the Federal Circuit has left by19
explaining why, as a normative matter, it is beneficial for the Federal Circuit to
issue mandamus on non-patent questions.  I suggest that Federal Circuit
mandamus on these issues simplifies the Federal Circuit’s jurisdictional inquiry,
helps reduce forum shopping, provides valuable doctrinal guidance to district
courts and other interested parties, and helps the Federal Circuit avoid undue
specialization.
Because the Federal Circuit has not engaged fundamental questions about the
proper scope of mandamus, the court has unthinkingly drifted toward a standard
under which it will grant mandamus on any legal question, whether controlled by
regional circuit law or Federal Circuit patent law, if the petition satisfies the
substantive criteria established by the Supreme Court for granting the writ.   In20
other words, the Federal Circuit’s mandamus analysis now resembles that of the
regional circuits:  The Federal Circuit immediately considers the merits of the
17. See supra note 16 and accompanying text.  
18. See, e.g., In re TS Tech USA Corp., 551 F.3d 1315 (Fed. Cir. 2008) (granting mandamus
on issue of transfer); In re Regents of the Univ. of Cal., 101 F.3d 1386 (Fed. Cir. 1996) (granting
mandamus on issue of attorney-client privilege).
19. 15A WRIGHT ET AL., supra note 6, § 3903.1.
20. See Cheney v. U.S. Dist. Court, 542 U.S. 367, 380-81 (2004) (noting that “three
conditions must be satisfied before [the writ] may issue”:  (1) “the party seeking issuance of the writ
[must] have no other adequate means to attain the relief he desires”; (2) “the petitioner must satisfy
the burden of showing that [his] right to issuance of the writ is clear and indisputable”; and (3) “the
issuing court, in the exercise of its discretion, must be satisfied that the writ is appropriate under
the circumstances” (second and third alterations in original) (citations omitted) (internal quotation
marks omitted)).
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petition without first considering any possible subject-matter limitation.  
But, as the Federal Circuit’s older mandamus case law recognized, the court
is different from the regional circuits in two important respects.  First, the
Federal Circuit has a unique choice-of-law regime.  It applies its own law to
questions of substantive patent law, to procedural issues unique to patent law,
and to questions of its own jurisdiction.   It applies the law of the relevant21
regional circuit to all other questions.   Second, the Federal Circuit has a unique22
jurisdictional structure, which is nationwide in geographic scope, but, as relevant
to this Article, limited in subject matter to cases arising under the patent laws.  23
By skirting its older mandamus case law, rather than confronting it, the Federal
Circuit has missed the opportunity to analyze whether these unique
characteristics should inform the standard for mandamus relief.  
The court’s refusal to engage questions about its mandamus power is
emblematic of a broader criticism of the Federal Circuit:  The court refuses to
acknowledge the policy questions that undergird its decisions, resulting in a
jurisprudence that is insufficiently sensitive to economic and social concerns.  24
The court’s hesitance to explicitly account for fundamental questions of policy
leads to doctrinal problems that are well illustrated by the recent venue cases
from the Eastern District of Texas:  The lack of a clear normative objective may
have led the Federal Circuit to vary the applicable legal rules from case to case
and to reach different results in factually similar cases.25
If the Federal Circuit were to critically examine the role of mandamus in the
federal scheme for resolving patent disputes, a clearer, more refined framework
for granting the writ might emerge.  This framework would account for the
uniqueness of the Federal Circuit and the court’s superior understanding of the
realities of patent litigation.  Under the reconceptualized framework for Federal
Circuit mandamus that I propose, the court would freely grant mandamus to
answer novel and important legal questions that are intertwined with the patent
law and that regularly evade appellate review.  As for non-patent questions, the
Federal Circuit would capitalize on its unique position as the forum for nearly all
patent appeals filed nationwide.  It would issue mandamus when this unique
perspective can provide a useful teaching moment for district courts.  
Had the Federal Circuit applied this approach in its recent venue cases, it
might have noticed that the Eastern District is, perhaps, not as much of a
“renegade jurisdiction” as Justice Scalia and conventional wisdom perceive it to
be.  Recent studies have undermined the view that it is impossible for defendants
21. See Joan E. Schaffner, Federal Circuit “Choice of Law”:  Erie Through the Looking
Glass, 81 IOWA L. REV. 1173, 1192, 1201 (1996).
22. See Panduit Corp. v. All States Plastic Mfg. Co., 744 F.2d 1564, 1573-75 (Fed. Cir.
1984) (per curiam).
23. See 28 U.S.C. §§ 1295(a)(1), 1338(a) (2006).
24. See, e.g., Dan L. Burk & Mark A. Lemley, Policy Levers in Patent Law, 89 VA. L. REV.
1575, 1671-75 (2003).
25. See infra Part III.B.
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to obtain transfer out of the Eastern District.   Given the Federal Circuit’s nearly26
exclusive jurisdiction over patent cases, this is something that the Federal Circuit
should have known and that could have tempered its decision to take the
unprecedented step of granting mandamus ten times in a little over three years. 
In three more recent venue cases, however, the Federal Circuit has correctly
employed its extensive experience with the Eastern District’s patent docket,
identifying attempts by plaintiffs to manipulate the transfer analysis and
recognizing that judicial familiarity with pertinent technology can outweigh
considerations of convenience.   There is thus some reason to believe that a27
more thoughtful model of mandamus is emerging in the Federal Circuit.  
That said, in December 2011, the court for the first time used mandamus to
order a court besides the Eastern District of Texas to transfer a patent case.  28
And, in many recent cases, the Federal Circuit has granted or denied mandamus
by analogizing or distinguishing its own case law, even though the petitions raise
only non-patent issues supposedly governed by regional circuit law.   The29
potential for continued expansion in the Federal Circuit’s use of the writ and the
large body of precedent the court has created in such a short time underscore the
need for a critical assessment of the proper role of mandamus in patent cases.
A brief word on the scope of this Article.  The Federal Circuit reviews many
decisions besides patent cases from the federal district courts.   For example, the30
court hears appeals from the Patent and Trademark Office, the Court of Federal
Claims, and the International Trade Commission, among others.   The Federal31
Circuit sometimes fields mandamus petitions directed toward these other
tribunals.  And the Federal Circuit has, with very few exceptions, exclusive
appellate jurisdiction over those tribunals.   By contrast, the authority to review32
district court judgments is split between the Federal Circuit (in cases arising
under the patent laws) and the regional circuits (in all other cases).   It is this33
split of authority that creates the complex jurisdictional, legal, and policy issues
that have caused confusion in the Federal Circuit about the proper standard for
mandamus relief.   Accordingly, this Article focuses primarily on the Federal34
26. See infra Part III.A.
27. See In re Microsoft Corp., 630 F.3d 1361 (Fed. Cir. 2011) (per curiam); In re Vistaprint
Ltd., 628 F.3d 1342 (Fed. Cir. 2010); In re Zimmer Holdings, Inc., 609 F.3d 1378 (Fed. Cir. 2010).
28. See In re Link_A_Media Devices Corp., 662 F.3d 1221 (Fed. Cir. 2011) (ordering
transfer from the District of Delaware to the Northern District of California).
29. See, e.g., In re Apple Inc., Misc. No. 103, 2012 WL 112893 (Fed. Cir. Jan. 12, 2012);
In re Biosearch Techs., Inc., Misc. No. 995, 2011 WL 6445102 (Fed. Cir. Dec. 22, 2011).
30. See generally Paul R. Gugliuzza, Rethinking Federal Circuit Jurisdiction, 100 GEO. L.J.
(forthcoming 2012) (manuscript at 27-28) (summarizing the Federal Circuit’s non-patent
jurisdiction), available at http://ssrn.com/abstract=1945039.
31. See 28 U.S.C. § 1295(a) (2006 & Supp. 2010).
32. See id.
33. See id. §§ 1291, 1295(a)(1), 1338.
34. See In re Innotron Diagnostics, 800 F.2d 1077, 1083 n.10 (Fed. Cir. 1986) (noting that
“[t]he problem of ‘serving two masters’ does not arise in” cases appealable only to the Federal
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Circuit’s mandamus jurisprudence in district court patent cases.
The Article proceeds in four parts.  Part I provides an overview of
mandamus, examining the writ’s history from its royal genesis to its present day
use as a mechanism of interlocutory appellate review.  Part II uncovers the
origins of the Federal Circuit’s initial view that it could issue mandamus on
patent issues only and shows how the Federal Circuit has abandoned that initial
view without providing any reasons for doing so.  Part III analyzes the Federal
Circuit’s recent, pathbreaking venue decisions, develops the theory of
supervisory plus mandamus, and shows how the recent decisions underscore the
need for a reconceptualization of Federal Circuit mandamus.  Part IV outlines a
rationale for Federal Circuit mandamus on non-patent issues, explores the
benefits that would result if the court were to explicitly consider the justifications
I outline, and considers some possible limitations on mandamus that are specific
to the Federal Circuit.  I conclude by urging the court to develop a mandamus
framework that acknowledges the Federal Circuit’s unique role in the federal
system.
I.  A PRIMER ON APPELLATE MANDAMUS
Mandamus, which literally means “we command,”  was one of the35
prerogative or extraordinary writs of the common law.   In short, mandamus36
requires the person or persons against whom it issues to take (or to refrain from
taking) some specified action.   Mandamus can be issued by a court against a37
public official, or by a higher court against a lower court.   38
Mandamus issued by a higher court against a lower court, referred to as
appellate mandamus, is an extraordinary event, especially in the federal court
system.  By statute, the federal courts of appeals have jurisdiction to review only
“final decisions” of the district courts.   Through mandamus, however, a litigant39
may obtain review of district court orders that do not finally resolve the case,
often referred to as interlocutory orders.  Mandamus thus provides an important
escapeway from the final judgment rule.  A mandamus petition is, however,
potentially disruptive to judicial efficiency because the district court case
continues while the appellate court decides the mandamus petition.
Because of this potential for disruption, appellate mandamus had a very
limited role in the English common law system and, until the 1950s, in the
Circuit).  
35. BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY 1046 (9th ed. 2009).
36. Other prerogative writs included prohibition, certiorari, quo warranto, and habeas corpus. 
See 1 DAN B. DOBBS, LAW OF REMEDIES § 2.9(1) (2d ed. 1993); Edward Jenks, The Prerogative
Writs in English Law, 32 YALE L.J. 523, 527 (1923).
37. The extraordinary writ that restrains a person from taking some action is technically the
writ of prohibition.  But modern parlance has combined prohibition and mandamus under the label
“mandamus.”  See TIGAR & TIGAR, supra note 3, at 185.
38. See DOBBS, supra note 36, § 2.9(1).
39. 28 U.S.C. § 1291 (2006).
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American federal system.  Appellate mandamus traditionally would issue only
to fix errors of a “jurisdictional” nature.   Since the late 1950s, however,40
mandamus has served a much broader function in the federal appellate courts,
issuing to correct significant or repeated district court errors on important
questions of law, whether jurisdictional or not.   To appreciate the Federal41
Circuit’s struggle with this broader function of appellate mandamus, it is
important to first understand the writ’s origins, its current use in appellate
practice, and two prominent theories of modern appellate mandamus,
“supervisory” and “advisory” mandamus.
A.  Origins of Appellate Mandamus
1.  Mandamus at Common Law.—The origins of the writ of mandamus are
“very obscure,” as one American court noted over a century ago.   Mandamus42
appears to have originated in the personal command (or prerogative) of the
English King.   In the sixteenth century, however, mandamus emerged as a43
judicial remedy available to subjects and the Crown alike.   It issued on direct44
petition from the Court of King’s Bench and typically ordered a public authority
to carry out a legal duty.   This judicial writ “gradually supplanted the old[er]45
personal command of the sovereign.”   46
In the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries, “the writ of mandamus was used
primarily to compel public authorities to return petitioners . . . to public offices
from which they had been unlawfully removed.”   Sir Edward Coke’s 161547
opinion for the King’s Bench in Bagg’s Case,  which is often cited as the “well-48
head of [m]andamus,”  is emblematic of the early use of the writ for restorative49
purposes.  James Bagg, one of the chief burgesses of the borough of Plymouth,
had been removed from office for speaking ill of the mayor, Bagg’s fellow
burgesses, and other officials.   Issuing the writ, Coke emphasized that the50
borough had acted beyond its authority by removing Bagg without providing him
40. 16 WRIGHT ET AL., supra note 6, § 3932.
41. See infra Part I.B.
42. In re Lauritsen, 109 N.W. 404, 408 (Minn. 1906).
43. See 1 CHESTER JAMES ANTIEAU, THE PRACTICE OF EXTRAORDINARY REMEDIES § 2.00
(1987); Leonard S. Goodman, Mandamus in the Colonies—The Rise of the Superintending Power
of American Courts, 1 AM. J. LEGAL HIST. 308, 309 (1957); S.A. de Smith, The Prerogative Writs,
11 CAMBRIDGE L.J. 40, 40-41 (1951).   
44. 1 ANTIEAU, supra note 43, § 2.00.  S.A. de Smith notes that the first reported case
involving a judicial writ of mandamus that served a similar purpose to the modern writ was
Middleton’s Case, (1573) 73 Eng. Rep. 752 (K.B.).  See de Smith, supra note 43, at 50.
45. WILLIAM WADE & CHRISTOPHER FORSYTH, ADMINISTRATIVE LAW 616 (9th ed. 2004). 
46. Lauritsen, 109 N.W. at 409.
47. 1 ANTIEAU, supra note 43, § 2.00.
48. (1615) 77 Eng. Rep. 1271 (K.B.).
49. Jenks, supra note 36, at 530 (italics omitted); see also 1 ANTIEAU, supra note 43, § 2.00.
50. Bagg’s Case, 77 Eng. Rep. at 1275.  
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notice and an opportunity to object.51
By the early eighteenth century, the writ had developed a broader use than
simply restoring public officials to office.   Mandamus would issue not only52
against executive officials, but also against inferior courts.   Just as mandamus53
in Bagg’s Case restrained the ultra vires act of the borough, mandamus would
restrain courts from exercising powers beyond their jurisdiction.   The writ54
would also compel courts to exercise jurisdiction with which they had been
vested.   Blackstone explained:55
[Mandamus] issues to the judges of any inferior court, commanding
them to do justice according to the powers of their office, whenever the
same is delayed.  For it is the peculiar business of the court of king’s
bench to superintend all inferior tribunals, and therein to enforce the due
exercise of those judicial or ministerial powers, with which the crown or
legislature have invested them:  and this not only by restraining their
excesses, but also by quickening their negligence . . . .56
Mandamus would not, however, lie to correct a decision that was intra vires, but
erroneous.   In other words, mandamus was not a substitute for appellate57
review.58
2.  American Beginnings.—Early American courts and the first U.S.
Congress imported the view that mandamus was an extraordinary remedy
designed to fix only jurisdictional errors.  Sections 13 and 14 of the Judiciary Act
of 1789 codified the federal courts’ mandamus power.   Section 13 addressed,59
among other things, the power of the Supreme Court to issue extraordinary writs. 
It provided that “[t]he Supreme Court . . . shall have power to issue . . . writs of
mandamus . . . in cases warranted by the principles and usages of law, to any
courts appointed, or persons holding office, under the authority of the United
States.”   Section 14 similarly vested in the lower federal courts the power to60
issue mandamus, providing that they “shall have power to issue writs of scire
facias, habeas corpus . . . and all other writs not specially provided for by statute,
51. Id. at 1280-81.
52. See de Smith, supra note 43, at 51.
53. Id.
54. See id. at 56.
55. See id. at 51.
56. 3 WILLIAM BLACKSTONE, COMMENTARIES *110.
57. See The Queen v. Justices of London, [1895] 1 Q.B. 616, 637; The King v. Justices of
Monmouthshire, (1825) 107 Eng. Rep. 1273, 1275 (K.B.); HALSEY H. MOSES, THE LAW OF
MANDAMUS 29-30 (1878) (citing cases).
58. See generally WADE & FORSYTH, supra note 45, at 623 (“Refusal to consider a party’s
case . . . has to be distinguished from refusal to accept his argument. . . . If the inferior court or
tribunal merely makes a wrong decision within its jurisdiction, . . . mandamus cannot be employed
to make it change its conclusion.”).
59. Judiciary Act of 1789, ch. 20, §§ 13, 14, 1 Stat. 73, 80-82.
60. Id. § 13, 1 Stat. at 81 (italics omitted).
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which may be necessary for the exercise of their respective jurisdictions, and
agreeable to the principles and usages of law.”61
In view of the requirement that mandamus issue only when consistent with
“the principles and usages of law,” the Supreme Court in the eighteenth and
nineteenth centuries generally permitted the use of mandamus in the same
manner as English courts at common law.   The Court also approved mandamus62
directed to judges of inferior courts.   But a litigant could not use a mandamus63
petition to challenge the correctness of a non-final decision.  In other words,
mandamus was not a means to evade the rule that only final judgments may be
appealed.   As the Court noted in Kendall, “mandamus does not direct the64
inferior court how to proceed, but only that it must proceed, according to its own
judgment, to a final determination,” which could then be appealed.65
In 1911, Congress recodified the federal courts’ power to issue extraordinary
writs.   But this recodification simply confirmed the prevailing practice.  The66
notes to the revised sections indicated that, under the new statute, mandamus
would remain a means by which a court could “direct a subordinate Federal court
to decide a pending cause,”  but would “not perform the office of an appeal or67
writ of error.”   68
Congress again reorganized and consolidated the judicial code in 1948.   In69
this recodification, the All Writs Act took its present form.  Congress eliminated
the separate provisions governing mandamus in the Supreme Court and the
inferior courts and replaced them with 28 U.S.C. § 1651, which reads (in relevant
61. Id. § 14, 1 Stat. at 81-82 (italics omitted).
62. See, e.g., United States ex rel. Dunlap v. Black, 128 U.S. 40, 48 (1888) (noting that
mandamus would issue when executive officials “refuse to act in a case at all” or refuse to exercise
“a mere ministerial duty”); Kendall v. United States ex rel. Stokes, 37 U.S. (12 Pet.) 524, 614, 621
(1838) (approving mandamus directed toward the U.S. Postmaster General); Marbury v. Madison,
5 U.S. (1 Cranch) 137, 173 (1803) (holding that mandamus was the proper remedy by which
William Marbury could seek to compel delivery of his commission as a justice of the peace).
63. See, e.g., Ex parte Bradstreet, 32 U.S. (7 Pet.) 634, 648-50 (1833) (mandamus would
order an inferior court to reinstate a case that it had dismissed); Ex parte Crane, 30 U.S. (5 Pet.)
190, 194 (1831) (mandamus would compel a judge to sign a bill of exceptions); Ex parte Wood,
22 U.S. (9 Wheat.) 603, 614-15 (1824) (mandamus would compel a district judge to conduct a trial
on the issue of patent validity).
64. See Bank of Columbia v. Sweeny, 26 U.S. (1 Pet.) 567, 569 (1828) (Marshall, C.J.)
(noting that issuing mandamus to review an interlocutory order “would be a plain evasion of the
provision of the Act of Congress, that final judgments only should be brought before this Court for
re-examination”).
65. Kendall, 37 U.S. (12 Pet.) at 622 (emphasis added); accord Gaines v. Relf, 40 U.S. (15
Pet.) 9, 17 (1841); Ex parte Hoyt, 38 U.S. (13 Pet.) 279, 290 (1839); Ex parte Whitney, 38 U.S.
(13 Pet.) 404, 408 (1839).  
66. Judicial Code of 1911, ch. 231, § 234, 36 Stat. 1087, 1156.
67. Id. § 234 note.
68. Id. § 262 note; accord id. § 234 note.
69. Pub. L. No. 80-773, 62 Stat. 869 (1948); see S. REP. NO. 80-1559, at 1 (1948).
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part):  “The Supreme Court and all courts established by Act of Congress may
issue all writs necessary or appropriate in aid of their respective jurisdictions and
agreeable to the usages and principles of law.”   Nothing in the legislative70
history suggests that Congress intended a substantive change to writ practice.  71
The Supreme Court confirmed that the All Writs Act did not affect the courts’
power to issue mandamus.   Yet, less than a decade after Congress passed the72
Act, the federal courts began to use the new statute to justify appellate review of
a wide variety of interlocutory orders previously unreviewable under the final
judgment rule.
3.  A Coda for the Traditional View.—As discussed, the Supreme Court had
long limited appellate mandamus to (1) “confining” inferior courts to their
“prescribed jurisdiction” and (2) “compelling” inferior courts to exercise
jurisdiction “when it is [their] duty to do so.”   The Court was not referring to73
“jurisdiction” in a technical sense, however.  Rather, the Court’s rule referred to
a “more flexible notion of ‘power.’”   If a district court “took some definable74
action [it] was not empowered to take . . . or refused to take some definable
action [that] . . . was clearly required,” the error was considered “jurisdictional,”
and mandamus would correct it.   For example, appellate mandamus would75
compel a district judge to sign a bill of exceptions (so that an appeal could be
taken),  to issue a bench warrant,  and to unseal deposition testimony and76 77
exhibits.   In these cases, the lower court had not refused jurisdiction in the78
modern, technical sense, “i.e., the . . . statutory or constitutional power to
adjudicate the case.”   It had simply refused to take an action that it had an79
70. 28 U.S.C. § 1651(a) (2006).
71. Rather, the legislative history suggests that Congress viewed as “unnecessary” the
separate provisions governing Supreme Court mandamus and the more general writ power of the
federal courts when it could accomplish the same effect through the more general and
comprehensive language of the All Writs Act.  See H.R. REP. NO. 80-308, at A144-45 (1947).
72. See La Buy v. Howes Leather Co., 352 U.S. 249, 255 (1957) (“The recodification of the
All Writs Act in 1948 . . . did not affect the power of the [c]ourts of [a]ppeals to issue writs of
mandamus . . . .”).  But cf. id. at 265-66 (Brennan, J., dissenting) (noting that § 13 of the Judiciary
Act of 1789 granted the Supreme Court power to issue writs of mandamus “in cases warranted by
the principles and usages of law” and contrasting the All Writs Act, which is “restricted in its use
to aiding the jurisdiction of the appellate court” (citing In re Josephson, 218 F.2d 174 (1st Cir.
1954) (Magruder, J.))).
73. Ex parte Peru, 318 U.S. 578, 583 (1943).
74. Supervisory and Advisory Mandamus, supra note 11, at 599.  
75. Id.
76. Ex parte Crane, 30 U.S. (5 Pet.) 190, 194 (1831).
77. Ex parte United States, 287 U.S. 241, 250 (1932).
78. Ex parte Uppercu, 239 U.S. 435, 440-41 (1915).
79. Steel Co. v. Citizens for a Better Env’t, 523 U.S. 83, 89 (1998) (emphasis omitted).  See
generally Howard M. Wasserman, The Demise of “Drive-By Jurisdictional Rulings,” 105 NW. U.
L. REV. COLLOQUY 184, 184 (2011) (discussing the Supreme Court’s recent “uninterrupted retreat
from the . . . ‘profligate’ and ‘less than meticulous’ use” of the word “jurisdiction” (quoting
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unassailable legal duty to take.80
Notwithstanding its loose understanding of “jurisdiction,” the Court,
throughout the first half of the twentieth century, insisted that mandamus could
not be used to review mere errors of judgment.   Yet, at the same time, the81
Court’s decisions began to hint that mandamus might lie for errors less serious
than usurpations of power or ignorance of clear legal duties.  In Ex parte Peru,
for example, the Court, citing the case’s “public importance and exceptional
character,” issued mandamus to compel the release of a Peruvian steamship,
overturning a district court ruling on sovereign immunity.   And in Los Angeles82
Brush Manufacturing Corp. v. James, the Court held that it could issue
mandamus to prevent a district court from referring most of its patent cases to a
special master.   83
B.  Appellate Mandamus in the Modern Era
As the Court began to hint at a broader role for appellate mandamus,
American civil litigation was beginning a dramatic evolution.  The number of
cases litigated to a final judgment after trial was declining.   Instead of going to84
trial, parties were increasingly using pretrial motions and the discovery process
to “posture themselves for a hard-fought but unappealable settlement.”   In other85
words, cases were increasingly being resolved in ways that, under a strict
construction of the final judgment rule, would bypass the appellate courts.  
It is therefore not surprising that exceptions to the final judgment rule
evolved as well.   For example, in the mid-twentieth century, the Supreme Court86
Arbaugh v. Y & H Corp., 546 U.S. 500, 510-11 (2006))).
80. See United States, 287 U.S. at 250 (“The authority conferred upon the trial judge to issue
a warrant of arrest upon an indictment does not, under the circumstances here disclosed, carry with
it the power to decline to do so under the guise of judicial discretion . . . .”); Uppercu, 239 U.S. at
440 (noting the judge’s “duty” to permit the records to be unsealed); see also Crane, 30 U.S. (5
Pet.) at 193 (noting that no precedent existed in which a court issued mandamus to compel a judge
to sign a bill of exceptions “because no judge did ever refuse to seal a bill of exceptions; and none
was ever refused, because none was ever tendered like this, so artificial and groundless” (emphasis
added) (internal quotation marks omitted)).
81. See De Beers Consol. Mines, Ltd. v. United States, 325 U.S. 212, 217 (1945) (“When
Congress withholds interlocutory reviews, [mandamus] can, of course, not be availed of to correct
a mere error in the exercise of conceded judicial power.  But when a court has no judicial power
to do what it purports to do—when its action is not mere error but usurpation of power—the
situation falls precisely within the allowable use of [mandamus].” (emphasis added)).
82. Ex parte Peru, 318 U.S. 578, 586 (1943).
83. L.A. Brush Mfg. Corp. v. James, 272 U.S. 701, 706 (1927).
84. See Marc Galanter, The Hundred-Year Decline of Trials and the Thirty Years War, 57
STAN. L. REV. 1255, 1257-58 (2005). 
85. Adam N. Steinman, Reinventing Appellate Jurisdiction, 48 B.C. L. REV. 1237, 1241
(2007).  
86. See id. at 1240.
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created the collateral order doctrine, which permits immediate appeal of orders
that resolve crucial issues that are independent of the case’s merits.   And, in a87
pair of mid-twentieth century cases, the Court introduced two new models for
interlocutory mandamus relief:  “supervisory” and “advisory” mandamus.  After
discussing those models, I conclude this part with a summary of current
mandamus doctrine and practice.
1.  Supervisory Mandamus.—Supervisory mandamus corrects “established
bad habits” of the lower courts.   This model of appellate mandamus first88
explicitly appeared in La Buy v. Howes Leather Co.   In La Buy, the Seventh89
Circuit had issued mandamus to vacate the order of a district judge referring
certain antitrust cases to a special master for trial.   The district judge, Judge La90
Buy, referred the cases because of their complexity, the projected length of the
trial, and the congestion of the district court’s calendar.   The Supreme Court91
affirmed the grant of mandamus, noting that Judge La Buy’s reference to a
special master “amounted to little less than an abdication of the judicial function
depriving the parties of a trial before the court on the basic issues involved in the
litigation.”   92
Given that district judges have wide discretion in referring cases to special
masters, the assertion that Judge La Buy abdicated his judicial role is
questionable.   Indeed, in the final portion of its opinion, the Court explicitly93
acknowledged the idea of supervisory appellate mandamus—the notion that
mandamus could be used to strike down “one instance of a significant erroneous
practice [that] the appellate court finds is likely to recur.”   The Court noted that94
the district court had repeatedly referred cases to special masters, that the
87. See Cohen v. Beneficial Indus. Loan Corp., 337 U.S. 541, 546 (1949).  While I refer to
the collateral order doctrine as an exception to the final judgment rule, the Supreme Court has at
times insisted that the doctrine “is ‘best understood not as an exception to the ‘final decision’ rule
laid down by Congress in § 1291, but as a ‘practical construction’ of it.’”  Will v. Hallock, 546 U.S.
345, 349 (2006) (quoting Digital Equip. Corp. v. Desktop Direct, Inc., 511 U.S. 863, 867 (1994)). 
But see FirsTier Mortg. Co. v. Investors Mortg. Ins. Co., 498 U.S. 269, 274 n.3 (1991) (“An
exception to [the final judgment rule] . . . is the ‘collateral order doctrine,’ which permits appeals
under § 1291 from a small class of rulings that do not end the litigation on the merits.” (citing
Cohen, 337 U.S. at 545-47) (emphasis added)); Coopers & Lybrand v. Livesay, 437 U.S. 463, 468
(1978) (“To come within the ‘small class’ of decisions excepted from the final-judgment rule . . . ,
the order must conclusively determine the disputed question, resolve an important issue completely
separate from the merits of the action, and be effectively unreviewable on appeal from a final
judgment.” (citing Abney v. United States, 431 U.S. 651, 658 (1977) (emphasis added)).
88. 16 WRIGHT ET AL., supra note 6, § 3934.1.
89. 352 U.S. 249 (1957).
90. Id. at 250-51.
91. Id. at 253.
92. Id. at 256.  
93. See Charles Alan Wright, The Doubtful Omniscience of Appellate Courts, 41 MINN. L.
REV. 751, 773-74 (1957).
94. Supervisory and Advisory Mandamus, supra note 11, at 610.
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Seventh Circuit “for years” had admonished that trial courts should seldom refer
cases to special masters, and that the Seventh Circuit was clearly at the “end of
patience.”   The Supreme Court thus approved the use of mandamus to supervise95
and correct the district court’s bad habit, concluding that “supervisory control of
the District Courts by the Courts of Appeals is necessary to proper judicial
administration in the federal system” and that “[t]he All Writs Act confers . . . the
discretionary power to issue writs of mandamus in the exceptional circumstances
existing here.”96
Supervisory mandamus thus serves a “corrective and didactic function.”  97
As one commentator put it:
If the court finds that the order represents a practice that is likely to be
repeated, it can overturn it whether or not the reason the practice is
disapproved is that the lower court may be said to have been without
“power” to enter a class of orders into which the order falls.98
2.  Advisory Mandamus.—Only five justices joined the opinion in La Buy. 
Seven years later, however, eight justices joined the Court’s opinion in
Schlagenhauf v. Holder,  which represented another expansion in the availability99
of mandamus.  The case introduced the concept of “advisory” mandamus, which
permits interlocutory review of novel and important legal questions.
Schlagenhauf arose from a tort suit by passengers of a bus that collided with
a tractor-trailer.   The district court, on the motion of two defendants, had100
ordered a third defendant, the bus driver, to submit to a mental and physical
examination.   The Seventh Circuit denied mandamus but the Supreme Court101
reversed.   102
The Court noted in passing that the bus driver argued that the district court
“lack[ed] . . . power” to order the examination.   But the Court emphasized that103
the challenged order was “the first of its kind,” and that the case presented a
“basic, undecided question,” an “issue of first impression”:  whether a defendant
could be ordered to undergo examination upon the request of his co-
defendants.   Under these “unusual” circumstances, the Court determined,104
mandamus was proper.105
Whereas supervisory mandamus helps cure repeated errors in the lower
95. La Buy, 352 U.S. at 258.
96. Id. at 259-60.
97. Will v. United States, 389 U.S. 90, 107 (1967).
98. Supervisory and Advisory Mandamus, supra note 11, at 610-11.
99. 379 U.S. 104 (1964).
100. Id. at 106.
101. Id. at 108-09.
102. Id. at 109.
103. Id. at 110-11.
104. Id. 
105. Id. at 110.
2012] THE NEW FEDERAL CIRCUIT MANDAMUS 359
courts, “advisory mandamus is reserved for big game” :  “systemically106
important issue[s] as to which [the appellate] court has not yet spoken.”   Judge107
Bruce Selya, who has written several notable mandamus opinions,  has108
emphasized that mere novelty is not enough to justify advisory mandamus. 
Rather, the issue presented must also be “of great public importance, and likely
to recur.”   In his view, advisory mandamus “should primarily be employed to109
address questions likely of significant repetition prior to effective review, so that
[the court’s] opinion would assist other jurists, parties, or lawyers.”110
3.  Current Mandamus Doctrine and Practice.—Even though La Buy and
Schlagenhauf were not the Supreme Court’s final words on appellate mandamus,
the supervisory and advisory models introduced by those cases form the
theoretical backbone of modern mandamus doctrine.  In the wake of those
seminal cases, the Court appeared to retighten the availability of the writ,
discounting the advisory rationale for issuing mandamus,  and contending that111
mandamus was inappropriate to review any discretionary decision of a district
court.   In more recent cases, however, the Court has confirmed that mandamus112
is a proper remedy to supervise district court practices  and to overturn113
discovery orders that are adverse to claims of privilege.   Importantly, the courts114
of appeals have continued to use mandamus to resolve significant and novel legal
issues,  and, contrary to the Supreme Court’s instruction, to supervise district115
106. United States v. Horn, 29 F.3d 754, 770 (1st Cir. 1994) (Selya, J.); see also In re Bushkin
Assocs., Inc., 864 F.2d 241, 247 (1st Cir. 1989) (Selya, J.) (advisory mandamus “is reserved for
blockbuster issues, not merely interesting ones”).
107. In re Atl. Pipe Corp., 304 F.3d 135, 140 (1st Cir. 2002) (Selya, J.).
108. See In re Sony BMG Music Entm’t, 564 F.3d 1 (1st Cir. 2009); United States v. Green,
407 F.3d 434 (1st Cir. 2005); Atl. Pipe, 304 F.3d 135; In re Providence Journal Co., 293 F.3d 1 (1st
Cir. 2002); Horn, 29 F.3d 754.
109. Horn, 29 F.3d at 769.
110. Id. at 770 (citation omitted) (internal quotation marks omitted).
111. See Will v. United States, 389 U.S. 90, 104 n.14 (1967) (distinguishing Schlagenhauf,
noting that although the case presented “new and substantial” questions the issuance of mandamus
was based “on the fact that there was real doubt whether the District Court had any power at all to
order a defendant to submit to a physical examination”).
112. Allied Chem. Corp. v. Daiflon, Inc., 449 U.S. 33, 36 (1980) (per curiam); Will v. Calvert
Fire Ins. Co., 437 U.S. 655, 665-66 (1978) (plurality opinion); see also Kerr v. U.S. Dist. Court,
426 U.S. 394, 405 (1976) (denying mandamus on an order compelling the production of privileged
documents because of the possibility of in camera review).
113. See Mallard v. U.S. Dist. Court, 490 U.S. 296, 309-10 (1989) (overturning district court
program requiring attorneys to represent indigent litigants as a condition of bar membership).
114. See Mohawk Indus., Inc. v. Carpenter, 130 S. Ct. 599, 607-08 (2009); Cheney v. U.S.
Dist. Court, 542 U.S. 367, 382-83 (2004).  
115. See, e.g., In re Asbestos Sch. Litig., 46 F.3d 1284, 1288 (3d Cir. 1994) (“Mandamus may
be especially appropriate to further supervisory and instructional goals, and where issues are
unsettled and important.”); United States v. Bertoli, 994 F.2d 1002, 1014 (3d Cir. 1993) (noting
that mandamus review is appropriate “when fundamental undecided issues . . . implicate not only
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court decisions on matters of discretion.   Thus, the Supreme Court’s post-La116
Buy and Schlagenhauf case law has, in general, not impacted the courts of
appeals’ continued use of supervisory and advisory mandamus.   117
Of course, there is no categorical distinction between the two theories, as a
novel ruling that could initially warrant advisory mandamus may easily become
a repeated error appropriate for supervisory mandamus.   Conversely, if a lower118
court’s recurring practice is sufficiently “bad” to warrant supervisory mandamus,
the court of appeals might not have addressed the issue.119
In short, under modern doctrine, the federal courts of appeals will use
mandamus to settle important, usually undecided, issues that are likely to arise
again in future cases and for which post-judgment review would be inadequate,
inefficient, or impossible.  Mandamus, used in this fashion, gives lower courts
appellate guidance so that mandamus review is unnecessary in future cases
raising the same issue.   By using the writ sparingly, appellate courts preserve,120
at least in part, the writ’s historically extraordinary character, avoiding undue
interference in lower court proceedings but sending a forceful message when the
writ does issue.
Appellate courts also continue to issue mandamus for traditional,
“jurisdictional” reasons.   And since appellate mandamus is a discretionary121
remedy, different courts have formulated different tests for the writ’s issuance. 
The Supreme Court, for example, has repeatedly stated that “three conditions
must be satisfied.”   First, the party seeking the writ must have “no other122
the parties’ interests but those of the judicial system itself”); In re Société Nationale Industrielle
Aérospatiale, 782 F.2d 120, 123 (8th Cir. 1986) (“[M]andamus review may be appropriate to
provide guidelines for the resolution of novel and important questions . . . that are likely to recur.”),
vacated on other grounds sub nom. Société Nationale Industrielle Aérospatiale v. U.S. Dist. Court,
482 U.S. 522 (1987).
116. Prime examples of cases reviewing on mandamus discretionary district court rulings are
the venue decisions discussed in Part III.B, infra.  
117. See TIGAR & TIGAR, supra note 3, at 193; 16 WRIGHT ET AL., supra note 6, § 3934.1. 
118. See United States v. Horn, 29 F.3d 754, 769 (1st Cir. 1994).
119. Cf. Supervisory and Advisory Mandamus, supra note 11, at 611 (suggesting that advisory
mandamus is merely a variant of supervisory mandamus).
120. See United States v. Hughes, 413 F.2d 1244, 1249 (5th Cir. 1969), vacated as moot sub
nom. United States v. Gifford-Hill-Am., Inc., 397 U.S. 93 (1970); 16A WRIGHT ET AL., supra note
6, §§ 3934, 3934.1. 
121. See supra Part I.A; see, e.g., Nixon v. Richey, 513 F.2d 427, 430 (D.C. Cir. 1975) (per
curiam) (ordering that a district judge must immediately consider an application to proceed before
a three-judge district court:  “We intimate no view as to what in this regard the District Judge
should decide.  We hold only that he must decide, and decide now.”); see also Sierra Rutile Ltd.
v. Katz, 937 F.2d 743, 751 (2d Cir. 1991) (“Should the district court continue in its refusal to
vacate the stay and to exercise jurisdiction over this action upon proper application, such may be
the circumstances under which a petition for mandamus might be appropriately . . . granted.”
(alteration in original) (citation omitted) (internal quotation marks omitted)).
122. Cheney v. U.S. Dist. Court, 542 U.S. 367, 380 (2004); accord Allied Chem. Corp. v.
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adequate means” to obtain the relief sought.   Second, the petitioner must show123
that its right to the writ is “clear and indisputable.”   Finally, the court must be124
satisfied, in its discretion, that the writ is “appropriate” under the
circumstances.   Perhaps because the “appropriate”-ness standard is rather125
amorphous, the lower courts have developed more detailed frameworks.   126
Today, courts review on mandamus a litany of issues, including orders
regarding discovery (in particular, the attorney-client privilege);  orders127
regarding transfer of venue;  orders on the consolidation or severance of cases128
for trial;  temporary restraining orders;  orders denying a jury trial;  and129 130 131
judicial and attorney disqualification orders;  among many others.   The132 133
varied function of mandamus in modern appellate practice illustrates the writ’s
evolution from its original use of fixing obvious “jurisdictional” errors to a
mechanism for supervising district court practices and deciding novel legal
issues.  In the next part, I examine the evolution of mandamus in the Federal
Circuit and how the Federal Circuit has struggled with the supervisory function
of mandamus, both because of the court’s unique nationwide jurisdiction and its
position as successor to a court of very limited function. 
II.  MANDAMUS IN THE FEDERAL CIRCUIT
The limited appellate subject-matter jurisdiction of the Federal Circuit’s
predecessor, the Court of Customs and Patent Appeals (CCPA), caused the
CCPA to adopt a unique, issue-based framework for evaluating its mandamus
Daiflon, Inc., 449 U.S. 33, 35-36 (1980) (per curiam); Kerr v. U.S. Dist. Court, 426 U.S. 394, 403
(1976).
123. Cheney, 542 U.S. at 380-81.
124. Id. at 381 (quoting Kerr, 426 U.S. at 403).
125. Id. (quoting Kerr, 426 U.S. at 403).
126. See, e.g., Bauman v. U.S. Dist. Court, 557 F.2d 650, 654-55 (9th Cir. 1977) (requiring
the court to balance five factors in deciding whether to grant mandamus:   (1) whether the party
seeking the writ has another adequate means to seek to the desired relief; (2) whether the petitioner
will suffer harm that cannot be remedied on appeal; (3) whether the district court’s order is “clearly
erroneous as a matter of law”; (4) whether the district court’s error is “oft-repeated”; and (5)
whether the district court’s order raises new or important problems or legal issues of first
impression).
127. See, e.g., In re BankAmerica Corp. Sec. Litig., 270 F.3d 639, 641 (8th Cir. 2001).  
128. See, e.g., infra Part III.B.  See generally 19 JAMES WM. MOORE ET AL., MOORE’S
FEDERAL PRACTICE § 204.06[3][a] (Daniel R. Coquillette et al. eds., 3d ed. 2011) (“[T]ransfer
orders may be reviewed by mandamus.”); 16 WRIGHT ET AL., supra note 6, § 3935.4 (discussing
mandamus use in transfer of venue cases).
129. See, e.g., Garber v. Randell, 477 F.2d 711, 715 n.2 (2d Cir. 1973).
130. See, e.g., In re Vuitton Et Fils S.A., 606 F.2d 1, 3 (2d Cir. 1979).
131. See, e.g., Beacon Theatres, Inc. v. Westover, 359 U.S. 500, 511 (1959). 
132. See, e.g., In re Aetna Cas. & Sur. Co., 919 F.2d 1136, 1143 (6th Cir. 1990) (en banc).
133. See 16 WRIGHT ET AL., supra note 6, § 3935.7.  
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jurisdiction.  Although the CCPA’s jurisdictional limitations have no analogues
in the Federal Circuit, the Federal Circuit nevertheless initially embraced a
similarly limited conception of mandamus, stating that it would entertain only
petitions that raised questions of patent law.  I begin this part by examining the
origins of this limited conception and showing how it proved unworkable.  I then
show how the Federal Circuit’s more recent mandamus jurisprudence, which
permits a broader use of the writ, fails to confront the rationale of the court’s
earlier decisions.  
A.  Mandamus in the Court of Customs and Patent Appeals
Congress created the CCPA in 1929 and merged it into the Federal Circuit
in 1982, when the Federal Circuit was created.   The CCPA’s subject-matter134
jurisdiction over patent cases was much more limited than the Federal Circuit’s. 
The CCPA was, in general, limited to reviewing decisions of the U.S. Patent and
Trademark Office (PTO); unlike the Federal Circuit, the CCPA did not have
jurisdiction over appeals from district court judgments in patent infringement
litigation.   In addition, CCPA review of PTO actions encompassed only two135
legal issues:  (1) patentability (i.e., whether the patent application satisfied the
statutory requirements that the invention be novel, useful, nonobvious,
adequately described, and claim patentable subject matter)  and (2) priority of136
invention (i.e., the determination of which party first made the invention and is
134. See Federal Courts Improvement Act of 1982, Pub. L. No. 97-164, § 122, 96 Stat. 25, 36;
4 DONALD S. CHISUM, CHISUM ON PATENTS § 11.06[3][b][I] (2005).  For historical discussions of
the creation of the Federal Circuit and comparisons to its predecessor courts, the CCPA and the
Court of Claims, see generally Marion T. Bennett, The United States Court of Appeals for the
Federal Circuit—Origins, in UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE FEDERAL CIRCUIT:  A
HISTORY:  1990-2002, at 3, 3-15 (2004) [hereinafter FEDERAL CIRCUIT HISTORY]; Daniel J. Meador,
Origin of the Federal Circuit:  A Personal Account, 41 AM. U. L. REV. 581 (1992).
135. See 28 U.S.C. § 1542 (1970), repealed by Federal Courts Improvement Act of 1982
§ 122; Charles L. Gholz, Patent and Trademark Jurisdiction of the Court of Customs and Patent
Appeals, 40 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 416, 417-20 (1972); Jeffery A. Lefstin, The Constitution of Patent
Law:  The Court of Customs and Patent Appeals and the Shape of the Federal Circuit’s
Jurisprudence, 43 LOYOLA L.A. L. REV. 843, 848-50 (2010).  Near the end of the CCPA’s
existence, in 1975, Congress granted the court jurisdiction to review decisions of the International
Trade Commission (ITC) in proceedings to prohibit the importation of devices that infringe U.S.
patents, so-called § 337 proceedings.  This jurisdiction gave the court a limited opportunity to
consider patent infringement issues in addition to the validity issues it considered when reviewing
PTO proceedings.  See Trade Act of 1974, Pub. L. No. 93-618, § 341(a), 88 Stat. 1978, 2053-56. 
In addition to the court’s patent and ITC jurisdiction, the CCPA also reviewed PTO decisions in
trademark cases, as well as the decisions of the U.S. Customs Court (later renamed the Court of
International Trade).  See GILES S. RICH, A BRIEF HISTORY OF THE UNITED STATES COURT OF
CUSTOMS AND PATENT APPEALS 1-2 (1980).
136. See 35 U.S.C. §§ 101-03, 112 (2006). 
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therefore entitled to the patent).   Because the CCPA lacked jurisdiction over137
district court patent cases, it did not decide issues of regional circuit law.   In138
addition, in appeals from interference proceedings (i.e., the contest through
which the PTO determines priority of invention),  the CCPA could decide only139
questions related to the determination of priority.   It could not review PTO140
determinations on underlying matters such as the proper scope of discovery  or141
other matters of procedure.142
The CCPA, like other federal appellate courts, asserted authority to issue
mandamus under the All Writs Act.   Because of its limited subject-matter143
jurisdiction, however, the CCPA, before deciding a mandamus petition on the
merits, was careful to ensure that it would have appellate jurisdiction over the
decision sought to be reviewed.  In Goodbar v. Banner, for example, the
petitioners sought a writ of mandamus directing the Board of Patent Interferences
to vacate an order compelling the petitioners to produce certain documents in an
interference proceeding.   The court immediately turned to the question of144
jurisdiction, noting that “[t]he All Writs Act is not an independent grant of
appellate jurisdiction, and, therefore, the appellate jurisdiction which the writs
are ‘in aid of’ must have some other basis.”   As to what the “other basis” could145
be, the court wrote that it “must be found within the subject matter jurisdiction
of this court.”   146
This discussion in Goodbar simply recognizes the elementary principle that
137. See id. § 102(g); 28 U.S.C. § 1542 (1970), repealed by Federal Courts Improvement Act
of 1982 § 122.  For applications filed after March 16, 2013, priority will no longer go to the first
person to make the invention, but to the first person to file a patent application.  See Leahy-Smith
America Invents Act, Pub. L. No. 112-29, § 3(b), 125 Stat. 284, 285-87 (2011) (to be codified at
35 U.S.C. § 102).
138. By contrast, when the Federal Circuit reviews a district court judgment in a patent case,
it considers all issues that arose in the underlying proceeding, and applies regional circuit law to
non-patent issues and procedural issues not unique to patent law.  See Panduit Corp. v. All States
Plastic Mfg. Co., 744 F.2d 1564, 1574-75 (Fed. Cir. 1984) (per curiam). 
139. See MANUAL OF PATENT EXAMINING PROCEDURE § 2301 (8th rev. ed. 2010).  In 2013,
when the priority rule changes from “first to invent” to “first to file,” see supra note 137,
interference proceedings will be replaced by “derivation” proceedings, which will determine
whether a competing application was derived from the applicant’s own invention.  See Leahy-
Smith America Invents Act § 3(I), Pub. L. No. 112, 125 Stat. 284 (2011) (to be codified at 35
U.S.C. § 135).
140. See 35 U.S.C. § 141 (2006).
141. See Goodbar v. Banner, 599 F.2d 431, 435 (C.C.P.A. 1979).
142. See Morris v. Tegtmeyer, 655 F.2d 216, 220-21 (C.C.P.A. 1981).
143. See Loshbough v. Allen, 404 F.2d 1400, 1405 (C.C.P.A. 1969); Charles L. Gholz,
Extraordinary Writ Jurisdiction of the CCPA in Patent and Trademark Cases, 58 J. PAT. OFF.
SOC’Y 356, 357-58 (1976).  
144. Goodbar, 599 F.2d at 432.  
145. Id. at 433 (citing Roche v. Evaporated Milk Ass’n, 319 U.S. 21, 23-26 (1943)).  
146. Id. at 433-34 (emphasis omitted).
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courts have mandamus jurisdiction if they could, at some point in the future,
entertain an appeal.   For the regional circuits, this is usually not a complex147
inquiry.  Since a regional circuit will eventually have appellate jurisdiction over
almost any district court case in its circuit, it likewise has mandamus jurisdiction
over almost any case.  But for the CCPA in cases like Goodbar, the jurisdictional
inquiry was more complex.  The CCPA had jurisdiction to review only certain
issues that arose in interference proceedings.  
In Goodbar, for example, the court noted that the petition arose out of a
discovery motion in a PTO interference proceeding and that it did not have
appellate jurisdiction over PTO decisions on motions.   Its appellate jurisdiction148
over interference proceedings was limited to questions of priority of invention
and other issues “ancillary to priority.”   Because the discovery issue in149
Goodbar did not relate to the sequence of invention, the court concluded that it
lacked jurisdiction over the petition.150
In several other cases, the CCPA applied the principle that it would hear on
mandamus only issues that were within the court’s appellate subject-matter
jurisdiction.   When the petition presented an issue that the CCPA would decide151
on appeal, the court would exercise mandamus jurisdiction.   When the court152
did not have jurisdiction over a ruling presented by mandamus, the court would
consider the petition only if the ruling had the effect of obstructing an appeal to
the CCPA.   Thus, any petitioner seeking mandamus from the CCPA faced the153
threshold question of whether the issue was within the CCPA’s narrow subject-
matter jurisdiction.  If not, the court would dismiss the petition. 
In 1982, Congress replaced the CCPA with the Federal Circuit.  Congress
granted the new court appellate jurisdiction over a diverse set of tribunals,
147. See Burr & Forman v. Blair, 470 F.3d 1019, 1027 (11th Cir. 2006) (“The [All Writs] Act
does not create subject matter jurisdiction for courts where such jurisdiction would otherwise be
lacking.  Instead, the Act provides courts with a procedural tool to enforce jurisdiction they have
already derived from another source.” (citation omitted)).
148. Goodbar, 599 F.2d at 434.
149. Id. (citing Duffy v. Tegtmeyer, 489 F.2d 745 (C.C.P.A. 1974)).
150. Id. at 435.
151. See, e.g., Morris v. Tegtmeyer, 655 F.2d 216, 220-21 (C.C.P.A. 1981) (holding that the
court lacked jurisdiction over a petition challenging the PTO Commissioner’s decisions about when
particular issues would be decided); Godtfredsen v. Banner, 598 F.2d 589, 592-93 (C.C.P.A. 1979)
(dismissing petition that sought an order directing the Commissioner to allow certain interference
counts to proceed and to stop proceedings on other counts), overruled on other grounds by Hester
v. Allgeier, 646 F.2d 513, 522 (C.C.P.A. 1981).
152. See, e.g., McNally v. Mossinghoff, 673 F.2d 1253, 1254 (C.C.P.A. 1982) (exercising
jurisdiction over a mandamus petition based on “petitioners’ allegation that; but for the
Commissioner’s refusal to revive” the petitioners’ patent application, the “application would
properly be in interference” with certain other patents); Morris v. Diamond, 634 F.2d 1347, 1350
(C.C.P.A. 1980) (finding jurisdiction over a mandamus petition where the decision of the
Commissioner sought to be reviewed was “ancillary to priority”).
153. See Margolis v. Banner, 599 F.2d 435, 443-44 (C.C.P.A. 1979).
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including the PTO, the Court of Federal Claims, the International Trade
Commission, the Merit Systems Protection Board, and later, the Court of Appeals
for Veterans Claims.   154
In addition, Congress granted the new court jurisdiction over appeals from
all district court cases arising under the patent laws.   Prior to the Federal155
Circuit’s creation, district court patent cases were appealed to that court’s
regional circuit.   But in 28 U.S.C. § 1295(a)(1), Congress provided the Federal156
Circuit with power to hear appeals from final decisions of district courts if the
district court’s jurisdiction is based, in whole or in part, on 28 U.S.C. § 1338.  157
Section 1338, in turn, grants the district courts original jurisdiction to hear,
among other matters, cases “arising under any Act of Congress relating to
patents.”   Rather than restricting the new court’s jurisdiction over district court158
cases to certain “patent issues” (as was the case with the CCPA), Congress thus
empowered the Federal Circuit to decide all issues presented on appeal, whether
issues of patent law or not.159
To be sure, not all patent law issues are appealed to the Federal Circuit.  For
example, the Supreme Court has held that cases involving only patent law
defenses do not “aris[e] under” the patent laws.   But given that the new Federal160
Circuit’s jurisdiction covered the entirety of any case arising under the patent
laws, it might have seemed likely that the CCPA’s issue-oriented mandamus case
law would become obsolete.  The Federal Circuit, however, surprisingly
perpetuated the CCPA’s narrow conception of mandamus.
B.  The Early Mandamus Decisions of the Federal Circuit
In its first opinion, the en banc Federal Circuit adopted as binding precedent
the jurisprudence of its predecessor courts, including the CCPA.   The court had161
defensible reasons for embracing CCPA precedent.  For one, it promoted
doctrinal stability in the areas of law in which the Federal Circuit and the
154. See 28 U.S.C. § 1295(a) (2006 & Supp. 2010); 38 U.S.C. § 7292(c) (2006).  For a
comprehensive overview of the cases over which the Federal Circuit has appellate jurisdiction, see
Gugliuzza, supra note 30 (manuscript at 27-28).
155. See 28 U.S.C. §§ 1295(a)(1), 1338(a).
156. See 4 CHISUM, supra note 134, § 11.06[3][e].
157. 28 U.S.C. § 1295(a)(1).
158. Id. § 1338(a). 
159. See Atari, Inc. v. JS & A Grp., Inc., 747 F.2d 1422, 1433-35 (Fed. Cir. 1984) (en banc),
overruled on other grounds by Nobelpharma AB v. Implant Innovations, Inc., 141 F.3d 1059, 1068
& n.5 (1998) (en banc in relevant part).
160. See Christianson v. Colt Indus. Operating Corp., 486 U.S. 800, 808-09 (1988); see also
Holmes Grp., Inc. v. Vornado Air Circulation Sys., Inc., 535 U.S. 826, 831-34 (2002) (holding that
patent law compulsory counterclaims do not “aris[e] under” the patent laws), abrogated by Leahy-
Smith America Invents Act, Pub. L. No. 112-29, § 19(a), 125 Stat. 284, 331 (2011) (to be codified
at 28 U.S.C. § 1338).
161. S. Corp. v. United States, 690 F.2d 1368, 1370 (Fed. Cir. 1982) (en banc).
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CCPA’s jurisdiction overlapped.   For another, it would have been burdensome162
for the Federal Circuit to start anew in areas in which many basic questions of
law were settled.   But the wholesale adoption of CCPA jurisprudence also163
caused problems because the court was, for the first time, reviewing district court
judgments in patent cases, rather than reviewing agency proceedings only.   In164
particular, the CCPA’s narrow mandamus standard, which became the Federal
Circuit’s mandamus standard in district court patent cases, was incompatible with
the new court’s broader subject-matter jurisdiction.
In its first published order deciding a petition for a writ of mandamus from
a district court, Baker Perkins, Inc. v. Werner & Pfleiderer Corp., the Federal
Circuit concluded that it had jurisdiction to decide the mandamus petition
because the district court’s jurisdiction was based on § 1338, and the Federal
Circuit would, accordingly, have jurisdiction over any appeal under
§ 1295(a)(1).   While the court’s analysis was correct, its statement of the165
jurisdictional standard was problematic.  The court wrote that “the petitioner
must initially show that the action sought to be corrected by mandamus” was
within the court’s subject-matter jurisdiction.   Viewed in context, the reference166
to “action,” is not a reference to the “civil action,” i.e., the case commenced in
the district court.   Rather, “action” refers to the specific action taken or order167
entered by the district judge and sought to be reviewed.  This is made plain not
only by the court’s citations to CCPA cases, which focused on the issue
presented via mandamus, but also by the court’s explicit reference to the “action
sought to be corrected.”   Simply put, the Federal Circuit’s standard seemed to168
ask the same jurisdictional question as the CCPA formerly did:  whether the issue
to be reviewed was within the court’s subject-matter jurisdiction.169
Yet there was and is no statutory support for the Federal Circuit to frame a
jurisdictional inquiry based on issues.  As noted, § 1295(a)(1) grants the court
jurisdiction to review all final decisions of the district courts, including all
interlocutory orders leading to those final decisions, so long as the district court’s
jurisdiction is based on § 1338.  Unlike in the CCPA’s jurisdictional statute,
there is no limitation as to which types of decisions in patent cases the court may
review on appeal.  The Federal Circuit, however, compelled at least in part by its
wholesale adoption of CCPA precedent, imported the CCPA’s narrow conception
of mandamus jurisdiction into its case law.
162. Id. at 1371.
163. Id. at 1370-71.
164. See Lefstin, supra note 135, at 868.
165. Baker Perkins, Inc. v. Werner & Pfleiderer Corp., 710 F.2d 1561, 1565 (Fed. Cir. 1983). 
166. Id. (citing Godtfredsen v. Banner, 598 F.2d 589 (C.C.P.A. 1979); Duffy v. Tegtmeyer,
489 F.2d 745 (C.C.P.A. 1974)).
167. FED. R. CIV. P. 2 (“There is one form of action—the civil action.”).
168. Baker Perkins, 710 F.2d at 1565 (emphasis added).
169. See Duffy, 489 F.2d at 748-49 (exercising mandamus jurisdiction because “the issue
involved here is one which we might have jurisdiction to decide in the context of our review of a
decision of the Board of Patent Interferences” (emphasis added)).
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To clearly see the confusion that ensued in the Federal Circuit’s early
mandamus jurisprudence, it is important to keep in mind that when a court of
appeals considers a mandamus petition, it in theory answers three distinct
questions (although most cases do not divide up the analysis so neatly).  First, the
court must decide whether it has jurisdiction over the case.   To answer this170
question in the mandamus setting, the court must decide whether it would have
jurisdiction over an appeal at some point in the future.   Second, the court must171
decide if it has the remedial power to grant the writ.   The federal courts’ power172
to issue appellate mandamus stems from the All Writs Act, § 1651(a).   Third,173
the court must answer the discretionary question of whether the writ is justified
under the circumstances.   This final question is often referred to as the174
“propriety” question, as distinguished from the first two questions of jurisdiction
and authority, respectively.175
The CCPA cases and Baker Perkins involved the first question, that of pure
jurisdiction.  In its early years, the Federal Circuit was also confused about the
source of the courts of appeals’ authority to issue the writ.  In Mississippi
Chemical Corp. v. Swift Agricultural Chemicals Corp., for example, the court
used mandamus to order a district court to enter summary judgment of patent
invalidity on collateral estoppel grounds.   At the end of its order, the court noted176
that it issued the writ “pursuant to [its] authority under 28 U.S.C. § 1651(a),” the
All Writs Act, because, “[u]nlike the other circuit courts of appeals, [it] ha[s] no
general supervisory authority over district courts.”   This language suggests a177
belief that when the regional circuits and the Supreme Court issue supervisory
mandamus, they base their authority on a source besides the All Writs Act—a
“general supervisory authority.”   Around this same time, similar statements178
appeared in other Federal Circuit cases,  as well as in a law review article by179
170. Cf. Baker Perkins, 710 F.2d at 1565 (“The All Writs Act is not an independent basis of
jurisdiction. . . .”).
171. See Roche v. Evaporated Milk Ass’n, 319 U.S. 21, 25 (1943).
172. Cf. Brittingham v. Comm’r, 451 F.2d 315, 317 (5th Cir. 1971) (noting that the All Writs
Act “empowers” district courts “to issue writs in aid of jurisdiction previously acquired on some
other independent ground”).
173. See FED. R. APP. P. 21 advisory committee’s note (1967 adoption).
174. Cf. Cheney v. U.S. Dist. Court, 542 U.S. 367, 380 (2004).
175. Cf. Supervisory and Advisory Mandamus, supra note 11, at 596 n.7 (distinguishing the
propriety question from the jurisdictional question).
176. Miss. Chem. Corp. v. Swift Agric. Chems. Corp., 717 F.2d 1374, 1379-80 (Fed. Cir.
1983) (citing Blonder-Tongue Labs., Inc. v. Univ. of Ill. Found., 402 U.S. 313 (1971)).
177. Id. at 1380.
178. Id.
179. See In re Precision Screen Machs. Inc., 729 F.2d 1428, 1429 (Fed. Cir. 1984)
(“Petitioners apparently recognize that this court currently has no . . . supervisory authority over
any district court under the Federal Courts Improvement Act of 1982, as might justify a writ of
mandamus under certain circumstances by a regional circuit court.  Accordingly, petitioners are
reduced to proceeding under 28 U.S.C. § 1651, the All Writs Act.” (citations omitted)); accord
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Chief Judge Markey.   The primary rationale for this position seems to be that180
the Federal Circuit, unlike the regional circuits, did not have a judicial council
to tend to administrative matters within the circuit.181
But regional circuits do not derive mandamus authority from the statute
establishing a judicial council.  They, like the Federal Circuit, derive it from the
All Writs Act.  The advisory committee’s note to Appellate Rule 21 (which
governs mandamus petitions) is clear:  “The authority of courts of appeals to
issue extraordinary writs is derived from 28 U.S.C. § 1651,” the All Writs Act.  182
Yet the Federal Circuit still generally shied away from supervisory mandamus,
based on the notion that the regional circuits have a more robust mandamus
authority than the Federal Circuit.  
Examining the remainder of the Federal Circuit’s early mandamus case law
only heightens the confusion.  In contrast to cases disavowing supervisory
authority and expressing jurisdictional limits on Federal Circuit mandamus are
other cases that, on issues related to patent law, issued what appeared to be
supervisory mandamus.   Moreover, the court regularly issued mandamus to183
serve its traditional purposes, such as reining in a court that was acting beyond
its authority  or compelling a district court to exercise jurisdiction.   184 185
In short, the model of mandamus adopted by the Federal Circuit in its early
years was confused.   The court limited the issuance of the writ in its186
supervisory form to issues of patent law, in part because the model was tethered
Petersen Mfg. Co. v. Cent. Purchasing, Inc., 740 F.2d 1541, 1552 (Fed. Cir. 1984), overruled on
other grounds by Beatrice Foods Co. v. New Eng. Printing & Lithographing Co., 899 F.2d 1171
(Fed. Cir. 1990) (en banc).  
180. See Howard T. Markey, The Phoenix Court, 32 CLEV. ST. L. REV. 1, 5 (1983) (“Under
the All Writs Act, it may be necessary in a particular case to issue an appropriate order to a lower
tribunal to preserve the jurisdiction of the court, but that is not, of course, an exercise of general
administrative authority.”).
181. See In re Oximetrix, Inc., 748 F.2d 637, 643 (Fed. Cir. 1984) (citing 28 U.S.C. § 332);
Markey, supra note 180, at 5.
182. FED. R. APP. P. 21 advisory committee’s note (1967 adoption).
183. See, e.g., In re Newman, 782 F.2d 971, 974 (Fed. Cir. 1986) (vacating district court order
that permitted the PTO to test a device for which Newman sought a patent but did not employ the
“safeguards” of Rule 34 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure); In re Mark Indus., 751 F.2d 1219,
1221-22, 1224-26 (Fed. Cir. 1984) (granting mandamus to vacate district court order that based an
inequitable conduct finding and a severe sanction on counsel’s failure to follow a “custom”
described by the opposing party).
184. See, e.g., Miss. Chem. Corp. v. Swift Agric. Chems. Corp., 717 F.2d 1374, 1380 (Fed.
Cir. 1983) (ordering district court to enter judgment on collateral estoppel grounds).
185. See, e.g., In re Snap-On Tools Corp., 720 F.2d 654, 655 (Fed. Cir.) (granting mandamus
to compel removal from state court to federal court), order amended by 735 F.2d 476 (Fed. Cir.
1983).  
186. See Gholz, supra note 15, at 422-37 (arguing that the Federal Circuit had, in fact,
accepted and exercised supervisory mandamus authority, and that the court had simply
“‘eschew[ed]’ use of the phrase ‘supervisory mandamus’”).
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to the views of the defunct CCPA.  And the court insisted that it was “devoid”
of supervisory authority over district courts, at least on issues of non-patent law,
because of its lack of a judicial council.   To make matters even more187
confusing, the court sometimes suggested that it would never consider non-patent
issues on mandamus.   At other times, the court somewhat tempered this188
restrictive view, suggesting that it would consider non-patent issues on
mandamus, but only if the lower court decision prevented an appeal to the
Federal Circuit.189
C.  Innotron’s Limit on Federal Circuit Mandamus
By the time In re Innotron Diagnostics  reached the Federal Circuit, the190
court was obviously unsure about its jurisdiction over mandamus petitions, as
well as its power to issue the writ.  In attempting to clarify the court’s case law
and reconceptualize the role of mandamus in the Federal Circuit, the opinion in
Innotron limited the writ in patent cases to issues implicating Federal Circuit
patent law.   Issues of regional circuit law unrelated to the Federal Circuit’s191
patent jurisprudence would not be eligible for mandamus review.  192
In Innotron, Innotron Diagnostics filed an antitrust suit against Abbott
Laboratories in the Central District of California.   Abbott then sued Innotron193
in the same court for patent infringement.  The court consolidated the cases and,
on Abbott’s motion, ordered that Innotron’s antitrust claims be severed for trial
after trial of the patent issues.   The Federal Circuit denied Innotron’s194
mandamus petition, but only after providing an extensive discussion of the role
of mandamus in the Federal Circuit.195
Writing for the court, Chief Judge Markey noted that the “[u]se of mandamus
in exercising ‘supervisory authority’ has been approved ‘in proper
circumstances’ by the Supreme Court”  and increasingly used by the regional196
circuits.   But, he emphasized, those cases involved courts “having appellate197
187. See In re Int’l Med. Prosthetics Research Assocs., Inc., 739 F.2d 618, 619 (Fed. Cir.
1984).
188. See Baker Perkins, Inc. v. Werner & Pfleiderer Corp., 710 F.2d 1561, 1565 (Fed. Cir.
1983) (noting that “the action sought to be corrected by mandamus is within this court’s statutorily
defined subject matter jurisdiction,” citing CCPA cases).
189. See C.P.C. P’ship v. Nosco Plastics, Inc., 719 F.2d 400, 401 (Fed. Cir. 1983) (denying
mandamus, noting that “[o]ur jurisdiction to hear the appeal on the merits in this case is not affected
by” the decision sought to be reviewed).
190. 800 F.2d 1077 (Fed. Cir. 1986).
191. Id. at 1083-84.
192. See id.
193. Id. at 1078.
194. Id. at 1078-79.
195. Id. at 1086.
196. Id. at 1081 (citing La Buy v. Howes Leather Co., 352 U.S. 249, 255 (1957)).
197. Id. 
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jurisdiction over judgments of district courts whose location is within its circuit,”
whereas the Federal Circuit’s appellate jurisdiction “is determined by the basis
for the district court’s jurisdiction.”   Chief Judge Markey noted that the198
Federal Circuit could clearly overturn via mandamus a district court order that
would prevent an appeal to the Federal Circuit or that would “otherwise
frustrate” the Federal Circuit’s appellate jurisdiction.   199
He then listed three categories of mandamus petitions for which the inquiry
is more complicated:
(1) [T]hose implicating responsibilities of regional circuit courts for
supervising, administering, overseeing, and managing the courts
within the circuit (e.g., assignment of judges, adjustment of
calendars, transfer of case to another district, reference to master);
(2) [T]hose that arise in all types of cases, but do not directly implicate
the patent or Little Tucker Act doctrinal jurisprudence of this court
(e.g., disqualification of counsel); and
(3) [T]hose that do directly implicate, or are intimately bound up with
and controlled by, the patent and Tucker Act doctrinal
jurisprudential responsibilities of this court (e.g., separate trial of
patent issues; refusal to apply 35 U.S.C. § 282; court-ordered tests
for utility).200
Because the Federal Circuit lacked supervisory authority over district courts,
Chief Judge Markey wrote, “a writ would not be ‘in aid of jurisdiction’ if issued
on petitions in categories (1) and (2).”   On the other hand, the court might “aid201
its jurisdiction” by hearing mandamus petitions on issues in category (3).  202
Because Innotron’s petition “challenge[d] an order intimately bound up with and
controlled by the law of patents (e.g., the relationship of patent infringement
defenses to allegations in ‘patent type antitrust’ claims),” the court determined
that Innotron’s petition fell within category (3).   Based on this analysis, the203
court summarized the situations in which it would entertain petitions for a writ
of mandamus in a patent case as “those, and only those, in which the patent
198. Id.
199. Id. at 1082.
200. Id.  Under the Tucker Act and Little Tucker Act, the federal government has waived its
sovereign immunity from certain types of lawsuits, most notably, contract disputes.  See 28 U.S.C.
§§ 1346, 1491 (2006 & Supp. 2010).  Because these cases are appealed almost exclusively to the
Federal Circuit, see id. § 1295(a)(2)-(3), mandamus petitions filed in Tucker Act and Little Tucker
Act cases do not implicate the same issues that arise in mandamus petitions in district court patent
cases, which are reviewed by the Federal Circuit in some instances (patent cases), but not others. 
See supra text accompanying notes 30-34.
201. Innotron, 800 F.2d at 1082.
202. Id.
203. Id.
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jurisprudence of this court plays a significant role.”   204
This limited conception mirrors the restrictions imposed by the CCPA.  The
court in Innotron cited CCPA opinions that asked whether the issue to be
resolved was within the court’s appellate jurisdiction  as well as earlier Federal205
Circuit cases that had themselves relied upon the CCPA’s mandamus
jurisprudence.   Interestingly, the Innotron opinion was written by Chief Judge206
Markey, who had served as Chief Judge of the CCPA,  authored one of the207
CCPA opinions dismissing a mandamus petition for lack of subject-matter
jurisdiction,  and denounced a supervisory role for the Federal Circuit.   208 209
The court’s holding that it would decide only mandamus petitions in which
the Federal Circuit’s patent law plays a role raised an important practical
question for prospective mandamus petitioners:  How does one seek mandamus
review of a question of regional circuit law in a case that would be appealed to
the Federal Circuit after judgment?  The Innotron court hinted that the
appropriate tactic might be to seek relief in the regional circuit.   210
As discussed in more detail below, however, this framework of bifurcated
review on mandamus would be at odds with Congress’s grant to the Federal
Circuit of appellate jurisdiction over all issues raised in cases arising under the
patent laws.  On an appeal from a final judgment, the Federal Circuit would have
jurisdiction over the entire case, including issues of regional circuit law, which
the Federal Circuit would decide in accordance with the law of the appropriate
regional circuit.   Yet, in Innotron, the court suggested that, on mandamus,211
those very same issues could be decided by petition to the regional circuit.  In
addition, the bifurcated framework proposed by Innotron is inconsistent with
contemporaneous Federal Circuit precedent, which held that the Federal
Circuit—and only the Federal Circuit—could issue mandamus in cases that were
within the court’s exclusive appellate jurisdiction.   In light of Innotron’s212
204. Id. at 1083-84.
205. Id. at 1082 n.8 (citing Godtfredsen v. Banner, 598 F.2d 589 (C.C.P.A. 1979); Duffy v.
Tegtmeyer, 489 F.2d 745 (C.C.P.A. 1974)).
206. See id. (citing In re Mark Indus., 751 F.2d 1219, 1222 (Fed. Cir. 1984); In re Oximetrix,
748 F.2d 637, 643 (Fed. Cir. 1984); Baker Perkins, Inc. v. Werner & Pfleiderer Corp., 710 F.2d
1561 (Fed. Cir. 1983)).
207. See Judge Howard Thomas Markey, in FEDERAL CIRCUIT HISTORY, supra note 134, at
105-06.
208. See Fraige v. Parker, 610 F.2d 795, 796 (C.C.P.A. 1979).
209. See Markey, supra note 180, at 5.
210. See Innotron, 800 F.2d at 1084 n.13; see also 15A WRIGHT ET AL., supra note 6, § 3903.1
(“There may be an implication in the Innotron Diagnostics opinion that the Federal Circuit believes
it appropriate for the regional circuits to exercise writ control of the matters foresworn by the
Federal Circuit, even though interlocutory and final judgment appeals will go to the Federal
Circuit.” (emphasis added) (citation omitted)).  
211. Innotron, 800 F.2d at 1084 n.13.
212. See In re Mark Indus., 751 F.2d 1219, 1222 (Fed. Cir. 1984) (noting that, because the
district court’s jurisdiction was based on § 1338, the Federal Circuit, “and only [the Federal
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questionable reasoning and the odd procedural framework it embraced, it is not
surprising that both the Federal Circuit and the regional circuits would strain to
avoid its holding. 
D.  The Early Retreat from Innotron
For a short time, the Federal Circuit faithfully applied Innotron as its
mandamus standard.   Three years after Innotron, however, the Ninth Circuit213
in Kennecott Corp. v. U.S. District Court faced a mandamus petition challenging
a ruling that fell squarely within Innotron’s unreviewable category (2):  an
attorney-disqualification ruling in a patent case.   Even though the Federal214
Circuit in Innotron stated that it would not entertain mandamus petitions on that
issue, the Ninth Circuit transferred the case to the Federal Circuit.215
Citing Innotron, the Ninth Circuit noted that “the Federal Circuit has taken
a restrictive view on the scope of its authority to entertain petitions for
mandamus which relate to procedural matters” and, thus, review via mandamus
“is effectively unavailable in the Federal Circuit.”   The Ninth Circuit observed,216
however, that in two recent cases involving interlocutory appeals under 28
U.S.C. § 1292, the Federal Circuit had reviewed attorney-disqualification
issues.   Thus, even though the Federal Circuit, under Innotron, would not hear217
the disqualification issue on mandamus, the Ninth Circuit reasoned that the
Federal Circuit would “quite likely” hear the issue on an interlocutory appeal.218
But even though the district judge had certified the issue for interlocutory
appeal, the petitioner had filed only a mandamus petition in the Ninth Circuit.  219
Because the statutory deadline to file a new request for interlocutory appeal in
the Federal Circuit had passed, the Ninth Circuit transferred the matter to the
Federal Circuit with the apparent hope that the Federal Circuit would construe
the mandamus petition as an application for interlocutory review.220
Kennecott illustrates the practical and doctrinal difficulties perpetuated by
a restrictive view of Federal Circuit mandamus.  First, the Federal Circuit would
Circuit], has authority to issue a writ appropriately in aid of jurisdiction in this case”).
213. See In re Calmar, Inc., 854 F.2d 461, 463 (Fed. Cir. 1988).
214. Kennecott Corp. v. U.S. Dist. Court, 873 F.2d 1292, 1292 (9th Cir. 1989); see Innotron,
800 F.2d at 1082 (disclaiming the ability to review on mandamus issues “that arise in all types of
cases, but do not directly implicate the patent or Little Tucker Act doctrinal jurisprudence of this
court (e.g., disqualification of counsel)”).
215. Kennecott, 873 F.2d at 1293-94.
216. Id. at 1292-93.
217. See id. at 1293 (citing Atasi Corp. v. Seagate Tech., 847 F.2d 826 (Fed. Cir. 1988);
Telectronics Proprietary, Ltd. v. Medtronic, Inc., 836 F.2d 1332 (Fed. Cir. 1988)).
218. Id.
219. Id. at 1292-93.
220. See id.  The Federal Circuit did as the Ninth Circuit hoped.  See Kennecott Corp. v.
Kyocera Int’l, Inc., Misc. No. 252, 1990 WL 28065, at *1 (Fed. Cir. Mar. 19, 1990) (accepting
jurisdiction and affirming the disqualification decision).
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unquestionably have exclusive jurisdiction over an appeal—even an interlocutory
appeal—challenging an attorney-disqualification ruling in a case arising under
the patent laws.  Yet, under Innotron, the Federal Circuit would not consider that
exact same issue via mandamus. 
Second, the Ninth Circuit’s decision to transfer the Kennecott case shows
that, contrary to Innotron’s suggestion, it is highly unlikely that a regional circuit
would or could grant mandamus when the district court’s jurisdiction is based on
§ 1338.  As discussed, the “[p]ower to issue writs of mandamus depends on
power to entertain appeals when the case ends.”   A regional circuit lacks the221
power to hear an appeal if a district court’s jurisdiction is based on § 1338, so a
regional circuit probably could not issue mandamus in that same case.   If the222
Federal Circuit were to persist in denying its mandamus power in such a case,
perhaps a regional circuit would be persuaded to issue mandamus based on a
pragmatic desire to avoid leaving the petitioner without any possible forum.  But,
as a purely doctrinal matter, such a practice would be hard to explain.  
In light of these shortcomings, the Federal Circuit itself began to look for
ways to avoid the framework of Innotron.  In In re Regents of the University of
California, the Regents sought mandamus review of an order of the Judicial
Panel on Multidistrict Litigation consolidating five pending suits in the Southern
District of Indiana.   In opposition to the petition, Genentech and Eli Lilly223
argued that the Federal Circuit lacked jurisdiction to review the transfer orders
on mandamus.   Indeed, such orders fell squarely within Innotron’s224
unreviewable category (1).   But without citing Innotron on this point, the court225
rejected the jurisdictional argument.226
The court relied on the following syllogism:
(1) The Federal Circuit, as a general matter, has authority to issue
mandamus in cases that fall within its appellate jurisdiction.227
(2) The Federal Circuit has considered questions of venue “when
properly raised,” citing cases in which the Federal Circuit
considered the issue of venue on appeal.228
(3) Therefore, venue issues are within the Federal Circuit’s jurisdiction
221. In re BBC Int’l, Ltd., 99 F.3d 811, 813 (7th Cir. 1996).
222. I have been unable to locate any regional circuit decision granting mandamus on a non-
patent issue in a patent case on the rationale that the Federal Circuit would not, under Innotron,
consider that non-patent issue on mandamus.
223. In re Regents of the Univ. of Cal., 964 F.2d 1128, 1129 (Fed. Cir. 1992).
224. Id. at 1129-30.
225. In re Innotron Diagnostics, 800 F.2d 1077, 1082 (Fed. Cir. 1986) (disclaiming the ability
to review on mandamus “transfer of [a] case to another district”).
226. Regents, 964 F.2d at 1130.
227. Id.
228. Id. (citing Exxon Chem. Patents, Inc. v. Lubrizol Corp., 935 F.2d 1263 (Fed. Cir. 1991);
VE Holding Corp. v. Johnson Gas Appliance Co., 917 F.2d 1574 (Fed. Cir. 1990); Kahn v. Gen.
Motors Corp., 889 F.2d 1078 (Fed. Cir. 1989)).
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when raised on mandamus.229
This conclusion, however, is inconsistent with Innotron, which explicitly refused
to entertain petitions regarding the “transfer of [a] case to another district.”  230
Moreover, the syllogism is faulty on its face.  The propositions (1) that the
Federal Circuit has some mandamus authority and (2) that the Federal Circuit
decides issues of venue on appeal do not invariably lead to the conclusion that
the Federal Circuit will hear issues of venue on mandamus.  
As I explain below, the restrictive view of Federal Circuit mandamus
espoused by Innotron was ill-advised, and the broader view embraced by Regents
is more desirable as a normative matter.   But that does not excuse the Federal231
Circuit from its institutional obligation to explain why it was departing from past
precedent.   Moreover, by failing to engage the core question of why the court232
should issue mandamus on non-patent issues, the court missed the opportunity
to more closely analyze and define the proper scope of Federal Circuit
mandamus.  
E.  Innotron Practically Overruled
Although Regents initiated the demise of Innotron, two regional circuit
decisions hastened it.  In In re BBC International Ltd., the Seventh Circuit
transferred to the Federal Circuit a mandamus petition in a patent case that
sought review of, among other things, a decision denying transfer of venue.  233
The court discounted Innotron by stating that Innotron did not deny authority to
issue mandamus on non-patent issues, but simply expressed a “[dis]inclination
to use [that] authority.”   Likewise, the Ninth Circuit, in Lights of America, Inc.234
v. U.S. District Court, transferred a mandamus petition that challenged a district
court action that fell within Innotron’s category (1):  a reference to a special
master.   Like the Seventh Circuit, the Ninth Circuit discounted Innotron by235
stating that it merely expressed a “(proper) reluctance” to issue extraordinary
writs.236
In re Princo Corp.  presented the Federal Circuit itself with an opportunity237
229. Id. (citing In re Cordis Corp., 769 F.2d 733 (Fed. Cir. 1985)).  In Cordis, a case decided
a year before Innotron, the court denied a mandamus petition seeking dismissal for improper venue. 
See Cordis, 769 F.2d at 734.
230. Innotron, 800 F.2d at 1082.  
231. See infra Part IV.A.
232. See PAUL D. CARRINGTON ET AL., JUSTICE ON APPEAL 31 (1976) (“The integrity of the
process requires that courts state reasons for their decisions.”).
233. In re BBC Int’l Ltd., 99 F.3d 811, 812 (7th Cir. 1996).
234. Id. at 813.
235. Lights of Am., Inc. v. U.S. Dist. Court, 130 F.3d 1369, 1370 (9th Cir. 1997); see
Innotron, 800 F.2d at 1082 (disclaiming the ability to review on mandamus orders of “reference to
master”).
236. Lights of Am., 130 F.3d at 1371.
237. 478 F.3d 1345 (Fed. Cir. 2007). 
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to confront Innotron and reconceptualize the scope of Federal Circuit mandamus. 
Despite the respondent’s citation to Innotron, the court in Princo granted
mandamus, holding that the district court had erroneously refused to stay a patent
infringement case pending an investigation by the International Trade
Commission.   The court acknowledged Innotron, but it framed the case not as238
a limit on Federal Circuit power, but rather as articulating a “discretionary
exception” that, “if it exists at all, is exceptionally narrow.”   Like the courts in239
BBC and Lights of America, the court in Princo focused on the negative task of
explaining why Innotron did not apply instead of answering the positive question
of why a broad use of mandamus by the Federal Circuit is normatively
appropriate.
The lengths to which the courts have gone to distinguish and downplay
Innotron make clear that its limitations on Federal Circuit mandamus are
unworkable.  Yet Innotron remains on the books and is cited in authoritative
treatises.   Parties opposing mandamus in the Federal Circuit also continue to240
cite Innotron in support.   Given this conflicting case law, the preeminent241
treatise on federal jurisdiction and procedure laments the “unsettled” relationship
between Federal Circuit and regional circuit writ authority.   242
Not only is this current state of the law confusing to litigants, it reflects no
thought about the doctrinal and policy considerations that might define the proper
scope of mandamus in the Federal Circuit.  The consequence of the Federal
Circuit’s incessant relegation of Innotron is that the court, without engaging in
a conscious analysis of the optimal use of its mandamus power, has developed
a de facto standard under which it will issue mandamus on any non-patent issue
that arises in a patent case, so long as the petition meets the substantive
requirements for the writ.   In the next part, I contend that the Federal Circuit’s243
recent venue decisions illustrate the shortcomings of this broad, unthinking
approach.  
238. Id. at 1347.
239. Id. at 1352.
240. See 16 WRIGHT ET AL., supra note 6, § 3932 (citing Innotron for the proposition that the
Federal Circuit “will not . . . use [mandamus] to supervise or oversee the district courts, nor to
resolve issues that arise in all types of cases and do not directly implicate the Federal Circuit’s
patent . . . jurisprudence”); see also ROBERT L. HARMON, PATENTS AND THE FEDERAL CIRCUIT 1206
nn.252 & 255 (8th ed. 2007). 
241. See, e.g., Princo, 478 F.3d at 1352; Lear Corp.’s Combined Petition for Panel Rehearing
and Rehearing En Banc at 3-5, 10-12, In re TS Tech. USA Corp., 551 F.3d 1315 (Fed. Cir. 2009)
(Misc. No. 2009-888), 2009 WL 329935; see also Reply in Support of Petition for a Writ of
Certiorari at 4 n.4, 7, MedioStream, Inc. v. Acer Am. Corp., 131 S. Ct. 2447 (2011) (No. 10-1090),
2011 WL 1479065.
242. 15A WRIGHT ET AL., supra note 6, § 3903.1.
243. See Princo, 478 F.3d at 1352.
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III.  SUPERVISORY PLUS MANDAMUS
Although the Federal Circuit has never overruled Innotron, it continues to
expand its use of mandamus.  The court’s recent, repeated grant of mandamus to
overturn the venue decisions of the Eastern District of Texas is an unprecedented
use of supervisory mandamus by the Federal Circuit.  In pioneering this radical
use of the writ, which I identify as a new “supervisory plus” theory of mandamus,
the court has let pass by an opportunity to make a clarifying statement about
mandamus in the Federal Circuit.  
I begin this part with background on the Eastern District of Texas and its
surprisingly large patent docket.  I then summarize the Federal Circuit’s recent
venue decisions, highlighting the inconsistencies that flow from the lack of clear,
guiding principles for Federal Circuit mandamus on non-patent issues.  These
inconsistencies, I contend, confirm the need for the reconceptualized model of
Federal Circuit mandamus that I describe in Part IV.    
A.  Patent Litigation in the Eastern District of Texas—
the “Renegade Jurisdiction”
Despite Congress’s effort to curb forum shopping in patent cases by creating
the Federal Circuit, the court decides only a small fraction of all patent cases.  244
Moreover, even in cases that are appealed, a district judge makes scores of
discretionary decisions that are effectively unreviewable on appeal but that, when
considered as a whole, significantly impact the outcome of the case.   Although245
district courts are required to apply Federal Circuit law to patent issues, little
question exists that patent holders are more likely to win in certain federal
judicial districts than in others.  246
At the fore of the debate over forum shopping is the Eastern District of
Texas.   One might not expect patent litigation to comprise much of the docket247
244. See Jay P. Kesan & Gwendolyn G. Ball, How Are Patent Cases Resolved?  An Empirical
Examination of the Adjudication and Settlement of Patent Disputes, 84 WASH. U. L. REV. 237, 271
(2006) (noting that about fifteen percent of patent cases are terminated by an appealable court
decision); accord Mark A. Lemley, Where to File Your Patent Case, 38 AIPLA Q.J. 401, 405
(2010).  Thus, at most, only fifteen percent of all patent cases are appealed to the Federal Circuit,
although the actual number is certainly smaller.  See Kimberly A. Moore, Judges, Juries, and
Patent Cases—An Empirical Peek Inside the Black Box, 99 MICH. L. REV. 365, 397 tbl.6 (2000)
(indicating that fifty-one percent of patent cases terminated after a trial were appealed).
245. See RICHARD A. POSNER, THE FEDERAL COURTS:  CHALLENGE AND REFORM 340 (1996).
246. See Kimberly A. Moore, Forum Shopping in Patent Cases:  Does Geographic Choice
Affect Innovation?, 79 N.C. L. REV. 889, 892 (2001); see also Ted Sichelman, Myths of
(Un)certainty at the Federal Circuit, 43 LOYOLA L.A. L. REV. 1161, 1171 (2010) (noting that,
while the Federal Circuit has improved doctrinal uniformity, “forum shopping remains a pernicious
feature of . . . patent litigation”).  
247. See Yan Leychkis, Of Fire Ants and Claim Construction:  An Empirical Study of the
Meteoric Rise of the Eastern District of Texas as a Preeminent Forum for Patent Litigation, 9 YALE
J.L. & TECH. 193, 195 (2007).
2012] THE NEW FEDERAL CIRCUIT MANDAMUS 377
of a court headquartered in Tyler, Texas, with judges also sitting in Marshall
(where most of the patent cases are filed),  Texarkana, Plano, and Beaumont.  248 249
Yet, in the past decade, more patent cases have been filed in the Eastern District
of Texas than in all but three other large, urban federal judicial districts that are
technology centers:  the Central District of California (Los Angeles), the
Northern District of California (San Francisco), and the Northern District of
Illinois (Chicago).   Indeed, patent litigation has helped revitalize Marshall’s250
economy, which once thrived on the oil, natural gas, and railroad businesses, but
had fallen on hard times by the late 1990s.251
Why would so many high-technology cases and high-powered litigants and
lawyers end up in the self-proclaimed Pottery Capital of the World?   The252
literature offers two common explanations.  The first attributes the Eastern
District’s patent docket to the court’s judges and the local rules they have adopted. 
Patent cases are often high-stakes affairs that present challenging legal questions. 
As a result, the cases are highly desirable for judges in a relatively rural area like
the Eastern District.   Moreover, the Eastern District’s judges show great253
enthusiasm for patent cases.   And the court’s system for assigning cases to its254
judges permits plaintiffs to predict with a great deal of certainty which judge will
hear their case.   In addition, the court was one of the first districts to adopt255
248. See Julie Creswell, So Small a Town, So Many Patent Cases, N.Y. TIMES, Sept. 24, 2006,
at B1.
249. See Xuan-Thao Nguyen, Justice Scalia’s “Renegade Jurisdiction”:  Lessons for Patent
Law Reform, 83 TUL. L. REV. 111, 120 (2008) [hereinafter Nguyen, Renegade Jurisdiction]
(discussing the geography of the Eastern District); U.S. DIST. COURT E. DIST. TEXAS, http://www.
txed.uscourts.gov (last visited Mar. 2, 2012) (providing information about the court and its judges). 
250. Lemley, supra note 244, at 405.
251. See Creswell, supra note 248. 
252. Barry Popik, Pottery Capital of the World (Marshall Nickname), BIG APPLE (Mar. 20,
2008), http://www.barrypopik.com/index.php/new_york_city/entry/pottery_capital_of_the_
world_marshall_nickname. 
253. See Nguyen, Renegade Jurisdiction, supra note 249, at 136-38.
254. See id. at 136 n.116.
255. See General Order Assigning Civil and Criminal Actions 11-13 (E.D. Tex. Oct. 3, 2011)
(indicating, for example, that 95% of patent cases filed in the Tyler division will be assigned to
Judge Davis, that 100% of patent cases filed in the Beaumont or Lufkin divisions will be assigned
to Judge Clark, and that all cases filed in Marshall and Texarkana will be assigned to Chief Judge
Folsom), available at http://www.txed.uscourts.gov/cgi-bin/view_document.cgi?document=20937. 
With Judge Folsom’s retirement in March 2012, the ability to “judge shop” may be somewhat
reduced.  See General Order Assigning Civil and Criminal Actions 12-3 (E.D. Tex. Jan. 17, 2012)
(indicating that civil cases filed in Marshall and Texarkana will be split between Judge Schneider
and Judge Gilstrap), available at http://www.txed.uscourts.gov/cgi-bin/view_document.cgi?
document=21694.  Judicial assignments in the Eastern District might also be affected by the Eastern
District’s participation in the Patent Pilot Program, which, in essence, allows certain judges to
express a preference for hearing patent cases and allows other judges to decline to hear patent cases. 
See District Courts Selected for Patent Pilot Program, ADMIN. OFF. U.S. CTS. (June 7, 2011),
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special local rules for patent cases,  which have made the court’s docket256
particularly fast-moving.   The court’s enthusiasm for patent cases, coupled with257
the restorative effect of patent litigation on Marshall’s economy, fueled the
popular notion that the judges of the Eastern District were unduly reluctant to
transfer patent cases to more convenient fora under § 1404(a).   But recent258
empirical studies have somewhat undermined this notion, suggesting that the
Eastern District transfers about the same percentage of its patent cases as other
judicial districts.     259
http://www.uscourts.gov/news/newsview/11-06-07/District_Courts_Selected_for_Patent_Pilot_
Program.aspx; see also Pilot Program in Certain District Courts, Pub. L. No. 111-349, 124 Stat.
3674 (2011).
Predictability in the assignment of cases has long been important for litigants choosing a venue
in a patent case.  In the 1990s, one of the most popular forums for patent litigation was the
Alexandria division of the Eastern District of Virginia, due to its fast-moving docket and proximity
to Washington, D.C.  See Nguyen, Renegade Jurisdiction, supra note 249, at 132-34.  The
division’s popularity quickly faded, however, after its district enacted a district-wide assignment
system for patent cases, under which a patent case filed in Alexandria could be assigned to the
Richmond, Newport News, or Norfolk divisions.  See Michael W. Robinson, Recent Developments
in Patent Litigation in the Eastern District of Virginia, VENABLE LLP (Jan. 1, 1999), http://www.
venable.com/recent-developments-in-patent-litigation-in-the-eastern-district-of-virginia-01-01-
1999.
256. See Xuan-Thao Nguyen, Dynamic Federalism and Patent Law Reform, 85 IND. L.J. 449,
476-77 (2010) [hereinafter Nguyen, Dynamic Federalism]; E.D. TEX. LOCAL R. app. M.  
257. See Gregory A. Castanias et al., Survey of the Federal Circuit’s Patent Law Decisions
in 2006:  A New Chapter in the Ongoing Dialogue with the Supreme Court, 56 AM. U. L. REV.
793, 983 (2007); see also Andrei Iancu & Jay Chung, Real Reasons the Eastern District of Texas
Draws Patent Cases—Beyond Lore and Anecdote, 14 SMU SCI. & TECH. L. REV. 299, 305, 313
(2011) (comparing case-resolution times in the Eastern District and other popular patent districts
over the past twenty years and concluding that “the Eastern District of Texas historically has had
a relatively quicker time to jury verdict than many other popular patent districts” but that “[i]t has
not been . . . the fastest”).  For a discussion by now-retired Judge T. John Ward of the origins of
the patent rules, see Symposium on Emerging Intellectual Property Issues, The History and
Development of the EDTX as a Court with Patent Expertise:  From TI Filing, to the First
Markman Hearing, to the Present, 14 SMU SCI. & TECH. L. REV. 253, 255-56 (2011).
258. See 28 U.S.C. § 1404(a) (2006) (permitting transfer “[f]or the convenience of parties and
witnesses” and “in the interest of justice . . . to any other district or division where it might have
been brought”); Robert A. Matthews, Jr., Update—Transfer of Venue in the E.D. Texas, PAT.
HAPPENINGS, Dec. 2009, at 4, 4-7, available at http://www.jdsupra.com/post/documentViewer.
aspx?fid=52cc121b-d1f4-4ad5-829b-21dc66802091; accord Durham, supra note 1, at 12;
Leychkis, supra note 247, at 216; Offen-Brown, supra note 1, at 73-74; Zhu, supra note 1, at 905-
06.  
259. See Paul M. Janicke, Venue Transfers from the Eastern District of Texas:  Case by Case
or an Endemic Problem?, LANDSLIDE, Mar.-Apr. 2010, at 16, 18-19 [hereinafter Janicke, Venue
Transfers] (arguing, based on data from 2006 and 2007, that the view that it was “impossible, or
nearly so, to get a patent infringement case transferred out of the Eastern District of Texas . . . had
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A second explanation for the Eastern District’s popularity stems from the
favorable results obtained by plaintiffs in that court.  As the court’s patent docket
exploded during the early 2000s, the court developed a reputation for having
juries and judges that were particularly favorable for patent holders.   In a260
famous exchange during oral argument in eBay, Inc. v. MercExchange, L.L.C.,
Carter Phillips and Justice Scalia both took shots at the Eastern District.  Phillips
complained that a Federal Circuit rule providing for nearly automatic injunctions
upon a finding of infringement was particularly harmful to defendants in the
Eastern District because “no patent has ever been declared invalid in that
jurisdiction, and no patent has []ever been found not to infringe.”   Justice261
Scalia responded by stating, “that’s a problem with Marshall, Texas” but that it
might not be appropriate to strike down the automatic-injunction rule simply
“because we have some renegade jurisdictions.”  262
In short, conventional wisdom offers two reasons for the attractiveness of the
Eastern District as a patent-litigation forum:  (1) a fast-moving docket, often
attributed to the court’s special patent rules (which stem from the judges’
enthusiasm for patent cases) and (2) patent-holder-friendly judges and juries. 
Mark Lemley has suggested that, as an empirical matter, the basis for the first
rationale is currently debatable—the Eastern District might no longer be a
little validity”); Paul M. Janicke, Patent Venue and Convenience Transfer:  New World or Small
Shift?, 11 N.C. J.L. & TECH. ONLINE 1, 19-23 (2009) [hereinafter Janicke, Patent Venue] (reaching
a similar conclusion based on data from 2005 to 2008); see also Chester S. Chuang, Offensive
Venue:  The Curious Use of Declaratory Judgment to Forum Shop in Patent Litigation, 80 GEO.
WASH. L. REV. (forthcoming 2012) (unpublished manuscript on file with the author) (finding,
consistent with Janicke’s studies, that the Eastern District grants about forty-eight percent of
transfer motions filed in non-declaratory judgment cases); Symposium on Emerging Intellectual
Property Issues, Tribalism and Customary Practices of the EDTX, 14 SMU SCI. & TECH. L. REV.
239, 247 (2011) (providing discussion by Michael E. Jones, long-time practitioner in the Eastern
District, regarding his personal success with transfer motions, noting that the “idea that the judges
will never transfer the case is just not true”). 
260. See Michael H. Baniak et al., IP Litigation in the 21st Century, 6 NW. J. TECH. & INTELL.
PROP. 293, 298 (2008); Donald R. Dunner, The U.S. Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit:  Its
Critical Role in the Revitalization of U.S. Patent Jurisprudence, Past, Present, and Future, 43
LOYOLA L.A. L. REV. 775, 781-82 (2010); Leychkis, supra note 247, at 206; Daniel Fisher, Plaintiff
Paradise, FORBES, Aug. 19, 2009, http://www.forbes.com/forbes/2009/0907/outfront-patent-law-
texas-plaintiff-paradise.html.
261. Transcript of Oral Argument, supra note 14, at 10; see also Leychkis, supra note 247, at
211-12 tbl.7 (listing patent jury trials in the Eastern District from 1999 to 2006, and showing that
no defendant prevailed until two defendants won in the summer of 2006). 
262. Transcript of Oral Argument, supra note 14, at 10-11.  If the Eastern District were truly
a “renegade” in that it disregarded the law of patent infringement and validity, one would expect
the court to be frequently reversed on appeal.  But at least one study suggests that the Eastern
District’s affirmance rate is actually above average.  See Iancu & Chung, supra note 257, at 306-07
(calculating that, from 1991 to 2010, the Federal Circuit affirmed in full 61% of appeals from the
Eastern District, slightly above the national average for all Federal Circuit patent cases).  
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“rocket docket.”   However, available data tends to support the notion that263
patent holders fare particularly well in the Eastern District.  Out of judicial
districts with more than twenty-five patent cases concluded in the past decade,
the Eastern District ranks sixth in percentage of wins by claimants.   And,264
almost as importantly, patent cases make it to trial in the Eastern District more
frequently than any other district besides the District of Delaware.   Because265
accused infringers in the Eastern District are particularly unsuccessful in
prevailing on dispositive pre-trial motions,  more cases are ultimately decided266
by juries, which are relatively sympathetic to claims of patent infringement.  267
263. See Lemley, supra note 244, at 424 tbl.9, showing that the Eastern District of Texas ranks
twenty-eighth among federal judicial districts in time to resolution in patent cases.  Lemley reasons
that the district’s low ranking “is likely a function of congestion resulting from its popularity as a
patent forum.”  Id. at 415.  Lemley’s statistics also show, however, that the Eastern District ranks
seventh among judicial districts in time to trial.  Id. at 419 tbl.7.  In part because of the relatively
average speed with which the Eastern District currently tries and resolves patent cases, Lemley
concludes that the district is overvalued as a forum for patent holders.  Id. at 428; accord Baniak
et al., supra note 260, at 298.  Patent holders may finally be catching on, as the number of patent
cases filed in the Eastern District declined from 359 in the twelve-month period ending September
30, 2007, to 322 in the twelve-month period ending September 30, 2008, to 242 in the twelve-
month period ending September 30, 2009.  See JAMES C. DUFF, JUDICIAL BUSINESS OF THE  UNITED
STATES COURTS:  2009 ANNUAL REPORT OF THE DIRECTOR 192 tbl.C-11 (2009); JAMES C. DUFF,
JUDICIAL BUSINESS OF THE UNITED STATES COURTS:  2008 ANNUAL REPORT OF THE DIRECTOR 197
tbl.C-11 (2008); JAMES C. DUFF, JUDICIAL BUSINESS OF THE UNITED STATES COURTS:  2007
ANNUAL REPORT OF THE DIRECTOR 199 tbl.C-11 (2007); see also Offen-Brown, supra note 1, at
70 tbl.1 (documenting the Eastern District’s patent case load from 2002 to 2009).  But cf. Douglas
C. Muth et al., The Local Patent Rules Bandwagon, 21 INTELL. PROP. & TECH. L.J., Aug. 2009, at
19 (arguing that the enactment of local patent rules in many other districts over the past four years
has siphoned cases away from the Eastern District).  
In 2010, however, the number of patent-case filings in the Eastern District increased to 446. 
See JAMES C. DUFF, JUDICIAL BUSINESS OF THE UNITED STATES COURTS:  ANNUAL REPORT OF THE
DIRECTOR 195 tbl.C-11 (2010) [hereinafter 2010 AO REPORT].  Some of this number may be
attributable to an increase in qui tam cases alleging false marking.  See Forest Group, Inc. v. Bon
Tool Co., 590 F.3d 1295, 1304 (Fed. Cir. 2009) (holding that the statutory fine under 35 U.S.C.
§ 292 for marking as “patented” an unpatented article must be imposed on each individual article
falsely marked, up to the statutory maximum of $500 per article), abrogated in part by Leahy-
Smith America Invents Act, Pub. L. No. 112-29, § 16(b), 125 Stat. 284, 329 (2011) (to be codified
at 35 U.S.C. § 292) (eliminating qui tam false marking suits).  However, at least one commentator
has concluded that, even excluding false marking cases, the Eastern District saw an increase in
filings from 2009 to 2010.  See James Pistorino, Concentration of Patent Cases in Eastern District
of Texas Increases in 2010, 81 PAT. TRADEMARK & COPYRIGHT J. (BNA) 803 tbls.2-3 (2011)
(using data culled from PACER).
264. Lemley, supra note 244, at 424 tbl.9.
265. Id. at 419 tbl.7.
266. See Iancu & Chung, supra note 257, at 317; Leychkis, supra note 247, at 216.  
267. See Iancu & Chung, supra note 257, at 305.
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In short, while the judges and juries of the Eastern District might not be as
categorically pro-patent as advocates for infringement defendants might
suggest,  the available data suggests that a patent holder will, as a general268
matter, fare better in the Eastern District than in many other district courts.
B.  Federal Circuit Supervision of the Eastern District’s Venue Decisions
Under the conventional view, the Eastern District protected its large patent
docket by being disinclined to transfer cases to other districts.   Since December269
2008, however, the Federal Circuit has seemingly tried to change the Eastern
District’s perceived reluctance to transfer.  Seizing on an en banc opinion of the
Fifth Circuit in a tort case,  the Federal Circuit has, since December 2008,270
granted ten mandamus petitions seeking transfer of patent cases out of the
Eastern District, after having never ordered transfer on mandamus in the court’s
first twenty-six years of existence.   This dramatic expansion in the availability271
of an extraordinary writ, coupled with inconsistencies in the court’s mandamus
case law, warrants a clarifying statement by the Federal Circuit about the
standards for mandamus.  The need for a clarifying statement is underscored by
the court’s recent, pathbreaking decision to use mandamus to order a court
besides the Eastern District of Texas to transfer venue. 
1.  The Fifth Circuit Lays the Foundation (Volkswagen).—The Federal
Circuit’s mandamus revolution began in the Fifth Circuit, with that court’s en
banc ruling in In re Volkswagen of America, Inc.   In a 10-7 decision, the Fifth272
Circuit granted mandamus and ordered the Eastern District of Texas to transfer
to the Northern District of Texas a tort case that arose out of a traffic accident in
the Northern District.   In reviewing the Eastern District’s refusal to transfer,273
268. Compare id. (calculating that patentees win seventy-three percent of jury trials in the
Eastern District, only slightly above the national average of sixty-eight percent), and Nguyen,
Renegade Jurisdiction, supra note 249, at 138-39, 142-43 (discussing Eastern District rulings and
verdicts in favor of accused infringers), with Sam Williams, A Haven for Patent Pirates, TECH. REV.
(Feb. 3, 2006), http://www.technologyreview.com/printer_friendly_article.aspx?id=16280
(discussing the views of advocates for infringement defendants, concluding that “plaintiffs have
such an easy time winning patent-infringement lawsuits [in the Eastern District] . . . that defendants
often choose to settle rather than fight”), and Brief for Amicus Curiae American Intellectual
Property Law Association in Support of Petitioners at 1, In re Volkswagen of Am., Inc., 545 F.3d
304 (5th Cir. 2008) (en banc) (No. 07-40058), 2008 WL 7789554 [hereinafter AIPLA Volkswagen
Amicus Brief] (noting “the widespread belief that the Eastern District of Texas is a plaintiff-friendly
venue that provides a substantial litigation advantage to a patent holder”).
269. See, e.g., Janicke, Patent Venue, supra note 259, at 4. 
270. Volkswagen, 545 F.3d 304.
271. See supra note 16 and accompanying text; cf. In re Holmes, Misc. No. 352, 1992 WL
349347, at *1 (Fed. Cir. Oct. 14, 1992) (granting mandamus petition from denial of transfer, but
ordering only that the district court reconsider its initial denial).
272. 545 F.3d 304.
273. Id. at 307.
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the Fifth Circuit applied the eight public and private interest factors of Gulf Oil
Corp. v. Gilbert,  a seminal forum non conveniens case.   To the Fifth Circuit,274 275
the most critical factors were (1) “the relative ease of access to sources of proof,”
(2) “the availability of compulsory process to secure the attendance of
witnesses,” (3) “the cost of attendance for willing witnesses,” and (4) “the local
interest in having localized interests decided at home.”   The Fifth Circuit276
determined that the Eastern District had misapplied these factors, granted
mandamus, and ordered transfer to the Northern District.277
Notably, on the “sources of proof” factor, the Fifth Circuit criticized the
district court for emphasizing that technological advances in document storage
and evidence transportation reduced the difference in convenience between the
Northern and Eastern Districts.   Accusing the district court of “read[ing] the278
sources of proof requirement out of the § 1404(a) analysis,” the court emphasized
that all of the documents and physical evidence, as well as the accident site, were
in the Northern District, favoring transfer.   Also, on the “cost of attendance for279
willing witnesses” factor, the Fifth Circuit stated that it had adopted a “100-mile”
rule, which provided that “[w]hen the distance between an existing venue for trial
. . . and a proposed venue under § 1404(a) is more than 100 miles, the factor of
inconvenience to witnesses increases in direct relationship to the additional
distance to be traveled.”   Because the trial venue in the Eastern District was280
155 miles from Dallas, the Fifth Circuit reasoned that this factor, too, weighed
in favor of transfer.  281
The Fifth Circuit’s traditionalist view of the “sources of proof” factor and its
formalistic 100-mile rule could be fairly criticized in an era when e-discovery and
e-filing are the reality and travel costs vary based on many factors besides sheer
distance.   Moreover, the plaintiffs lived in the Eastern District when the282
accident occurred, and many key witnesses remained there.   Although a full283
critique of Volkswagen is beyond the scope of this Article, the salient point as
relevant to Federal Circuit mandamus is that the proper outcome of the § 1404(a)
analysis was at least debatable.  Whether the district court was right or wrong to
deny transfer, it is hard to see how Volkswagen’s right to transfer was “clear and
274. 330 U.S. 501 (1947).
275. Volkswagen, 545 F.3d at 315.
276. Id. at 315-16 (internal quotation marks omitted).  The other Gulf Oil factors include: 
practical problems making trial expeditious and inexpensive, court congestion, the forum’s
familiarity with the governing law, and the avoidance of unnecessary conflict-of-laws problems. 
Id. at 315.
277. Id. at 316-18.
278. Id. at 316.
279. Id.
280. Id. at 317 (quoting In re Volkswagen AG, 371 F.3d 201, 204-05 (5th Cir. 2004) (internal
quotation marks omitted)).
281. Id.
282. See id. at 322 (King, J., dissenting).
283. See id.
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indisputable,” as the Supreme Court requires for mandamus to issue.   Yet the284
Fifth Circuit granted the writ.
2.  An Unprecedented Grant of Mandamus by the Federal Circuit (TS Tech)
and Early Hints at Instability (Telular and Genentech).—Although Volkswagen
was a tort case, the American Intellectual Property Law Association appeared as
amicus curiae, urging the Fifth Circuit to grant mandamus because the “plaintiff-
friendly” Eastern District was too reluctant to transfer patent cases.   And285
indeed, Volkswagen has played a central role in the Federal Circuit’s mandamus
revolution.  For one, it signaled to the Federal Circuit that the Fifth Circuit was
willing to grant the writ in debatable circumstances, especially in cases from the
Eastern District.  Moreover, because the Federal Circuit had effectively
abandoned any Federal Circuit-specific limitations on the availability of
mandamus (such as those articulated in Innotron), granting mandamus to
overturn Eastern District venue decisions now required no more than analogizing
to Volkswagen, since transfer of venue is a non-patent issue that is controlled by
regional circuit law.  
That is exactly what the Federal Circuit did in its first mandamus decision
granting transfer of venue, In re TS Tech USA Corp., decided in December
2008.   In that case, Lear Corp. sued TS Tech in the Eastern District of Texas286
for patent infringement.   TS Tech filed a motion to transfer the case to the287
Southern District of Ohio, which the district court denied.   On TS Tech’s288
petition for mandamus, the Federal Circuit ordered transfer.289
The Federal Circuit hewed very close to Volkswagen.  In an order written by
Judge Rader, the court determined that the Eastern District misapplied three of
the four § 1404(a) factors that the district court had misapplied in Volkswagen.  290
Notably, on the “cost for witnesses” factor, the court stated that district court
ignored the 100-mile rule by downplaying the significance of the additional
distance between Texas and the key witnesses, who resided in Ohio, Michigan,
and Canada.   Moreover, the Federal Circuit, like the Fifth Circuit in291
Volkswagen, determined that the district court “read[] out of the § 1404(a)
analysis” the “sources of proof” factor, when it emphasized that many of the
284. Cheney v. U.S. Dist. Court, 542 U.S. 367, 380-81 (2004).
285. AIPLA Volkswagen Amicus Brief, supra note 268, at 1-2.  In response, a group of
intellectual property lawyers from the Eastern District filed an amicus brief arguing against
mandamus.  See Brief for Amicus Curiae Ad Hoc Committee of Intellectual Property Trial Lawyers
in the Eastern District of Texas in Support of Respondents at 21, Volkswagen, 545 F.3d 304 (No.
07-40058), 2008 WL 7789556 (“The Eastern District has unjustly garnered a reputation as a place
where large corporations are dragged against their will, particularly in patent cases, and given a
good thrashing.  This reputation is largely a myth.”).  
286. In re TS Tech USA Corp., 551 F.3d 1315 (Fed. Cir. 2008).  
287. Id. at 1318.
288. Id. 
289. Id.
290. Id. at 1319-21.
291. Id. at 1320.
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relevant documents were stored electronically.   292
In the wake of TS Tech, the Federal Circuit faced an onslaught of mandamus
petitions seeking transfer out of the Eastern District.  The court’s next mandamus
decision was an unpublished order in In re Telular Corp.   In Telular, the court293
denied a petition seeking transfer from the Eastern District of Texas to the
Northern District of Illinois.   Although the court again applied Fifth Circuit294
law, the court emphasized a stringent standard found only in a footnote in
Volkswagen and found nowhere in TS Tech.  The court noted that it will not grant
a mandamus petition “[u]nless it is clear that the facts and circumstances are
without any basis for a judgment of discretion.”   The court continued:  “In295
other words, we will deny a petition ‘[i]f the facts and circumstances are
rationally capable of providing reasons for what the district court has done.’”296
If the courts had emphasized such a stringent standard in Volkswagen or TS
Tech, those cases might have turned out differently.  Perhaps the district courts
reached the wrong result in those cases, but the courts certainly provided reasons
for denying transfer that were at least rational.  Justifications such as the ease of
transporting evidence and witnesses might not be persuasive to an appellate court
deciding the issue de novo, but surely they meet the minimal standard of
rationality set forth in Telular. 
Viewed together, TS Tech and Telular might hint that, although the Federal
Circuit was applying Fifth Circuit law, its mandamus analysis was more dynamic. 
The Federal Circuit’s next significant encounter with mandamus explicitly
embraced a more context-sensitive analysis.  In In re Genentech, Inc., the
defendants sought an order directing the Eastern District of Texas to transfer a
patent infringement case brought by Sanofi-Aventis to the Northern District of
California.   The district court had denied transfer.   While the defendants297 298
were headquartered in California and several witnesses lived in California, many
other witnesses and documents were scattered throughout the United States and
Europe.   So, the district court reasoned, Texas was a convenient, central299
location for trial.  300
292. Id. at 1320-21.
293. 319 F. App’x 909 (Fed. Cir. 2009).
294. Id. at 912.
295. Id. at 911 (citing In re Volkswagen of Am., Inc., 545 F.3d 304, 317 n.7 (5th Cir. 2008)
(en banc)).
296. Id. at 911-12 (quoting Volkswagen, 545 F.3d at 317 n.7 (alteration in original)).
297. In re Genentech, Inc., 566 F.3d 1338, 1341 (Fed. Cir. 2009).  On the same day the court
issued Genentech, the court decided In re Volkswagen of America, Inc., 566 F.3d 1349, 1351 (Fed.
Cir. 2009), in which the court denied a mandamus petition seeking transfer from the Eastern District
of Texas to the Eastern District of Michigan.  The court emphasized that two other, similar
infringement cases were already pending in the Eastern District of Texas.  Id.
298. Sanofi-Aventis Deutschland GmbH v. Genentech, Inc., 607 F. Supp. 2d 769, 781 (E.D.
Tex.), mandamus granted sub nom. In re Genentech, Inc., 566 F.3d 1338 (Fed. Cir. 2009).
299. Id. at 775-77.
300. Id. at 777.
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The Federal Circuit disagreed.   Much of the Federal Circuit’s opinion301
concerns the district court’s analysis of the convenience to the parties and
witnesses.  The district court had strictly applied the 100-mile rule, noting that
it would be more convenient for European witnesses to travel to Texas than to
California.   The Federal Circuit criticized the district court on this point, noting302
instead that the 100-mile rule “should not be rigidly applied” in this case, because
the European witnesses would have to travel a long distance regardless.   The303
court applied a similar analysis on the “sources of proof” factor, emphasizing that
Sanofi’s documents would have to be transported from Europe and the East
Coast whether the case was tried in Texas or California.304
TS Tech, Telular, and Genentech reveal some doctrinal instability beneath
the Federal Circuit’s initial foray into reviewing the Eastern District’s decisions
on transfer of venue.  In TS Tech, the court deferred to the Fifth Circuit’s
formalist transfer rules,  but in Genetech the court downplayed the rigidity of305
those rules.   And, in Telular, the court announced a “rationality” standard for306
mandamus relief  that the petitioners in TS Tech and Genetech would have307
been hard pressed to meet, had the court applied it.   
3.  Instability Entrenched (Hoffman-La Roche, Nintendo, VTech, Apple, and
Acer).—The court next granted transfer in In re Hoffman-La Roche Inc.  and308
In re Nintendo Co.   While Hoffman-La Roche presented a reasonably strong309
case for transfer,  Nintendo was closer.  In Nintendo, Motiva, an Ohio310
corporation, sued Nintendo Co. (a Japanese corporation headquartered in Japan)
and Nintendo of America Inc. (a Washington corporation headquartered in
Redmond, Washington) (collectively, “Nintendo”), alleging that the Nintendo
Wii infringed a patent owned by Motiva.   Nintendo sought transfer to the311
Western District of Washington.   Although the district court concluded that the312
“cost for attendance of willing witnesses factor slightly favor[ed] transfer, and
the ‘local interest’ factor strongly favor[ed] transfer,” the district court
nevertheless denied transfer because, unlike in Genentech and TS Tech, Nintendo
had not shown that the vast majority of documents and witnesses were located
301. See Genentech, 566 F.3d 1338.
302. Id. at 1344.
303. Id.
304. See id. at 1346.
305. See In re TS Tech USA Corp., 551 F.3d 1315, 1320-22 (Fed. Cir. 2008).
306. See Genentech, 566 F.3d at 1344-46.
307. In re Telular Corp., 319 F. App’x 909, 912 (2009).
308. 587 F.3d 1333, 1335 (Fed. Cir. 2009).
309. 589 F.3d 1194, 1201 (Fed. Cir. 2009).
310. In Hoffman-La Roche, the Federal Circuit granted transfer from the Eastern District of
Texas to the Eastern District of North Carolina.  Hoffman-La Roche, 587 F.3d at 1335.  As in TS
Tech, the case had no connection to Texas.  Id. at 1336-37.  Rather, much of the evidence was
located in North Carolina and many of the key witnesses lived there.  Id.  
311. Nintendo, 589 F.3d at 1196-97.
312. Id. at 1197.
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near the transferee court.   Rather, there were witnesses and documents in Japan313
and at various locations throughout the United States.   The Federal Circuit314
disagreed and ordered transfer.315
The Federal Circuit’s application of the “cost for witnesses” and “sources of
proof” factors in Nintendo is debatable.  The Federal Circuit claimed that the
“cost for witnesses” factor “clearly” favored transfer,  but it is hard to see how316
this is so.  Four potential witnesses lived in Washington, four lived in Japan, one
lived in Ohio, and one lived in New York.   There is no doubt a Washington317
trial would have been more convenient for the four Washington witnesses.  But
given that the witnesses from Japan would have to travel a substantial distance
regardless (an argument similar to that advanced by the Federal Circuit in
granting transfer in Genentech) and that the Ohio and New York witnesses would
have to travel farther for a Washington trial, it is hard to see how this factor
“clearly” favored transfer.  318
Similarly, on the “sources of proof” factor, the Federal Circuit gave
substantial weight to Nintendo’s claim that most of Nintendo of America’s
relevant documents were located in Washington.   But the record also showed319
that Nintendo’s research and development documents were located in Japan.  320
Thus, many of the relevant documents would have to travel a significant distance,
regardless of where the trial was held.  Certainly, a trial in Washington may have
been marginally more convenient.  But it is hard to see how this factor weighed
“heavily” in favor of transfer, as the Federal Circuit asserted.  321
The court’s emphasis on the two factors it viewed as particularly important
suggests an analysis more complex than simply applying Volkswagen.  Yet the
face of the Nintendo opinion does not explicitly reflect consideration of issues
specific to the Federal Circuit or to patent litigation.  If the court had engaged in
this reflection, it might have realized, for example, that it was setting an unusual
precedent by granting mandamus a fourth time in six months on the same issue
decided by the same district court.
Although the court denied the next two petitions it decided,  the decisions322
still do not reflect any introspection.  Instead, they exhibit more doctrinal
instability.  In In re VTech Communications, Inc., the court, as it had done in
Telular, presaged its denial of the petition by framing the legal standard much
313. Motiva LLC v. Nintendo Co., No. 6:08-CV-429, 2009 WL 1882836, at *6 (E.D. Tex.
June 30, 2009), mandamus granted sub nom. In re Nintendo Co., 589 F.3d 1194 (Fed. Cir. 2009).
314. Id.
315. Nintendo, 589 F.3d at 1196.
316. Id. at 1199.
317. Id. at 1197.
318. See id. at 1199.
319. Id.
320. Id.
321. Id. at 1199-200.  
322. See In re Apple Inc., 374 F. App’x 997 (Fed. Cir. 2010); In re Vtech Commc’ns, Inc.,
Misc. No. 909, 2010 WL 46332, at *1 (Fed. Cir. Jan. 6, 2010).
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more stringently than in cases in which the court had granted petitions.   Then,323
in In re Apple Inc., the court framed the standard in even more stringent terms:
Applying Fifth Circuit law in cases arising from district courts in that
circuit, this court has held that mandamus may be used to correct a
patently erroneous denial of transfer.  That standard is an exacting one,
requiring the petitioner to establish that the district court’s decision
amounted to a failure to meaningfully consider the merits of the transfer
motion.324
The court has repeated this new, “failure to meaningfully consider the merits”
standard in at least two subsequent orders denying mandamus.   The stringent325
standards that the Federal Circuit has sometimes applied in denying mandamus
are the simplest illustrations of the need for a clarifying statement by the Federal
Circuit about its mandamus standards.
4.  Capitalizing on Federal Circuit Expertise (Zimmer, Microsoft, and
Vistaprint).—While the Federal Circuit may have thus far passed on
opportunities to reframe the role of mandamus, some of the court’s more recent
decisions hint at a more refined analysis.  In In re Vistaprint Ltd., for example,
the Federal Circuit disclaimed an interpretation of Nintendo that would prohibit
denying transfer based on judicial economy when all of the convenience factors
favor transfer.   The court upheld the Eastern District’s denial of transfer326
because, even though many of the relevant witnesses and documents were located
in the proposed transferee district (Massachusetts), the Eastern District had
substantial experience with the patent-in-suit from prior litigation and a co-
pending case involving the same technology and patent.327
The more context-sensitive holding of Vistaprint  built on the court’s prior328
decision in In re Zimmer Holdings, Inc.,  which rejected a plaintiff’s attempt329
to manipulate venue by establishing an office in the Eastern District—at the same
location as another of its litigation counsel’s clients.   The district court had330
denied Zimmer’s motion to transfer, refusing to consider whether the plaintiff
323. VTech Commc’ns, 2010 WL 46332, at *1 (“Unless it is clear that the facts and
circumstances are without any basis for a judgment of discretion, we will not proceed further in a
mandamus petition to examine the district court’s decision.  In other words, we will deny a petition
‘[i]f the facts and circumstances are rationally capable of providing reasons for what the district
court has done.’” (quoting In re Volkswagen of Am., Inc., 545 F.3d 304, 317 n.7 (5th Cir. 2008)
(en banc) (alteration in original))).
324. Apple, 374 F. App’x at 998-99 (citations omitted). 
325. See In re Simpson Strong-Tie Co., 417 Fed. App’x 941, 943 (Fed. Cir. 2011); In re
Echostar Corp., 388 F. App’x 994, 995 (Fed. Cir. 2010).
326. In re Vistaprint Ltd., 628 F.3d 1342, 1345-46 (Fed. Cir. 2010).
327. Id. at 1346-47.
328. See id.
329. 609 F.3d 1378 (Fed. Cir. 2010).
330. Id. at 1379.
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was actually conducting any business in its Texas office.   The Federal Circuit331
granted mandamus.  “Assess[ing] . . . the realities of the case,” the court noted
that the Eastern District was convenient only for the plaintiff’s litigation counsel
and that the plaintiff had no employees in Texas.   Rather, it was a Michigan332
limited liability corporation with two corporate officers who were both residents
of Michigan, where all of its research and development took place.   The court333
found this to be a “classic case” of “gam[ing] the system by artificially seeking
to establish venue.”334
Similarly, in In re Microsoft Corp., the court determined that the plaintiff’s
incorporation in Texas sixteen days before filing suit did not establish the Eastern
District as a convenient place for trial.   The court made clear that it would not335
permit manipulation of the § 1404(a) convenience factors by pointing out that the
plaintiff’s argument against transfer “rest[ed] on a fallacious assumption:  that
this court must honor connections to a preferred forum made in anticipation of
litigation and for the likely purpose of making that forum appear convenient.”336
Cases like Zimmer and Microsoft represent a thoughtful use of mandamus by
the Federal Circuit.  The Federal Circuit is in a unique position to observe
jurisdictional tricks employed by serial patent litigants, such as non-practicing
entities  and their counsel.  Because it hears nearly all appeals filed in patent337
cases nationwide, the court is uniquely situated to engage in a context-sensitive
transfer analysis that accounts for considerations beyond the cold appellate
record and formal legal doctrine.  And the sometimes harsh language used by the
Federal Circuit in Zimmer and Microsoft sends a clear teaching message (one of
the primary purposes of mandamus) to the Eastern District that it should not
permit manipulation of venue.  
Similarly, as Vistaprint suggests, a context-sensitive analysis on mandamus
can and should take account of factors beyond mere convenience that impact
whether a case will be brought to a speedy and efficient resolution.  Somewhat
lost in cases like Nintendo and Genentech, with their emphasis on the importance
of the “access to proof” and “cost to witnesses” factors, is that § 1404(a) makes
transfer available not only “[f]or the convenience of parties and witnesses” but
also “in the interest of justice.”   When, in cases like Vistaprint, the court338
withholds mandamus on the ground that the district court’s expertise with a
particular patent or technology trumps convenience, the court hues more closely
to the transfer statute.   And, of more importance to formulating a cogent theory339
331. Id. at 1380.
332. Id. at 1381.
333. Id.
334. Id.
335. In re Microsoft Corp., 630 F.3d 1361, 1365 (Fed. Cir. 2011).  
336. Id. at 1364.
337. Or, more pejoratively, “patent trolls.”  See J. Jason Williams et al., Strategies for
Combating Patent Trolls, 17 J. INTELL. PROP. L. 367, 368 (2010).  
338. 28 U.S.C. § 1404(a) (2006).
339. See In re Vistaprint Ltd., 628 F.3d 1342, 1346-47 (Fed. Cir. 2010).
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of Federal Circuit mandamus, the court capitalizes on its own familiarity with the
process of patent litigation.  A decision like Vistaprint recognizes, perhaps as
only the Federal Circuit can, that it can be an extraordinary investment of judicial
time and the parties’ resources to educate a judge on the technology relevant to
a particular case.
5.  A New Frontier in the Mandamus Revolution (Link_A).—For the first
three years of its mandamus revolution, the Federal Circuit focused exclusively
on the Eastern District of Texas.  Indeed, one might discount the importance of
the Federal Circuit’s mandamus cases by noting that they all apply Fifth Circuit
law, which embraces a relatively robust role for mandamus in supervising venue
decisions.   In December 2011, however, the court for the first time used340
mandamus to order a court besides the Eastern District of Texas to transfer a
patent case. 
In In re Link_A_Media Devices Corp., Bermuda-based Marvell International
had sued Link_A_Media Devices (LAMD) for patent infringement in the District
of Delaware.   LAMD is incorporated in Delaware but has offices in California,341
Minnesota, the United Kingdom, and Japan.   Claiming that its principal place342
of business was in the Northern District of California, LAMD sought transfer to
that district.   The district court denied the motion, but the Federal Circuit,343
applying Third Circuit law, granted mandamus and ordered transfer.   Much344
like in TS Tech, the case from the Eastern District that began the mandamus
revolution, the Federal Circuit in Link_A criticized the district court for (1)
placing too much weight on the plaintiff’s choice of forum and (2) modernizing
for an era of electronic discovery and air travel the § 1404(a) factors of
“convenience of the witnesses” and “location of the books and records.”  345
Interestingly, however, the leading Third Circuit case on transfer of venue (a case
that the Federal Circuit cited frequently in Link_A) emphasizes that “the
plaintiff’s choice of venue should not be lightly distributed.”   Moreover, that346
case instructs district courts to consider convenience for the witnesses “but only
to the extent that the witnesses may actually be unavailable for trial in one of the
340. See generally Danny S. Ashby et al., The Increasing Use and Importance of Mandamus
in the Fifth Circuit, 43 TEX. TECH L. REV. 1049, 1050 (2011) (summarizing “[t]he current trend in
the Fifth Circuit towards the increased issuance of writs of mandamus,” which began in 2003 with
the court’s decision in In re Horseshoe Entm’t, 337 F.3d 429 (5th Cir. 2003)). 
341. In re Link_A_Media Devices Corp., 662 F.3d 1221, 1221 (Fed. Cir. 2011) (per curiam).
342. Marvell Int’l Ltd. v. Link_A_Media Devices Corp., Civ. No. 10-869-SLR, 2011 WL
2293999, at *1 (D. Del. June 8, 2011), mandamus granted sub nom. In re Link_A_Media Devices
Corp., 662 F.3d 1221 (Fed. Cir. 2011).
343. Id.
344. Link_A, 662 F.3d at 1221.
345. Id. at 1223-24; cf. In re TS Tech USA Corp., 551 F.3d 1315, 1320-21 (Fed. Cir. 2008)
(similar).
346. Jumara v. State Farm Ins. Co., 55 F.3d 873, 879 (3d Cir. 1995) (internal quotation marks
omitted).
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fora.”   That case also indicates that the “location of books and records” factor347
should be “similarly limited to the extent that the files could not be produced in
the alternative forum.”   Despite this seeming flexibility in Third Circuit law348
and no indication that witnesses or evidence could not appear or be produced in
Delaware, the Federal Circuit found that LAMD had a “clear and indisputable”
right to transfer.349
It is too early to tell whether the expansion of aggressive mandamus review
to cases outside the Eastern District of Texas is an emerging trend or an
aberration.   For this reason, the remainder of this Article focuses mostly on the350
mandamus decisions arising out of the Eastern District.  The potential for
expanded use of mandamus supervision, however, reinforces the imperative for
the Federal Circuit to critically assess the proper role of the writ in patent
litigation, a task I begin in Part IV.  
C.  A Question of Motivation and a New Theory of Mandamus
Before analyzing the proper role for mandamus in patent litigation, however,
I consider in more detail the factors that have instigated the Federal Circuit’s
mandamus revolution, focusing mainly on the ten cases from the Eastern District
of Texas.  In particular, I consider two important theoretical questions.  First,
why has the Federal Circuit singled out the Eastern District?  And, second, must
we develop a new theory of appellate mandamus, beyond the jurisdictional,
supervisory, and advisory theories, to classify the Federal Circuit’s unparalleled
supervision of one district court?
1.  The Federal Circuit’s Motivation.—The Federal Circuit’s aggressive
review of the Eastern District’s venue decisions raises questions about the
Federal Circuit’s motivation.  Why is the Federal Circuit so closely supervising
the venue decisions of the Eastern District?  Why has the Federal Circuit not
been as aggressive in reviewing venue decisions of other district courts? 
Although consideration of the court’s motive is admittedly somewhat
speculative, I briefly consider three possible explanations to spur conversation
on the topic. 
347. Id. (emphasis added).
348. Id. (emphasis added).
349. Link_A, 662 F.3d at 1221.
350. Except for Link_A, the Federal Circuit has denied every mandamus petition challenging
a venue decision by a court besides the Eastern District, see supra note 10 and accompanying text,
even though some of those cases presented reasonably strong factual arguments for transfer.  For
instance, in In re Affymetrix, Inc., the Federal Circuit denied a mandamus petition that sought
transfer from the Western District of Wisconsin to the Northern District of California, even though
the defendant’s employee-witnesses, all six third-party witnesses, the development and marketing
documents, and the accused product itself, were located in California.  In re Affymetrix, Inc., Misc.
No. 913, 2010 WL 1525010, at *1-2 (Fed. Cir. Apr. 13, 2010); see also Illumina, Inc. v.
Affymetrix, Inc., No. 09-cv-277-bbc, 2009 WL 3062786, at *1-2 (W.D. Wisc. Sept. 21, 2009)
(district court opinion denying transfer).
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For a simple explanation of the court’s aggressive actions, one might point
to the Eastern District’s poor reputation among patent-infringement defendants,
who are often large corporations that frequently litigate before the Federal
Circuit, and claim that the Federal Circuit has come to the rescue of the corporate
interests that have captured the specialized court.   A second, more refined351
explanation might be that the Federal Circuit is displeased with the efforts of
district courts, like the Eastern District of Texas, that have informally become
judicial centers for patent litigation.  One obvious way to fix the numerous
perceived problems in modern patent law  would be for Congress to change352
patent law from the top-down.  Difficulties with obtaining effective legislative
reform,  however, have caused some scholars in recent years to explore the353
possibility of reforming the patent system from the bottom-up by enhancing trial-
court familiarity with patent law.   Professor Xuan-Thao Nguyen, for example,354
suggests “local” reform of the patent laws through adoption of local patent rules
and development of judicial expertise,  commending the Eastern District as “a355
case study of how a district court has actively transformed itself into a
knowledgeable court with strong expertise in solving patent disputes.”   She356
notes, however, that Congress and the Federal Circuit have attempted to punish
these efforts at local reform, specifically citing the mandamus decisions from the
Eastern District of Texas.   Indeed, the Chief Judge of the Federal Circuit,357
Randall Rader, has on multiple occasions expressed his “concern[] that patent
litigation is becoming too centralized in a few districts.”   358
351. Cf. CARRINGTON ET AL., supra note 232, at 168 (noting the problem that specialized
courts can be dominated by the entities that frequently appear before it).  
352. For comprehensive critiques of the modern patent system, see, for example, JAMES
BESSEN & MICHAEL J. MEURER, PATENT FAILURE:  HOW JUDGES, BUREAUCRATS, AND LAWYERS
PUT INNOVATORS AT RISK (2008); DAN L. BURK & MARK A. LEMLEY, THE PATENT CRISIS AND HOW
THE COURTS CAN SOLVE IT (2009); ADAM B. JAFFE & JOSH LERNER, INNOVATION AND ITS
DISCONTENTS:  HOW OUR BROKEN PATENT SYSTEM IS ENDANGERING INNOVATION AND PROGRESS,
AND WHAT TO DO ABOUT IT (2004).
353. See BURK & LEMLEY, supra note 352, ch. 10.  Congress has made a handful of changes
to the patent statute in the Leahy-Smith America Invents Act, Pub. L. No. 112-29, 125 Stat. 284
(2011) (to be codified in scattered sections of 28 and 35 U.S.C.).  Whether these changes will end
the patent crisis remains to be seen, although some are skeptical.  See, e.g., Talk of the Nation:  Will
Patent Reform Bill Help or Hurt Inventors?, NPR (Sept. 12, 2011), http://www.npr.org/2011/09/12/
140404985/will-patent-reform-bill-help-or-hurt-inventors (comments of James Bessen).  
354. See, e.g., Jeanne C. Fromer, Patentography, 85 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1444, 1447-48 (2010);
Nguyen, Dynamic Federalism, supra note 256, at 474-83.
355. See Nguyen, Dynamic Federalism, supra note 256, at 474-83.  
356. Nguyen, Renegade Jurisdiction, supra note 249, at 114.  
357. See Nguyen, Dynamic Federalism, supra note 256, at 488 n.254.  
358. Interview by Laura Robinson & Erin Gibson with Randall R. Rader, Chief Judge, U.S.
Court of Appeals for the Fed. Circuit (Dec. 9, 2010) [hereinafter Interview with Randall R. Rader],
available at http://www.dlapiper.com/ interview_with_the_honorable_randall_r_rader; see also
Randall R. Rader, Chief Judge, U.S. Court of Appeals for the Fed. Circuit, The State of Patent
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This potential hostility to bottom-up reform might inform an analysis of the
court’s motive in its recent mandamus decisions.  More broadly, aggressive
Federal Circuit supervision of district court procedure fits a narrative that the
Federal Circuit consistently maximizes its power at the expense of other bodies
that interact with patent law, such as the district courts, the PTO, and even state
courts.  While commentators have studied the Federal Circuit’s relationships with
each of these other bodies individually,  future work could synthesize this359
scholarship into an institutional critique of the Federal Circuit. 
In any event, Federal Circuit hostility toward bottom-up patent reform
through trial-level expertise might explain why the recent mandamus decisions
have been directed at the Eastern District of Texas and the District of Delaware. 
As Mark Lemley has noted, these two districts stand out among districts with the
most patent cases because they are neither population nor technology centers. 
Rather, the Eastern District of Texas is simply a popular destination for patent
plaintiffs, and the District of Delaware is the state of incorporation for many
litigants.  360
Finally, it is impossible to ignore the interest that Chief Judge Rader
individually has taken in the Eastern District of Texas.  Not only has he publicly
expressed concern about the centralization of patent litigation in the Eastern
District,  he was the author of the order in TS Tech, the first Federal Circuit361
case to order transfer out of the Eastern District.   Moreover, in 2010, Chief362
Litigation, Speech at the Fifteenth Annual Eastern District of Texas Bench and Bar Conference
(Sept. 27, 2011), in 21 FED. CIR. B.J. 331, 341 (2012) (“[T]he best way for us to strengthen our
judicial system is to share and promote other venues.”).  
359. See, e.g., Stuart Minor Benjamin & Arti K. Rai, Who’s Afraid of the APA?  What the
Patent System Can Learn from Administrative Law, 95 GEO. L.J. 269, 272 (2007) (studying the
relationship between the Federal Circuit and the PTO); William C. Rooklidge & Mathew F. Weil,
Essay, Judicial Hyperactivity:  The Federal Circuit’s Discomfort with Its Appellate Role, 15
BERKELEY TECH. L.J. 725, 726 (2000) (studying the relationship between the Federal Circuit and
the district courts); Christopher G. Wilson, Note, Embedded Federal Questions, Exclusive
Jurisdiction, and Patent-Based Malpractice Claims, 51 WM. & MARY L. REV. 1237, 1239-40
(2009) (studying the relationship between the Federal Circuit and state courts). 
360. Lemley, supra note 244, at 407.  From 2000 to 2010, the Eastern District of Texas ranked
fourth among all judicial districts in the number of patent cases litigated, and the District of
Delaware ranked sixth.  Id. at 405-06 tbl.2.  The Central District of California ranked first, the
Northern District of California ranked second, the Northern District of Illinois ranked third, and the
Southern District of New York ranked fifth.  Id. 
361. See, e.g., Interview with Randall R. Rader, supra note 358.
362. In re TS Tech USA Corp., 551 F.3d 1315, 1317-18 (Fed. Cir. 2008).  Judge Rader also
wrote the order granting mandamus in In re Nintendo Co., 589 F.3d 1194 (Fed. Cir. 2009), and was
a member of the panel that issued a per curiam order granting mandamus in In re Morgan Stanley,
417 F. App’x 947 (Fed. Cir. 2011).  In addition, Judge Rader was a member of the first panel to
grant a mandamus petition seeking transfer from a district besides the Eastern District of Texas. 
See In re Link_A_Media Devices Corp., 662 F.3d 1221 (Fed. Cir. 2011) (per curiam).
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Judge Rader sat by designation in a number of Eastern District patent cases.  363
Although the judge said that his motivation was benign,  others have speculated364
that he was sending a message that the Eastern District is too favorable to patent
holders.365
There may, of course, be other factors animating the Federal Circuit’s recent
aggressiveness with the Eastern District of Texas.   But because these factors366
363. See Clearvalue, Inc. v. Pearl River Polymers, Inc., 704 F. Supp. 2d 584 (E.D. Tex. 2010);
IP Innovation LLC v. Red Hat, Inc., 705 F. Supp. 2d 692 (E.D. Tex. 2010); Performance Pricing,
Inc. v. Google, Inc., 704 F. Supp. 2d 577 (E.D. Tex. 2010); PA Advisors, LLC v. Google, Inc., 706
F. Supp. 2d 739 (E.D. Tex. 2010).
364. See Zusha Elinson, Big Tech Shouts ‘Yippee!,’ Patent Bar Chattering as Rader Heads
to Texas, CORPORATE COUNSEL, Mar. 15, 2010 (quoting Judge Rader:  “It’s a place of importance
in the patent world and as . . . incoming chief judge of the Federal Circuit, I wanted to make sure
that I understand the forces at play . . . . I want to work under their rules and understand the
pressures they deal with.”); see also George C. Beighley, Jr., The Court of Appeals for the Federal
Circuit:  Has It Fulfilled Congressional Expectations?, 21 FORDHAM INTELL. PROP. MEDIA & ENT.
L.J. 671, 727 (2011) (quoting Judge Rader praising the Eastern District’s judges for being
“‘conscientious in their application of patent law’”).
365. See Elinson, supra note 364 (discussing Judge Rader’s rulings favoring patent-
infringement defendants and suggesting that his presence spurred settlements in other cases). 
Federal Circuit Judge William Bryson has also been presiding over a small number of patent cases
in the Eastern District.  See Michael C. Smith, How Many Baylor Lawyers Does It Take to Swear
in a Federal Judge?, EDTEXWEBLOG.COM (Dec. 20, 2011, 6:19 PM), http://mcsmith.blogs.com/
eastern_district_of_texas/2011/12/how-many-baylor-lawyers-does-it-take-to-swear-in-a-federal-
judge.html.  Judge Bryson’s visit appears designed at least in part to assist the Eastern District in
processing the cases left behind by the retirement of Judge T. John Ward.  See John Council, Father
and Son Reunion, TEX. LAWYER (Oct. 24, 2011), http://www.law.com/jsp/tx/PubArticleFriendly
TX.jsp?id=1202519747336&slreturn=1.  This shortage of judges may be remedied with the recent
confirmation of Judge Rodney Gilstrap.  See Smith, supra.
366. For example, it is interesting to note that, when TS Tech was decided, proposals were
percolating in Congress to amend the venue statute for patent cases.  See, e.g., S. 515, 111th Cong.
§ 8 (2009).  These proposals were designed to limit the ability of patent holders to file infringement
suits in districts that have only a modest connection to the case, like the Eastern District of Texas
in some of the cases discussed in this Article.  The recently passed patent reform statute, however,
contains minimal revisions to the venue rules.  Cf. Leahy-Smith America Invents Act, Pub. L. No.
112-29, § 9(a), 125 Stat. 284, 316 (2011) (to be codified in scattered sections of 35 U.S.C.)
(changing venue for district court challenges to PTO decisions from the District of Columbia to the
Eastern District of Virginia).  The Federal Circuit’s decisions in TS Tech and its progeny might be
seen as a successful effort to forestall congressional meddling with the patent litigation system.  It
also fits a narrative of Federal Circuit hostility toward other entities’ efforts to shape patent law. 
See supra note 359 and accompanying text.  In fact, these venue cases are not the only recent
example of the Federal Circuit directly addressing an issue on which Congress was considering
passing legislation.  Compare, e.g., Lucent Techs., Inc. v. Gateway, Inc., 580 F.3d 1301, 1335 (Fed.
Cir. 2009) (reversing damages award of approximately $358 million as unsupported by substantial
evidence), with S. 515, 111th Cong. § 4 (2009) (requiring the court to specifically identify the
394 INDIANA LAW REVIEW [Vol. 45:343
are not discussed in the court’s orders, a debate about motives is apt to lapse into
speculation.  
2.  A New Theory of Mandamus.—As a theoretical matter, the Federal
Circuit’s aggressive review of the Eastern District’s mandamus decisions does
not fit neatly into the jurisdictional, supervisory, or advisory models of
mandamus discussed above.  Accordingly, I suggest that the Federal Circuit may
have created a new, anomalous model of mandamus that I call “supervisory plus”
mandamus.  It is “supervisory” in the sense that it is mandamus issued to correct
a significant, erroneous practice—the Eastern District’s repeated misapplication
of § 1404(a).  But it is supervisory “plus” because the Federal Circuit is doing
more than correcting one instance of the practice to send a message to the lower
court.  It is granting mandamus in every erroneous case it sees.
One example of the supervisory plus theory in action is the recent decision
in In re Verizon Business Network Services Inc.   In that case, the Eastern367
District had denied a motion to transfer an infringement suit to the Northern
District of Texas, emphasizing that the Eastern District had previously heard a
suit involving the same patent and, during the course of that suit, had construed
many of the patent’s claims.   On mandamus, the Federal Circuit used the writ368
for what seemed to be pure error correction.   With regard to the fairness and369
convenience factors, the court emphasized simply that the case was “in many
respects analogous to Volkswagen.”   In addition, the court distinguished370
Vistaprint on its facts, noting that, in the case at hand, there was no co-pending
litigation.   Rather, the prior litigation had concluded five years before the371
current case was filed.   Then, without any significant discussion of the372
extraordinary, unprecedented, or important nature of the case, the court granted
the writ, ordering the case transferred a mere 150 miles west, from Marshall to
Dallas.373
Not only is the court seemingly using mandamus for pure error correction,
it is also now granting relief by simply analogizing to its prior mandamus
decisions, even though transfer of venue is an issue supposedly controlled by
regional circuit law.  For example, in In re Morgan Stanley, the court ordered
transfer from the Eastern District of Texas to the Southern District of New
York.   The court pointed out that the plaintiff and twenty-seven of the forty-374
one defendants were “headquartered in or close by the transferee venue,” similar
to Acer, where the plaintiff and five of the twelve defendants were headquartered
methodologies or factors for calculating damages that are supported by the evidence), and Leahy-
Smith America Invents Act (containing no significant amendment to patent damages law).
367. 635 F.3d 559 (Fed. Cir. 2011).
368. Id. at 560-61.
369. See id. at 561-62.
370. Id. at 561.
371. Id. at 562.
372. Id. 
373. Id. at 561-62.  
374. In re Morgan Stanley, 417 F. App’x 947 (Fed. Cir. 2011) (per curiam).  
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in the transferee venue.   The court also rejected the plaintiff’s argument that,375
because half of the patents-in-suit had been asserted in a prior case in the Eastern
District, judicial economy favored denial of transfer.   The court analogized to376
Zimmer and Verizon, cases the court read to embrace the principle that “the
proper administration of justice may be to transfer to the far more convenient
venue even when the trial court has some familiarity with a matter from prior
litigation.”   Similar to Verizon, the court’s order of transfer based on analogy377
to prior Federal Circuit cases does not look like the grant of extraordinary relief
under Fifth Circuit law, but simple interlocutory error correction under Federal
Circuit law.  378
This novel, case-by-case approach to the interlocutory remedy of mandamus
is a dramatic reordering of appellate procedure.  Liberalizing the standards for
interlocutory relief can significantly undermine a trial court’s authority, as its
decisions are subject to immediate second-guessing on appeal.  Indeed, the
375. Id. at 948 (citing In re Acer Am. Corp., 626 F.3d 1252, 1254 (Fed. Cir. 2010)).  
376. See id. at 949.  
377. Id. (citing Verizon, 635 F.3d 559; In re Zimmer Holdings, Inc., 609 F.3d 1378 (Fed. Cir.
2010)).  
378. As in Morgan Stanley, in In re Biosearch Technologies, Inc., Misc. No. 995, 2011 WL
6445102, at *1 (Fed. Cir. Dec. 22, 2011), the Federal Circuit relied heavily on its own mandamus
case law and ordered transfer from the Eastern District of Texas to the Northern District of
California.  Id.  The court conceded that its prior mandamus decisions were only “persuasive
authority for transfer.”  Id. at *3.  But the court nevertheless emphasized that “[i]n analogous
situations, where an invention has no connection with Texas, we have determined that the asserted
geographical centrality of Texas did not outweigh the many aspects of convenience to the
defendant,” id. (citing In re Genentech, Inc., 566 F.3d 1338 (Fed. Cir. 2009)), and that “in cases
such as In re Nintendo Co., 589 F.3d 1194 (Fed. Cir. 2009) and In re Hoffmann-La Roche, 587
F.3d 1333 (Fed. Cir. 2009), this court ordered transfer from the plaintiff’s chosen Eastern Texas
forum, noting ‘a stark contrast in relevance, convenience, and fairness between the two venues,’”
id. (quoting Hoffmann-La Roche, 587 F.3d at 1336).  
The court has also invoked its own precedent to deny transfer on mandamus.  In In re Apple
Inc., Misc. No. 103, 2012 WL 112893, at *2 (Fed. Cir. Jan. 12, 2012), the court emphasized that
“measured against cases like Volkswagen, TS Tech, Genentech, and Acer, there [was] a plausible
argument that Apple,” the party seeking transfer, “did not meet its burden of demonstrating . . . that
the transferee venue [was] ‘clearly more convenient.’”  Id.  The court emphasized that, “[a]s
compared to those cases in which [it had] granted mandamus,” there were “fewer defendants in the
Northern District of California” (the proposed transferee district), “and potential evidence identified
in the Eastern District of Texas.”  Id.  In addition, in Apple, there were defendants and witnesses
that, in the court’s view, would “find it easier and more convenient to try th[e] case in the Eastern
District of Texas” than in the Northern District of California.  Id.  
These decisions, based largely on the Federal Circuit’s own case law, raise questions not only
about mandamus theory, they more broadly illustrate problems in applying the Federal Circuit’s
choice of law principles.  The court may have good reason to treat as the primary binding authority
its own prior mandamus decisions on transfer of venue in the specific context of patent litigation,
but under the current choice-of-law regime, it cannot do so.  
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limited data available suggests that litigants have begun to seek extraordinary
relief from the Federal Circuit far more frequently after TS Tech.  In the three
years before TS Tech, litigants filed with the Federal Circuit twenty-nine
petitions per year on average.   In the past two years, by contrast, the annual379
average has increased to 45.5, an increase of 56.9%.  380
One might expect that the court would justify its pathbreaking
approach—especially an approach that flouts a principle as venerable as the final
judgment rule—through considered and explicit discussions of the legal and
policy justifications for the new order.  Indeed, the relatively permissive standard
applied in recent mandamus decisions—fueled by the court’s reliance on its own
mandamus precedent—presents the possibility that the court, without critically
and transparently weighing the costs and benefits of its approach, may soon find
mandamus to be an acceptable means for interlocutory appeal of other significant
pre-trial rulings, such as claim construction orders.   Yet, remarkably, the381
379. These figures were obtained from the statistics maintained by the Federal Circuit and the
Administrative Office of the United States Courts (AO).  See Statistics:  Appeals Filed, Terminated,
and Pending, U.S. CT. APPEALS FED. CIRCUIT, http://www.cafc.uscourts.gov/the-court/statistics.
html (last visited Mar. 2, 2012).    
380. Id.  The jump in mandamus petitions filed in the Federal Circuit has been so dramatic
that, in his usually pro forma annual report, the director of the AO specifically noted that the
increase in petitions for writs of mandamus in the Federal Circuit was “related to petitions under
28 U.S.C. § 1404 to transfer patent cases out of the Eastern District of Texas.”  2010 AO REPORT,
supra note 263, at 18.  This swell of appellate mandamus petitions was foreseen by civil procedure
scholars who argued against transfer in the Fifth Circuit’s Volkswagen case.  See Brief of Civil
Procedure Law Professors as Amici Curiae in Support of Respondents at 19, In re Volkswagen of
Am., Inc., 545 F.3d 304 (5th Cir. 2008) (en banc) (No. 07-40058), 2008 WL 7789555 (“[T]he
Panel’s decision wrongly turns appellate courts into a defendant’s ally by making appellate
superintendence, by way of appeal or mandamus, a likely prospect following a trial judge’s decision
to deny transfer.”).
381. Given the Federal Circuit’s propensity to reverse district court claim construction orders
at a high rate, see Sichelman, supra note 246, at 1175 fig.1, and the importance of claim
construction orders to the determination of infringement, see Markman v. Westview Instruments,
Inc., 52 F.3d 967, 989 (Fed. Cir. 1995) (en banc) (Mayer, J., concurring) (“[T]o decide what the
claims mean is nearly always to decide the case.”), aff’d, 517 U.S. 370 (1996), Congress and some
commentators have proposed permitting more frequent pre-judgment appeals of those orders, see
S. 515, 111th Cong. § 8 (2009); Craig Allen Nard, Process Considerations in the Age of Markman
and Mantras, 2001 U. ILL. L. REV. 355, 372-77.  Some Federal Circuit judges have seemed willing
to allow interlocutory claim construction appeals, see Paul Michel, Judicial Constellations: 
Guiding Principles as Navigational Aids, 54 CASE W. RES. L. REV. 757, 765 (2004) (“[W]e have
never taken a position as an institution that we simply will not grant a . . . discretionary
interlocutory . . . appeal from a Markman ruling.  We might . . . . We will do so when we get a
convincing reason stated in the petition.”); Kathleen M. O’Malley et al., A Panel Discussion: 
Claim Construction from the Perspective of the District Judge, 54 CASE. W. RES. L. REV. 671, 685
(2004) (quoting now-Federal Circuit Judge O’Malley, speaking when she was a district judge: 
“[S]everal of us have attempted to convince the [Federal Circuit] to take interlocutory appeals of
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Federal Circuit has not explicitly addressed the broader implications of its
aggressive supervision of the Eastern District.  Nor has the Federal Circuit
considered any Federal-Circuit-specific or patent-litigation-specific constraints
on its decisions to order transfer of venue.  
Because the court has not acknowledged the context in which the cases arise,
the court seems to have overlooked that it might be overzealous in its
supervision.  Data compiled by Paul Janicke shows that in 2006 and 2007,
motions to transfer venue were filed in only 8.3% of Eastern District patent
cases,  suggesting that defendants do not view the Eastern District as382
particularly inhospitable.  One might argue in response that defendants simply
do not file transfer motions in the Eastern District because they have little hope
of succeeding.  But Janicke’s study also raises doubts about whether obtaining
transfer out of the Eastern District is as difficult as the conventional wisdom
suggests.  For example, Janicke shows that the Eastern District, even before TS
Tech, transferred roughly the same percentage of its patent cases as other district
courts.  383
In any event, the Federal Circuit’s analysis could better account for
circumstances that it is in a unique situation to understand because of its position
as the arbiter of almost all district court patent appeals nationwide.  And the
Federal Circuit could better explain the reasons for its sub silentio nullification
of the final judgment rule in venue cases from the Eastern District.
The Federal Circuit’s current model of supervisory plus mandamus is
problematic not only from a policy and theoretical perspective.  It is also rife
with doctrinal inconsistency, such as the varying standard for mandamus relief
discussed above.  Some of this inconsistency stems from the Federal Circuit’s
certain claim construction decisions—those that are really critical, that are case-dispositive and that
are done early in the decision making process.”), even though the court as a whole seems reluctant
to do so on a consistent basis, see Regents of the Univ. of Cal. v. Dakocytomation Cal., Inc., 517
F.3d 1364, 1371 (Fed. Cir. 2008) (granting permission for interlocutory appeal of claim
construction order, noting that “[w]hile we have not generally certified motions for interlocutory
appeal of claim construction, we determined that it was especially desirable in this case in view of
the pendency of [a] related appeal on the denial of the preliminary injunction based on some of the
same issues”).
382. Janicke, Patent Venue, supra note 259, at 23.  By comparison, in the Central District of
California (a district Janicke describes as “a notoriously poor district” for patent holders), transfer
motions were filed in 6.8% of cases.  Id.
383. Id. at 19-23; Janicke, Venue Transfers, supra note 259, at 16.  Nevertheless, one might
further argue that the Eastern District’s transfer rate should be much higher than the national
average because the Eastern District is likely not a convenient forum for many of the cases filed
there.  See Janicke, Patent Venue, supra note 259, at 22-23; Janicke, Venue Transfers, supra note
259, at 16 (showing that the Eastern District denies a higher percentage of transfer motions than
other leading patent districts).  That argument may hold sway.  But my point is merely that the
Eastern District’s transfer practice is not so clearly aberrational as to warrant supervisory plus
mandamus without a frank assessment of the normative justifications for displacement of the final
judgment rule. 
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obligation to apply the Fifth Circuit’s formalist transfer law.  But the Federal
Circuit has shown a willingness to apply its own law in mandamus cases, and the
court could use a review of its own case law as a platform for reexamining its
own role in the system of mandamus review.  More directly, the court could
modify or overrule its current choice-of-law regime and transparently treat its
own mandamus case law as binding.  This way, the court could restart its
mandamus law on a clean slate, and more directly engage the considerations that
determine whether mandamus is warranted in the specific context of transfer of
venue in patent litigation. 
In Innotron, the court attempted to take account of the court’s unique role in
the federal judiciary by adopting Federal-Circuit-specific limitations on the
writ.   The Innotron framework, however, was too restrictive.  It deprived the384
public of the many benefits of Federal Circuit mandamus on non-patent issues.  385
By limiting Federal Circuit mandamus to patent-related issues, as the CCPA had
done, the framework developed by the nascent Federal Circuit was not well-
suited to the court’s new role reviewing district court patent cases (as compared
with the CCPA’s role, which was to review only determinations of the PTO).  386
A reconceptualization would force the court to make sure that its mandamus
standard accounts for the realities of modern patent litigation and the Federal
Circuit’s unique role in the federal system.  Moreover, a bold statement regarding
Federal Circuit mandamus would provide clarity to litigants and to the regional
circuits, and would put Innotron to rest once and for all.  Finally, in the specific
context of transfer of venue, the court could make a clear, direct, and
comprehensive statement about when transfer should be granted, hopefully
reducing the need for case-by-case supervision of the Eastern District of Texas.
IV.  A NEW FRAMEWORK FOR FEDERAL CIRCUIT MANDAMUS
In this part, I consider what a reconceptualized version of Federal Circuit
mandamus would look like.  Setting aside for the moment any specific problems
with the Federal Circuit’s recent supervision of the Eastern District’s venue
decisions, I first argue that, as a normative matter, it is generally desirable for the
Federal Circuit to issue mandamus on non-patent issues that arise in patent cases. 
I then outline considerations that might limit this general proposition—restraints
the Federal Circuit might realize were it to stop skirting Innotron and asserting
mandamus authority on all issues raised in patent cases.  In outlining these
limiting considerations, I return to the Federal Circuit’s recent venue decisions
and show how this refined standard could be applied to maximize the didactic
function of mandamus while preserving district court autonomy and litigation
efficiency.
384. See In re Innotron Diagnostics, 800 F.2d 1077, 1080-84 (Fed. Cir. 1986).
385. See infra Part IV.A.
386. See Lefstin, supra note 135, at 868-69.
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A.  The Benefits of Federal Circuit Mandamus on Non-Patent Issues
There are clear benefits from a regime under which the Federal Circuit issues
mandamus on non-patent topics, such as transfer of venue.  These benefits are
obscured by the current state of the law, where Innotron remains on the books,
and the courts simply distinguish or, more frequently, ignore it.  I focus on four
benefits in particular in arguing that Federal Circuit mandamus on non-patent
issues is, in general, desirable.  As a practical matter, these benefits could be used
in arguing that the court should overrule Innotron once and for all.
1.  Jurisdictional Simplification.—By issuing mandamus on non-patent
issues, the Federal Circuit simplifies the jurisdictional inquiry on a mandamus
petition.  As noted, on appeal, the Federal Circuit has jurisdiction so long as the
district court’s jurisdiction was based in whole or in part on § 1338.   The court387
in Innotron was unclear about whether the limitation on Federal Circuit
mandamus was a limit on the court’s jurisdiction, a question of remedial power,
or a matter of discretion in resolving the merits of a mandamus petition.  388
Taking Innotron (for the moment) to articulate a purely jurisdictional limitation,
there would be a separate jurisdictional standard for mandamus petitions only,
one that is found nowhere in the Judicial Code.  The question is whether “the
patent jurisprudence of [the Federal Circuit] plays a significant role” in the
decision sought to be reviewed.   If that standard is not satisfied, the Federal389
Circuit has no mandamus jurisdiction, even if the court would have jurisdiction
on appeal.
This multi-track jurisdictional scheme is needlessly complex and
inefficient.    It is one thing to have a higher merits standard for obtaining the390
extraordinary, interlocutory relief of mandamus than to obtain error correction
on appeal.  The higher mandamus standard deters frivolous filings and promotes
an efficient adjudication process, while still allowing room to answer important
questions that regularly evade appellate review.  It is quite another thing to create
a standard that makes it difficult for litigants and courts to determine where a
mandamus petition should be filed.  Such a standard would lead to extensive
argument over the threshold question of the proper court to hear the petition. 
This argument will, in most instances, be quite wasteful because of the high
standard for obtaining mandamus relief on the merits.  The standard also
engenders delay—not only because the court will have to take time to examine
its jurisdiction, but also because cases would sometimes be transferred to or from
a regional circuit and rebriefed in the new court.
To be sure, parties sometimes fiercely litigate the question of whether an
387. 28 U.S.C. § 1295(a)(1) (2006).  
388. See Innotron, 800 F.2d at 1084. 
389. Id. 
390. Cf. Beatrice Foods Co. v. New Eng. Printing & Lithographing Co., 899 F.2d 1171, 1178
(Fed. Cir. 1990) (en banc) (Newman, J., concurring in the judgment) (arguing, based on
considerations of judicial economy, “that there should not be separate appellate routes depending
on the claims or issues of a case”).
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appeal should be heard in a regional circuit or the Federal Circuit.   But in the391
mine-run of patent infringement cases, it is clear that the district court’s
jurisdiction is based at least in part on § 1338, so there is no serious question of
appellate jurisdiction.   Conversely, when the jurisdictional inquiry is framed392
as whether the Federal Circuit’s patent jurisprudence plays a significant role, the
courts will have to engage in difficult line-drawing exercises that will, in turn,
introduce uncertainty into the law.   393
Innotron itself provides an example of difficult line-drawing.  The court
decided to entertain the mandamus petition in that case because it involved
severance of patent claims and patent-related antitrust claims for trial.   Yet the394
court just as easily could have emphasized that the question of severance arises
under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 42(b), which applies to all types of civil
claims, patent or not, and thus falls within Innotron’s unreviewable category (2): 
issues that arise in all types of cases and do not directly implicate patent law.  395
The court also could have emphasized that a key consideration in construing Rule
42(b) is judicial economy—the minimization of expense and delay.   It could396
have reasoned that the regional circuit has a much better sense of docket
congestion in the district courts in its circuit than the Federal Circuit does, so
review of severance decisions is more akin to an administrative matter—properly
reviewable in the regional circuit only.  If, however, the court had simply held
that it had mandamus jurisdiction because it had appellate jurisdiction, this line-
drawing problem would not have arisen.
Adoption of the appellate-jurisdiction standard for mandamus petitions does
not eliminate controversy about Federal Circuit jurisdiction.  But uniting the
Federal Circuit’s mandamus and appellate jurisdiction standards at least reduces
391. See, for example, Christianson v. Colt Industries Operating Corp., 486 U.S. 800, 806-07
(1988), in which an appeal was transferred from the Federal Circuit to the Seventh Circuit and then
back to the Federal Circuit, with each court claiming that it lacked jurisdiction.  The Supreme
Court, on certiorari to the Federal Circuit, ordered the case transferred back to the Seventh Circuit. 
Id. at 819.   
392. See Christopher A. Cotropia, “Arising Under” Jurisdiction and Uniformity in Patent
Law, 9 MICH. TELECOMM. & TECH. L. REV. 253, 275-76 (2003).
393. Cf. Ted L. Field, Improving the Federal Circuit’s Approach to Choice of Law for
Procedural Matters in Patent Cases, 16 GEO. MASON L. REV. 643, 677-78 (2009) (noting the
importance of legal uniformity and predictability in the Federal Circuit’s achievement of Congress’s
aims in creating the court).  The difficulties in defining jurisdictional limits by the subject matter
of the case involved are well documented.  See, e.g., Charles W. Adams, The Court of Appeals for
the Federal Circuit:  More than a National Patent Court, 49 MO. L. REV. 43, 68 (1984)
(“[D]efining a court’s jurisdiction in terms of subject matter can lead to wasteful litigation over
jurisdictional limits, splitting single disputes between two or more courts, and conflicts with courts
of overlapping jurisdiction.”).
394. Innotron, 800 F.2d at 1083-84.
395. Id. at 1082.
396. See FED. R. CIV. P. 42(b) (permitting severance “[f]or convenience, to avoid prejudice,
or to expedite and economize”); 9A WRIGHT ET AL., supra note 6, § 2388.
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uncertainty and the possibility for manipulation through framing choices made
by the court and the parties.397
2.  Elimination of Forum Shopping by Preventing Bifurcated Appeals.—In
creating the Federal Circuit, Congress sought to reduce forum shopping by
restoring uniformity to the patent laws.   Federal Circuit mandamus on non-398
patent issues reduces the incentive to forum shop among district courts in
different regional circuits.
Under a standard limiting Federal Circuit mandamus to issues implicating the
court’s patent jurisprudence, the range of issues considered on mandamus would
be narrower than on appeal.  On appeal, the Federal Circuit can decide every
issue in an entire district court case, including non-patent law issues.   On399
mandamus, however, interlocutory rulings on non-patent law issues would be
reviewable only in a regional circuit, if anywhere.   This bifurcated appeal400
process (in which an issue is decided by a regional circuit on mandamus, but by
the Federal Circuit on a post-judgment appeal), would provide an incentive for
a plaintiff to choose a district court in a regional circuit with a more favorable
view on an issue reviewable via mandamus, such as transfer of venue.  Thus,
through the vehicle of mandamus, a litigant preferring to have the regional circuit
decide a particular non-patent question could actually obtain review in a favored
appellate forum by filing a mandamus petition, even if that question would be
reviewable by the Federal Circuit on appeal from final judgment.
In addition to promoting forum shopping, a system of bifurcated review
would encourage litigants to file more mandamus petitions.  The denial of
mandamus does not have law-of-the-case effect when the case is ultimately
appealed.   So, under a bifurcated system, a dissatisfied litigant could have an401
issue reviewed by two different courts at two different times:  first, in the
regional circuit on mandamus, and second, on appeal in the Federal Circuit.
397. Cf. Rochelle Cooper Dreyfuss, The Federal Circuit:  A Case Study in Specialized Courts,
64 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1, 59 (1989) (“The rule requiring the [Federal Circuit] to defer to regional law
in nonpatent substantive areas does not work well:  the line between patent and nonpatent issues
is often illusory . . . .”); Field, supra note 393, at 652 (arguing that the Federal Circuit can choose
either its own law or regional circuit law, whichever it prefers, “depending upon whether it defines
the issue broadly or narrowly”).
398. See S. REP. NO. 97-275, at 5 (1981); see also United States v. Hohri, 482 U.S. 64, 71-72
(1987); Atari, Inc. v. JS & A Grp., Inc., 747 F.2d 1422, 1435 (Fed. Cir. 1984) (en banc), overruled
on other grounds by Nobelpharma AB v. Implant Innovations, Inc., 141 F.3d 1059, 1068 & n.5
(Fed. Cir. 1998) (en banc in relevant part).
399. See Atari, 747 F.2d at 1433 (“In creating this court’s jurisdiction, Congress had presented
to it two choices:  (a) granting this court appellate jurisdiction over only the patent issues in a case
(‘issue’ jurisdiction); or (b) granting this court appellate jurisdiction over the entire case (‘arising
under’ jurisdiction).  Congress specifically and unequivocally rejected the former and chose the
latter.” (footnote omitted)).
400. See Innotron, 800 F.2d at 1084 n.13.
401. See Kennedy v. Lubar, 273 F.3d 1293, 1299 (10th Cir. 2001).
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3.  Valuable Doctrinal Guidance.—In addition, there are valuable doctrinal
benefits from a regime in which the Federal Circuit issues mandamus on the
same spectrum of issues it considers on appeal.  This regime provides the Federal
Circuit with more opportunities to rule on issues frequently arising in patent
litigation, but not easily remedied on appeal.  Questions of attorney-client
privilege and change of venue are prime examples of issues that are practically
impossible to remedy on appeal (because if they are erroneously decided they
will likely be an unreversable harmless error)  but that can effectively be402
reviewed on mandamus.   403
Rochelle Cooper Dreyfuss has argued that the Federal Circuit’s insistence on
applying regional circuit law to non-patent issues deprives the public of the
court’s valuable expertise on issues that, while not formally issues of patent law,
the Federal Circuit likely has something useful to say.   A similar argument404
applies in the mandamus context.  The Federal Circuit has extensive experience
with issues of non-patent law, particularly procedural issues, that arise in patent
cases and that might be reviewed on mandamus.  If these issues were decided by
the regional circuits (or by no court), as would be the case under Innotron, lower
courts, litigants, and the public would be deprived of the Federal Circuit’s input. 
The Federal Circuit, for example, is particularly well-versed in confidentiality
and protective-order issues that arise in patent litigation,  as well as attorney-405
client privilege issues that are not necessarily unique to patent law.   Even406
though the Federal Circuit might formally apply regional circuit law to these
issues, precedential Federal Circuit orders would provide valuable doctrinal
guidance about how the issues should be resolved in the context of patent
litigation.  
4.  Avoidance of Specialization.—A final benefit of Federal Circuit
mandamus on non-patent issues is that it might help the court avoid potential
problems arising from judicial specialization, such as interest-group capture,
“tunnel vision” (i.e., losing sight of basic values at stake and instead developing
arcane and intricate doctrine), a lack of prestige of the judicial positions, a lack
of deference to trial judges, and a lack of incentive to fully and clearly express
legal reasoning.   The large number of lower tribunals reviewed by the Federal407
402. See In re Nat’l Presto Indus., Inc., 347 F.3d 662, 663 (7th Cir. 2003).
403. See, e.g., In re Seagate Tech., LLC, 497 F.3d 1360, 1366-67 (Fed. Cir. 2007) (en banc)
(reviewing via mandamus issues of attorney-client privilege and work product protection).
404. See Dreyfuss, supra note 397, at 59.
405. See, e.g., In re Jenoptik AG, 109 F.3d 721, 723 (Fed. Cir. 1997) (applying Ninth Circuit
law to confidentiality issue).
406. See, e.g., In re Pioneer Hi-Bred Int’l, Inc., 238 F.3d 1370, 1374 (Fed. Cir. 2001)
(applying Eighth Circuit law to privilege issue).
407. See CARRINGTON ET AL., supra note 232, at 168; Comm’n on Revision of the Fed. Court
Appellate Sys., Structure and Internal Procedures:  Recommendations for Change, 67 F.R.D. 195,
234-35 (1975).  Congress recognized these potential dangers when creating the Federal Circuit. 
See H.R. REP. NO. 97-312, at 19-23 (1981); S. REP. NO. 97-275, at 6 (1981).
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Circuit would seemingly help alleviate specialization problems.   Yet some still408
believe the Federal Circuit has fallen prey to the pitfalls of specialized courts.  409
By considering non-patent issues on mandamus, the Federal Circuit broadens the
subject matter of issues it decides and varies the procedural posture in which it
makes those decisions.  The court’s mandamus jurisprudence then develops not
in a patent-focused tunnel, but with a broader sense of where the decisions fit in
the legal landscape.
B.  A More Refined Standard
I have argued that there are significant benefits from Federal Circuit
mandamus on non-patent issues.  These benefits, however, do not necessarily
mean that the proper standard for mandamus in the Federal Circuit is to grant
mandamus in every single case that a regional circuit would.  Rather, the court
should use the discretion inherent in mandamus adjudication to develop a
standard that accounts for the court’s unique role in the federal system.  
In describing a Federal Circuit-specific framework, I begin with the basic
premise that significant errors appropriate for mandamus relief (based on the
substantive criteria for granting the writ) should not go uncorrected solely
because an appeal lies to the Federal Circuit and not a regional circuit.  Congress
intended the Federal Circuit to have equal status with its sister circuits,  so the410
court should, in general, have the same remedial powers as those courts.   The411
primary differences between the Federal Circuit and its sister circuits are (1) the
Federal Circuit’s choice-of-law regime, under which it applies regional circuit
law to non-patent issues and procedural issues not unique to patent law, and (2)
the Federal Circuit’s jurisdictional structure, which is nationwide in geographic
scope, but limited in subject matter to cases arising under the patent laws.  Any
408. See John M. Golden, The Supreme Court as “Prime Percolator”:  A Prescription for
Appellate Review of Questions in Patent Law, 56 UCLA L. REV. 657, 666, 675 (2009).
409. See Arti K. Rai, Engaging Facts and Policy:  A Multi-Institutional Approach to Patent
System Reform, 103 COLUM. L. REV. 1035, 1110 (2003); see also Holmes Grp., Inc. v. Vornado Air
Circulation Sys., Inc., 535 U.S. 826, 839 (2002) (Stevens, J., concurring in part and concurring in
the judgment) (“[O]ccasional decisions by courts with broader jurisdiction will provide an antidote
to the risk that the specialized court may develop an institutional bias.”).  Without offering a final
judgment on this issue, I have suggested elsewhere that the mix of cases within the Federal Circuit’s
jurisdiction may not be ideal.  See Gugliuzza, supra note 30 (manuscript at 29-61).
410. See S. REP. NO. 97-275, at 2-3 (noting that the Federal Circuit “is on line with other
Federal courts of appeals that is, it is not a new tier in the judicial structure”); In re Roberts, 846
F.2d 1360, 1362 (Fed. Cir. 1988) (en banc) (“This court is a co-equal member of a system of
thirteen appellate courts arranged in a single tier.”).
411. See Beatrice Foods Co. v. New Eng. Printing & Lithographing Co., 899 F.2d 1171, 1179
(Fed. Cir. 1990) (en banc) (Newman, J., concurring in the judgment) (“I think it unlikely that the
Federal Circuit was intended to have less authority under 28 U.S.C. § 2106 [which provides federal
appellate courts with their general remedial authority] than did the courts that received patent
appeals before our formation.”).
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Federal Circuit-specific considerations on mandamus review should flow from
these unique characteristics. 
I organize my discussion of these considerations around the separate (but
sometimes overlapping) theories of mandamus.  I first briefly discuss how the
Federal Circuit should make full use of mandamus for its traditional,
“jurisdictional” purposes.  I then contemplate Federal Circuit-specific limitations
on mandamus when the court uses the writ for advisory, supervisory, or
supervisory plus purposes. 
1.  Jurisdictional Mandamus Consistent with § 1338.—As noted, the
traditional role of appellate mandamus was to restrain a court from acting without
authority and to compel a court to exercise authority with which it had been
vested.   Similarly, perhaps the least controversial use of appellate mandamus412
under the All Writs Act is to ensure that a lower court action does not prevent an
appeal—mandamus that is truly “in aid of” the appellate court’s jurisdiction.  413
The Federal Circuit has regularly used mandamus for these “jurisdictional”
functions when a district court’s jurisdiction is based on § 1338.   The CCPA,414
likewise, would issue mandamus to set aside rulings obstructing an appeal to the
CCPA.   415
It is hard to see any reason why the Federal Circuit should not continue this
practice.  The use of mandamus to compel or restrain the acts of a lower court
traces its roots to common law practice and serves the valuable function of
ensuring that lower federal courts exercise the power given to them by Congress,
nothing more and nothing less.  The use of mandamus to ensure that district
courts do not prevent an appeal to the Federal Circuit is similarly well-grounded. 
Where Congress has provided a right to appeal (as it has done for patent cases in
§ 1295), district courts should not be permitted to nullify that right through
erroneous rulings.
2.  Advisory Mandamus on Issues Intertwined with Patent Law.—An
important purpose of this Article has been to critique the Federal Circuit’s use
of supervisory mandamus, that is, mandamus issued to correct an egregious
district court error that is likely to recur.  Yet the Federal Circuit, like the other
courts of appeals, also issues advisory mandamus, that is, mandamus issued to
answer important, unresolved legal questions.  Before outlining a
reconceptualized model of supervisory mandamus in the Federal Circuit, it is
worthwhile to consider how the court’s standards for advisory mandamus might
also be clarified. 
412. See supra Part I.A.
413. See McClellan v. Carland, 217 U.S. 268, 280 (1910) (“[W]here a case is within the
appellate jurisdiction of the higher court, a writ of mandamus may issue in aid of the appellate
jurisdiction which might otherwise be defeated by the unauthorized action of the court below.”).
414. See, e.g., In re Cont’l Gen. Tire, Inc., 81 F.3d 1089, 1090 (Fed. Cir. 1996) (vacating order
compelling alleged infringer to file a reexamination request with the PTO); In re Snap-On Tools
Corp., 720 F.2d 654, 655 (Fed. Cir.) (granting mandamus to compel removal from state court to
federal court), order amended by 735 F.2d 476 (Fed. Cir. 1983).
415. See Margolis v. Banner, 599 F.2d 435, 443 (C.C.P.A. 1979).
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The object of advisory mandamus is to answer questions of law that cannot
await or regularly evade appellate review.   Thus, the Federal Circuit’s choice-416
of-law rules are key to determining the optimal scope of advisory mandamus.  On
most non-patent questions, the Federal Circuit applies regional circuit law.  417
Because the Federal Circuit cannot definitively say what regional circuit law is,
the court should be hesitant to issue advisory mandamus on questions of regional
circuit law.  This is especially true when the issue is completely unrelated to
patent law, such as a purely procedural issue the regional circuit has simply not
resolved.  The Federal Circuit could of course provide some advisory guidance
to the parties and the public on such a question, at least until the pertinent
regional circuit decides the question.  But the Federal Circuit’s inability to
definitively resolve the question substantially reduces the benefits of the
disruptive interlocutory appeal without reducing its costs. 
On the other hand, when the issue of regional circuit law is intertwined with
the patent law, such as a question of how the attorney-client privilege applies in
a patent-specific context, the benefits of the decision increase for two reasons. 
First, the Federal Circuit may be able to provide guidance that cannot be obtained
elsewhere.  Because the regional circuits now decide few patent cases, the
Federal Circuit is practically the only court that can provide advice on issues of
regional circuit law as they arise in patent litigation, such as disputes over the
designation and disclosure of confidential technical documents.  Second, and
relatedly, a regional circuit is less likely to overrule the Federal Circuit’s advice
on an issue of regional circuit law as it applies in patent litigation.  The court may
not be presented with a patent case providing the opportunity to overrule the
Federal Circuit, and even if it were, the regional circuit might defer to the Federal
Circuit’s expertise regarding patent litigation.
To be sure, there is no way to clearly define the class of issues that are
intertwined with patent law.  But the broader point is to focus the court on the
costs and benefits of interlocutory review.  Mandamus might not be justified on
an issue of regional circuit law that is in no way a consequence of the patent
claims in the case.  The Federal Circuit’s decision would provide no definitive
guidance and could easily be overruled by the regional circuit.  By contrast, when
an issue is a direct consequence of the patent claims in the case, the Federal
Circuit can provide useful guidance that might outweigh the costs of a disruptive
interlocutory appeal.
On questions of pure patent law, the optimal standard for Federal Circuit
advisory mandamus is clearer.  With the exception of the U.S. Supreme Court,
the Federal Circuit is the final judicial arbiter of questions of patent law. 
Accordingly, the Federal Circuit should issue advisory mandamus on important,
unresolved issues of patent law that cannot effectively be reviewed on a post-
judgment appeal, a normative recommendation that seems to accord with the
416. See supra text accompanying notes 99-110.
417. See Panduit Corp. v. All States Plastic Mfg. Co., 744 F.2d 1564, 1574-75 (Fed. Cir.
1984) (per curiam).
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court’s current practice.   The difficult consideration here is defining which418
questions are worthy of interlocutory review.  The Federal Circuit has only
briefly alluded to the factors it considers in deciding to issue advisory mandamus. 
But a reconceptualization of mandamus standards would permit a fuller
discussion. 
A framework for Federal Circuit advisory mandamus should be stringent
enough to deter petitions that are frivolous or filed only as a delay tactic.  Yet it
should preserve mandamus as an option in cases where the benefits of
interlocutory review outweigh the substantial costs of disruption to the trial
process.  Drawing in part from factors considered important in cases decided by
both the Federal Circuit and other courts, a framework for advisory mandamus
in the Federal Circuit should impose the following requirements:
(1) The question presented should be governed by Federal Circuit law
or intertwined with the patent law.
(2) The question presented should be one of first impression.  If not, the
court should hear the petition only if it intends to reconsider its prior
decision.  419
(3) The issue should be likely to recur absent a definitive decision.420
(4) The question presented should regularly evade review.   A421
petitioner can satisfy this requirement by showing that the alleged
error would likely be held harmless on a post-judgment appeal and
is thus unlikely to be raised by a savvy appellant.422
(5) The petitioner should face a threat of immediate irreparable harm if
the error is not corrected before appeal.  This immediate irreparable
harm should be something more than the fact that the error might be
held harmless on appeal.  Disclosure of documents protected by
attorney-client privilege is a clear example of an immediate
irreparable injury,  as is the disqualification of trial counsel,  and423 424
other examples may exist.
(6) The question presented should be important; district courts, litigants,
and the public should derive significant guidance from its
resolution.   A prime indicator for a question’s importance, and the425
quantum of guidance that its resolution would provide, is the scope
418. See, e.g., In re Deutsche Bank Trust Co. Ams., 605 F.3d 1373 (Fed. Cir. 2010) (patent-
prosecution bar); In re Seagate Tech., LLC, 497 F.3d 1360 (Fed. Cir. 2007) (en banc) (attorney-
client privilege).
419. See, e.g., Seagate, 497 F.3d at 1367.
420. See United States v. Horn, 29 F.3d 754, 769-70 (1st Cir. 1994) (Selya, J.).
421. See id. at 770.
422. See 28 U.S.C. § 2111 (2006).
423. See In re Regents of the Univ. of Cal., 101 F.3d 1386, 1387-88 (Fed. Cir. 1996).
424. See In re Shared Memory Graphics LLC, 659 F.3d 1336, 1340 (Fed. Cir. 2011).
425. In re Bushkin Assocs., Inc., 864 F.2d 241, 247 (1st Cir. 1989) (Selya, J.).
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of disagreement among the lower courts.426
An explicit discussion of these principles, which I have mostly synthesized
from existing case law, would spur the court to consider the costs and benefits
of an interlocutory decision on mandamus.  Of course, it is not necessary for the
Federal Circuit to adopt this six-element framework to conduct a thorough
analysis of whether advisory mandamus is appropriate.  And, because the lines
between advisory and supervisory mandamus sometimes blur, the considerations
I have outlined can be useful guideposts in deciding a wide array of mandamus
petitions.  Indeed, most of these elements would be useful to any appellate court
refining the proper scope of mandamus, not just the Federal Circuit.  My point
is only that, if the Federal Circuit were to consciously reassess the role of
mandamus, it could elaborate on specific considerations (such as the six I have
outlined) that illuminate the costs and benefits of allowing a disruptive
interlocutory appeal on an important, unsettled question of law. 
3.  Insightful and Didactic Supervisory Mandamus on Non-Patent
Questions.—Returning specifically to supervisory mandamus, it is this use of the
writ that has engendered the most confusion in the Federal Circuit, as shown by
the courts’ retreat from Innotron.  If the Federal Circuit confronted Innotron and
critically examined its own supervisory power, it might realize certain, limiting
principles that could add significant coherence to the court’s mandamus
framework. 
One possible limiting principle flows from the Federal Circuit’s recent
supervision of the transfer decisions of the Eastern District of Texas.  Typically,
courts use supervisory mandamus to fix one instance of an erroneous district
court practice and to send a message that the practice is improper.   But, with427
the Eastern District of Texas, the Federal Circuit seems to have lost sight of the
extraordinary nature of mandamus, granting the writ in ten similar cases.  
This possible overuse of the writ is particularly problematic in the Federal
Circuit.  Because of the Federal Circuit’s nationwide geographic jurisdiction, the
court could provide significant guidance to all district courts through a judicious
use of the writ.  The Federal Circuit arguably dilutes the didactic message when
it uses mandamus as what appears to be an error correction device, a perception
that is exacerbated when the Federal Circuit grants mandamus by simply
analogizing to its own case law on a matter that is supposedly governed by
regional circuit law.  One Federal Circuit case granting mandamus may be a
teaching moment for district courts.  For example, the Federal Circuit has made
attention-getting statements in mandamus petitions dealing with attorney-client
426. See In re BP Lubricants USA Inc., 637 F.3d 1307, 1310, 1313 (Fed. Cir. 2011) (holding
that false marking claims must be pled with particularity, noting that this was a “question . . . of first
impression” about which “trial courts have been in considerable disagreement”); In re Deutsche
Bank Trust Co. Ams., 605 F.3d 1373, 1375 (Fed. Cir. 2010) (granting mandamus on “an important
issue of first impression in which courts have disagreed”).
427. See supra text accompanying notes 88-98.
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privilege issues,  patent-prosecution bars,  and false marking claims.   Ten428 429 430
similar, fact-specific mandamus cases, however, may be too much to draw a
district court’s attention to the Federal Circuit’s specific concerns. 
The dilutive effect of this “supervisory plus” mandamus might be further
enhanced in the Federal Circuit, which, as compared to the regional circuits, has
fewer opportunities to informally reinforce the teaching points of its mandamus
cases.  Commentators have recognized the importance of informal interactions
to supervisory mandamus, noting that “a petition for writ of mandamus may
provoke one or more court[] of appeals judges to contact the district judge and
informally suggest that he or she take steps to correct a problem.”   While431
district judges regularly interact with their regional circuit judges outside of the
adjudicative process (in circuit judicial conferences and on circuit judicial
councils, for example), similar interaction with Federal Circuit judges
historically has been rarer.   Thus, when issuing mandamus on issues of432
regional circuit law, the court should be very mindful of the writ’s extraordinary
character and use the writ carefully.  This ensures that in the exceptional case
when the writ does issue, district courts nationwide pay full attention to the
guidance the Federal Circuit provides. 
A counterargument to this point is that a small number of district courts, like
the Eastern District of Texas, handle much, if not most, of the patent litigation
in the United States.  Those courts might understand the relevance of the Federal
Circuit’s pronouncements on important issues, even if the Federal Circuit is using
mandamus so frequently as to make a mere footnote of the writ’s extraordinary
character.  Moreover, the Federal Circuit’s pronouncements might not be relevant
to district courts that handle almost no patent cases.  In short, it might not matter
how the Federal Circuit is addressing the flaws it sees in certain courts’ treatment
of patent cases.  The courts to which the Federal Circuit’s decisions are relevant
428. See, e.g., In re Seagate Tech., LLC, 497 F.3d 1360, 1367 (Fed. Cir. 2007) (en banc); In
re Spalding Sports Worldwide, Inc., 203 F.3d 800, 804 (Fed. Cir. 2000).
429. See Deutsche Bank, 605 F.3d at 1376.  
430. See BP Lubricants, 637 F.3d at 1310-12.  
431. TIGAR & TIGAR, supra note 3, at 193.  While the authors concede that “[t]here is only
anecdotal evidence on the prevalence of this ‘informal mandamus jurisprudence’” they note that
“it is frequently discussed at judicial conferences.”  Id. at 193-94.  
432. Unlike in the regional circuits, district judges are not heavily involved in the Federal
Circuit’s judicial conference, see CAFC Judicial Conference, PATENT DOCS. (Apr. 9, 2010),
http://www.patentdocs.org/2010/04/cafc-judicial-conference.html, and the Federal Circuit has no
judicial council.  That said, Chief Judge Rader’s recent stint as a visiting judge in the Eastern
District of Texas surely provided some opportunity for informal discussion.  See supra notes 363-65
and accompanying text.  Additionally, district judges who frequently hear patent cases, such as the
judges of the Eastern District, have begun in recent years to sit by designation with the Federal
Circuit.  See U.S. Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit:  Visiting Judges, U.S. CT. APPEALS FED.
CIRCUIT, http://www.cafc.uscourts.gov/images/stories/announcements/VJ_Chart_for_Website_8.
pdf (last visited Mar. 2, 2012) (providing list of visiting judges who have sat with the Federal
Circuit).
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will invariably pay attention, and those that care little about patent cases will not. 
But the simple fact that courts with patent-heavy dockets will likely pay more
attention to the Federal Circuit should not excuse the Federal Circuit from
maximizing the didactic function of mandamus.  Even if the sheer quantity of
mandamus petitions granted does not affect the writ’s teaching function, the court
could still better identify the issues on which supervisory mandamus is needed
to teach a clear lesson to the district courts.  One guide for the Federal Circuit
could be to ensure that the writ issues only when it will effect real change in a
district court’s practice.  In the Eastern District’s venue cases, for example, some
empirical evidence suggests that, contrary to conventional wisdom, the Eastern
District transferred a proportion of its patent cases comparable to other judicial
districts.   Consequently, special oversight of the court’s venue decisions might433
not have been needed.  434
By contrast, in other situations, the Federal Circuit’s intimate familiarity with
patent litigation and its major players might allow the court to see a need for
supervision that other courts might miss.  For example, in Zimmer and Microsoft,
the court correctly identified the plaintiffs’ attempts to manipulate venue.  435
Because the Federal Circuit is uniquely aware of the tactics employed by serial
patent litigants (such as non-practicing entities and their counsel), it was not
fooled by the plaintiff’s establishment of an “office” in Texas  or pre-suit436
incorporation in the state.   Moreover, the court used appropriately aggressive437
language in making clear that plaintiffs may not game the system to establish
venue.   This language sends a clear message to courts about when transfer438
should be granted in future cases—exactly what supervisory mandamus is
supposed to do.  Similarly, in Vistaprint, the court drew upon its understanding
of the technological complexity of patent litigation to ensure that a patent case
remained before a court that was familiar with the technology at issue.439
By considering whether its supervision can meaningfully impact a district
court’s practice, send a clear teaching message, provide unique insight into the
433. See Janicke, Patent Venue, supra note 259, at 20-21.
434. To be sure, the data also suggests that the Eastern District denied a higher percentage of
transfer motions than other leading patent districts.  See id. at 22-23.  But, for mandamus purposes,
what the data shows is that the Eastern District was not so blatantly flouting the law of § 1404(a)
as to unquestionably warrant supervisory plus mandamus.  
435. In re Microsoft Corp., 630 F.3d 1361, 1365 (Fed. Cir. 2011) (per curiam); In re Zimmer
Holdings, Inc., 609 F.3d 1378, 1381-82 (Fed. Cir. 2010).
436. Zimmer, 609 F.3d at 1381-82.
437. Microsoft, 630 F.3d at 1365.  
438. See id. at 1364 (rejecting the plaintiff’s argument against transfer as “rest[ing] on a
fallacious assumption:  that this court must honor connections to a preferred forum made in
anticipation of litigation and for the likely purpose of making that forum appear convenient”);
Zimmer, 609 F.3d at 1381 (“This is a classic case where the plaintiff is attempting to game the
system by artificially seeking to establish venue by sharing office space with another of the trial
counsel’s clients.”). 
439. In re Vistaprint, Ltd., 628 F.3d 1342, 1346-47 (Fed. Cir. 2010).
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facts on the ground, or better account for the realities of patent litigation, the
Federal Circuit can better identify the cases that warrant the extraordinary
remedy of mandamus.  The end result of this inquiry may be that the Federal
Circuit issues mandamus in fewer venue cases from the Eastern District, where
aggressive supervision might be unnecessary, but is more alert to jurisdictional
tricks employed by litigants in venues that are vying to replace the Eastern
District as the hotbed for patent litigation, such as the Western District of
Wisconsin.   The court might also use broader and more aggressive language440
to make the standards for mandamus and for transfer of venue as clear as
possible, in an effort to reduce the need for case-by-case supervision of the
Eastern District.
In sum, the Federal Circuit’s singular nature suggests that the mandamus
standards that work for the regional circuits will not necessarily work for the
Federal Circuit.  A common criticism of the Federal Circuit is that it refuses to
engage broader policy concerns in its decisions, and instead develops a
formalistic, context-insensitive jurisprudence that inhibits the development of
“optimal rules.”   If the Federal Circuit were to confront Innotron and the441
reasoning behind it, rather than distinguishing, downplaying, or ignoring the
case, the court could develop a more refined mandamus framework that accounts
for its choice-of-law constraints, its sui generis jurisdictional structure, and its
superior understanding of the realities of patent litigation.  
CONCLUSION
Federal Circuit mandamus is at a critical juncture.  It has been over twenty
years since the court, in Innotron, last examined the role of Federal Circuit
mandamus in the federal scheme for resolving patent disputes.  Because the court
has not engaged in any introspection, it has drifted toward a standard under
which it will consider any issue of regional circuit law on mandamus, so long as
the underlying case would ultimately be appealed to the Federal Circuit.  That
standard might work for the regional circuits, which are almost always applying
their own circuit’s law and reviewing a narrow group of district judges with
whom they frequently interact.  The Federal Circuit, however, with its uniquely
broad geographic jurisdiction and uniquely narrow subject-matter jurisdiction,
might require a more refined standard.  
The repeated issuance of mandamus to the Eastern District of Texas does not
reflect any effort to account for the Federal Circuit’s uniqueness.  Instead, it
resembles interlocutory error correction under Federal Circuit law, a model of
440. Cf. In re Affymetrix, Inc., Misc. No. 913, 2010 WL 1525010, at *1-2 (Fed. Cir. Apr. 13,
2010) (denying mandamus petition that sought transfer from the Western District of Wisconsin to
the Northern District of California, even though the defendant’s employee-witnesses, all six third-
party witnesses, the development and marketing documents, and the accused product itself, were
located in California).
441. E.g., Rochelle Cooper Dreyfuss, The Federal Circuit as an Institution:  What Ought We
to Expect?, 43 LOY. L.A. L. REV. 827, 833-34 (2010).
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mandamus that this Article has termed “supervisory plus” mandamus.  The court
could certainly fix the shortcomings of its mandamus doctrine and practice.  It
should begin from the premise that Federal Circuit mandamus on non-patent
issues is, in general, useful and efficient.  The court should be fully aware of the
need to use the writ judiciously, and could preserve its didactic function by
reserving the writ for situations where, as judged from the Federal Circuit’s
unique position as appellate forum for nearly all patent cases, serious change is
needed in a district court’s practice.  This approach would recognize that the
Federal Circuit is a federal appellate court like no other, while also ensuring that
mandamus remains an option in those extraordinary situations in which the
benefits of immediate review outweigh its substantial costs.
